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preface
To say that capital is social is not at all the same thing as saying 
that the social is capital.
(With due acknowledgement to the Mad hatter and the March hare.)
The story is told (it is almost certainly false) that Queen Victoria 
was so taken by Alice	in	Wonderland that she requested its author, 
Lewis Carroll (aka Charles Dodgson, a lecturer in mathematics at 
Christ Church, Oxford), to send her a copy of his next published 
work. She duly received An	Elementary	Treatise	on	Determinants. 
Now the divide between fantasy and mathematics is not so great 
that it cannot be bridged by a single individual. But social science 
and social theory have become marked by a number of less easily 
bridged divides – not least those of methodology, method and 
subject matter. This is so much so that it is relatively rare for a 
topic to find a presence across all disciplines and, even where 
there are exceptions, the topics concerned tend to be treated and 
understood in entirely different ways. This is hardly surprising if, 
for example, we focus on the relationship between economics and 
the other social sciences. The dismal science has, with some notable 
exceptions where rational choice is involved, a totally different 
concept of the individual than that of social theory, a consequence 
in part of the equally yawning gap between the methodologies 
associated with axiomatic deduction as opposed, for example, to 
postmodernist deconstruction of identity. By the same token, the 
ways in which society is addressed are at odds with one another, 
reflecting methodological individualism on the one hand rather 
than some form of systemic analysis on the other.
Nonetheless, we do all live in the same world even if we 
experience and interpret it differently. Some general concepts are 
almost unavoidably shared, apart from individual and society, most 
notably the state and the market. And others, such as globalisation, 
enjoy a prominence when we reflect what is taken to be the ethos 
of a particular stage in our commonly shared history. That history 
and our existence are now dominated by capitalism, however this 
is itself understood as an economic and social category. In the age 
of neo-liberalism, there has been a thrust to convert as much as 
viii
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possible to market forms in general and to the control of capital in 
particular. This has reinforced, rather than introduced, a tendency 
to treat all, and not just commercial, resources as if they were a 
form of capital. Most notable has been human capital in the past. 
It has been complemented by environmental capital as the way 
in which we do, or do not, sustain the globe’s ecology. ‘Mental 
capital’ is a recent addition – incorporating the idea that we should 
treat our own well-being as a sort of asset, sharing characteristics 
with the factory if not the bank account (see Chapter 2), and no 
doubt minds as well as banks can go toxic.
This is all a blatant example of a sort of generalised commodity 
fetishism in which all social relations, and not just those attached to 
the market, appear as, indeed, they are in part, a material relation 
between things that have some worth or, at least, some effect. 
Everything from our abilities to our states of mind becomes capital-
like. In this light, it is hardly surprising that each and every social 
relation or interaction should become seen as a form of capital, 
something to be accumulated and to be deployed for advantage if 
not profit. And this is exactly why the notion of social capital has 
emerged and shot to prominence over the past 20 years (although 
why this should happen now, with the content and incidence that 
it has across the social sciences, is addressed in what follows). So, 
if I were to be asked to give a definition of social capital, it would 
be any aspect of the social that cannot be deemed to be economic 
but which can be deemed to be an asset. As will be seen, it can be 
anything from your personal acquaintances (not what but who you 
know) and family, through communal or associational activity, to 
your identity or culture and trust in police, politicians or others, 
and so on.
And so the social becomes capital and the capital is no longer 
social despite our opening (invented) quote. Let us leave the last 
word to Alice herself, who could well have been dreaming of 
social capital.
If I had a world of my own, everything would be nonsense. 
Nothing would be what it is, because everything would be what 
it isn’t. And contrary wise, what is, it wouldn’t be. And what it 
wouldn’t be, it would. You see?
prefaCe ix
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1
Introduction
This book has been many years in the writing and even more in the 
making. For there is a prehistory that will be more or less put aside 
(but see Chapter 2), ultimately leading to the publication of Social 
Capital versus Social Theory (Fine 2001a). After that, within a year 
or so, I vowed to go cold turkey on what was becoming an obsessive 
attention to social capital. The rewards of my continuing addiction 
had diminished considerably and might even have become negative. 
One event more than any other persuaded me to change my mind: 
the appearance of the article by Bebbington, Guggenheim, Woolcock 
and Olson (Bebbington et al. 2004). I had seen an earlier draft in 
2002 but was, I thought, reliably informed, to my disappointment, 
that it was not to be published. But there it was in print after all, a 
remarkable testimony to the momentum behind, and role of, social 
capital in the World Bank and, to that extent, more widely and 
generally so. As detailed in Chapter 6, this account of social capital 
is so revealing, and yet so flawed, that I was drawn back into the 
study of social capital – or, perhaps I should say, ‘social capital’, 
as, in a sense, there is no such thing, other than in the minds of the 
scholarly careless and/or opportunistic.
It was and remains hard, at least for me, to resume the critique 
of social capital in a half-hearted way, not least because I have 
always sought to command both its position as a whole across the 
social sciences and how this has evolved, and continues to evolve, 
with its rise and fall within the World Bank particularly emblematic 
if not entirely representative. So, in 2004, I once again searched 
over the literature, not having done so for a number of years. The 
stockpile was intimidating, and the subsequent flow equally so. Just 
to catch up was a monumental task, inevitably selective and only 
partially completed. And so it has remained. But it did mean that 
my knowledge of social capital ranged far beyond the triggering 
mechanism derived from and around the account of the World 
Bank’s social capitalists.
From then until now has been a cycle of beginning to draft 
chapters for the book, only to be interrupted by other commitments 
1
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and finding a new round of literature to absorb upon resumption. To 
my shock, I found that ten months had passed from the beginning 
of January 2008 until I was able to resume what has now proved 
to be the final stage of this labour of Sisyphus. In the interim, of 
course, the literature had continued to accumulate, more in spread 
of subject matter than depth of analysis. This meant that I was 
faced with the daunting task of organising my discussion of the 
material, both incorporating the new into the old framework of 
what had been confronted before and stretching that framework to 
accommodate as comfortably as possible what I chose to include. 
This has not simply been a matter of principle but of practice since, 
as already indicated, the literature has been expanding faster than 
it can be read and absorbed, let alone be written about.
Having published so much about social capital already, I was 
also determined to explore new themes and motivations, and to 
write a new book rather than merely updating the old one. Of 
course, some of the themes from the old book are retained, the 
most important being that social capital is the degradation of, not 
a contribution to, social science. It is worth laying out the features 
of social capital that were recognisable even after a short life of 
little more than a decade.
First is the breadth and scope of social capital across a number 
of dimensions. As will become apparent, what it is ranges over 
all forms of individual interaction (with the partial exception of 
those within market and global relations and those within the 
state – why not who you know within the state bureaucracy and 
the international elite in particular?). The same applies to other 
non-individualistic forms of interaction or collectivity as embodied 
in institutions and culture, widely conceived and ranging equally 
extensively from the family or household through to all other levels 
below the international (with the exception again of the state, as 
before, and with the curious absence of the global as a sphere of 
application for social capital; but see Chapter 7). The applications 
of social capital have also been astonishingly diverse, with some 
presumption that its presence offers potential benefits to outcomes. 
And the spread of social capital across disciplines is also extraor-
dinarily impressive, much like, if to a lesser extent, the presence of 
globalisation across the social sciences – which, interestingly, has 
experienced a similar timing in emergence and drive to prominence 
(Fine 2004a).
Second, though, this marriage between social capital and social 
theory has been an unfortunate one. For social capital has both 
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reduced and distorted the contributions that are available from the 
rich traditions across the social sciences. In short, social capital has 
been parasitical, only prospering in its own degraded and degrading 
way through drawing upon social theory selectively and, inevitably, 
at its expense.
In part, third, this is because ‘social capital’ is itself a sort of 
oxymoron. It presumes that there can be a capital that is not social. 
It is rarely made explicit what this asocial capital is, where the 
boundary lies between it and social capital, and what role is played 
by that other capital in itself and as complement to, or constraint 
upon, its alter ego. Not surprisingly, despite the terminology, 
the relationship between social capital and capitalism is usually 
glossed over.
Fourth, as a result, the economy, and economic theory, tend to 
remain unexamined in the context of social capital. There is some 
loosely formulated presumption that markets cannot work at all or 
cannot work perfectly in the absence of social capital. This opens 
the potential for (more) social capital to enhance the working of the 
market, just as it enriches non-economic behaviour and outcomes 
through benevolent collectivity.
Fifth, whilst the economy only occupies a shadowy existence 
across the other social sciences, it offers a highly attractive analytical 
fix for economics itself, as a residual theoretical and empirical factor. 
Differences in economic performance had traditionally been seen 
as the consequence of different quantities of capital and labour. 
The former had been refined to incorporate various types, such as 
physical, financial, environmental and human capital. Social capital, 
for economists in their own limited departure from neo-liberalism, 
could be added to capture anything else that might contribute to 
performance, with the non-market such as social capital understood 
as the path-dependent response to market imperfections.
Sixth, it is not only within economics that social capital finds a 
natural home as a type of capital to represent a residual explanatory 
factor that fills out the social as opposed to the economic. Social 
capital has generally served so much as a residual explanatory factor 
for other disciplines and applications that it has frequently pushed 
itself forward to become a leading explanatory factor. This can only 
be so through setting aside what are other, arguably more powerful, 
determinants of economic, social and cultural life. Generalising 
over such an extensive literature as is offered by social capital is 
dangerous; but omissions (apart from the economy other than 
as something given but to be enhanced), despite being significant 
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elements in social interaction, include class, the state, trade unions, 
and political parties, substance and organisations. For, although 
there is a healthy literature on social capital and political activity 
as such, it is remarkably removed from the substance of politics 
itself, whether by content or nature of activity (other than whether 
voting or not – but in support of what, how and with what beliefs?). 
Not surprisingly, social capital has appealed across the spectrum 
of conventional politics, from Bush to Blair, so anaesthetised and 
yet flexible is it in its political and uncritical content. And, by the 
same token, from scholarship through to rhetoric, cooperation and 
collectivity for mutual gain have been emphasised at the almost 
absolute expense of power, oppression and conflict.
Seventh, the policy perspective induced by social capital, although 
never put in these terms, is self-help raised to the level of the collective. 
However good or bad things might be, they could be better if people 
interacted more, trusted one another, and cooperated. Social capital 
offers the golden opportunity of improving the status quo without 
challenging it. Everything from educational outcomes through 
crime prevention to better psychological health can be improved 
if neighbours and communities would only pull together and trust 
and interact with one another.
Eighth, Bourdieu is acknowledged to have been an early purveyor 
of social capital, and he placed considerable emphasis on both its 
class dimensions and its contextual content. He offered a much 
deeper understanding of social capital than what has followed, but 
also a narrower definition, as he distinguished it from cultural and 
symbolic (and economic) capital. These differences have been lost in 
subsequent literature by rounding up the symbolic and the cultural 
into the social, whilst equally dropping the class and contextual 
content for universal notions of any collectivity across time, place 
and application. In place of Bourdieu, the rational choice or indi-
vidualistic foundations of other renditions of the concept of social 
capital, drawing on the influence of the rational choice sociologist 
James Coleman, have come to the fore, although these have been 
disguised, since acknowledgement of them would reduce the appeal 
of social capital to those other than of a neo-liberal bent. And the 
most recent literature has begun to bring Bourdieu and context 
back in and to stand aloof from rational choice. Yet this renders 
the concept different in every application, so that transposability 
between case studies and analytical categories relies upon a leap 
of faith. In this respect, social capital is treated as if it were capital 
in money form, along with presumptions of fluidity between its 
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various components and effects (something of which Bourdieu 
himself was guilty). This all renders the relationship between social 
capital and neo-liberalism to be complex and shifting; see below 
and later chapters.
Ninth, social capital has become so prominent so rapidly as a 
result of what can only be described as an intellectual malaise within 
academic life, although it is a moot point whether this has worsened 
over the concept’s lifetime as a result of the pseudo-commerciali-
sation of research activity. Precisely because of its amorphous, 
all-encompassing nature, social capital is an ideal example, for want 
of a more tempered term, of the hack academic (‘hackademic’?). To 
put it bluntly, social capital has prospered at the expense of intellectual 
integrity, as publications, research grants and popular punditry have 
been exploited for gain, academic, personal or otherwise. Social 
capital plus topic X has been the route to open new avenues and 
close others, generally both replicating and reducing what we knew 
about X previously and adding to the forward momentum of social 
capital in scope of definition and application.
Tenth, proponents of social capital have exhibited a stunning 
capacity to absorb criticism, when recognising it, by continuing 
to move forward. Opposition is readily perceived as seeking the 
addition of an otherwise missing variable or method, so that the 
remedy is to incorporate what is otherwise absent. Where criticism 
is offensive to the core values of social capital, it is usually simply 
ignored, especially in relation to the points already elaborated. This 
is so much so that those contributions that do acknowledge criticism 
do so selectively, for the purpose of supporting their own particular 
contributions.
Eleventh, as should be apparent, irrespective of other criticisms, 
social capital has become definitionally chaotic, as it is imbued with 
so many different variables, approaches and applications. Again, 
this has frequently been acknowledged in the literature, only for 
another definition or approach to be adopted, compounding rather 
than resolving the collective conceptual chaos (the social capital 
of social capital!). There is a significant, if heavily outweighed, 
literature that is critical of social capital and, almost certainly, a 
body of social scientists who will have nothing to do with it because 
of its conceptual chaos and incoherence. Yet this aversion to social 
capital inhabits a parallel universe with limited dialogue with, or 
response from, the ranks of the social capitalists themselves.
Last, social capital has thrived in the particular intellectual 
context peculiar to the 1990s, in which there has been a reaction 
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against the extremes of both neo-liberalism and postmodernism. 
Social capitalists have rejected the belief that markets work perfectly 
and have embraced the idea of getting real about how people go 
about their (daily) lives. This is also characteristic of social capital’s 
counterpart, globalisation, which in many other respects is both the 
complement and the opposite to social capital. As already indicated 
though, the global is notable for its absence from the world of 
social capital; the latter is more about communities accepting the 
world as it is and bettering themselves on this basis as a form of 
‘participation’ and ‘empowerment’. Thus, and further, the ‘dark 
side’ of social capital, as in corruption and community or racist 
violence for example, is often acknowledged only to be brushed 
aside. This places social capital in a peculiar relationship to neo-
liberalism, although some see it as an instrument and cloak for it.
These features of social capital form the starting point from which 
a further ten years of literature have been assessed, not only to track 
the most recent developments but also to explore new themes. Since 
I have been a tutor for research students for 30 years or so, it seemed 
appropriate to use that experience to offer advice on how (not) to 
do research. This is made explicit in Chapter 2, where lessons are 
drawn from my social capital work to address the task of how to 
go about writing a literature survey. One central lesson offered is 
to find one or more organising ‘pegs’ on which to hang a survey to 
give it analytical as opposed to descriptive content. And the chapter 
itself takes up the peg of the degradation of social science that is 
perpetrated by social capital, further deploying the metaphor of 
McDonaldisation.
The chapters that follow can in part be interpreted as having one 
or more pegs of their own, not always made explicit. Chapter 3 
examines the history of social capital as a concept and, equally, the 
constructed history that has been imposed upon it. It shows that 
social capital does not have a history of any substance – and for 
good reason given its legion faults. Indeed, it is necessary to explain 
why social capital should have become so prominent, and so rapidly 
so, at the end of the second millennium and, yet, was so pale in 
presence previously. And, to the extent that social capital does have 
a history, it is with a content that is the opposite of the one that has 
been discovered or invented to support the substance of this bloated 
orgy of literature confined to the late twentieth century. For social 
capital has previously been perceived to be an economic category, 
not one of civil society, signifying both the aggregate capital as 
a whole and the systemic properties to which this is attached. In 
Fine 01 text   6 26/11/2009   11:46
IntroductIon  7
other words, social capital in history has been about the political 
economy of capitalism and not about civil society detached from 
the economy.
Despite its short history, social capital has had a rich and rapid 
evolution. As previously documented in my earlier book and by 
many others subsequently, its origins in the radical sociology of 
Bourdieu were discarded for the rational choice functionalism 
associated with James Coleman before this, in turn, was veiled by 
an expanding scope of definition and application and a multidiscipli-
nary spread. Inevitably, the result was to expose the deep limitations 
of the concept for the tasks it was being asked to accomplish, 
especially by omission of many of the standard variables across 
social theory. As is now all too apparent, this did not lead to the 
rejection of social capital. On the contrary, the omissions provided 
the foundations for the continuing expansion of social capital by 
adding what had previously been missing, with limited care and 
attention to individual, let alone collective, coherence. The result, 
as documented in Chapter 4, has been what might be termed the 
‘bringing back in’, or BBI, syndrome, itself a peg of wider potential 
applicability than to social capital alone. The chapter demonstrates 
this process for social capital in general and across particular topics, 
such as BBI class, gender, race and context. The ultimate irony is 
provided by BBI Bourdieu, or BBBI. But, whatever Bourdieu’s merits 
and deficiencies in positing the category of social capital, BBBI 
restores at most a pale version of his original intent and content 
– other than with a few exceptions that prove the rule. This is hardly 
surprising since what was left out, and so is subsequently open to 
BBI, is the radical and critical content of social theory. And this can 
hardly be satisfactorily grafted on as an afterthought or qualification 
to a stock that is so disregarding of such considerations.
Such a state of affairs has not been without its positive side, as 
illustrated in Chapter 5, where the curious absence of social capital 
from the discipline of history is observed and explained (although 
the historical application of social capital by non-historians is far 
from rare). The resistance by historians to the unsubtle charms of 
social capital is explained differently as far as social history and 
economic history are concerned. For the former, sensitivity to context 
and to the major factors in historical change that social capital has 
tended to overlook has meant that the discipline has cold-shouldered 
the concept, not least in light of the previous, if light, tradition 
of perceiving social capital to be economic capital as a whole or 
to be social and economic infrastructure. In principle, though, 
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social capital is far more attractive to economic history, especially 
cliometrics in its newer form of emphasising that institutions 
matter in light of market imperfections. But, as no more than an 
accident of timing, ‘institutions’ as the all-embracing category to 
capture the non-economic had already attained prominence within 
economic history before social capital emerged as a potential 
alternative residual concept to occupy the putative space between 
market and state (and the state itself has also been reduced to the 
status of institution, designed like any other to respond to path 
dependence, market imperfections, and so on). So, whilst social 
capital might have been an ideal conduit for the newer (market 
imperfections) economic history, it had already been eclipsed by 
the new institutional economics in that role.
The relationship between social capital and (the discipline of) 
history offers a case study of social capital within a discipline, 
one in which social capital has failed to establish a stronghold, 
not least because of its limited capacity to deal with context and 
the major determinants of economic and social change in any 
convincing fashion. This is the first of three case studies, each 
distinctive (and suggesting the adoption of pegs along the lines of 
why social capital should have different impacts across different 
and within specific disciplines), with the two others following 
in Chapters 6 and 7. The World Bank (and, to a lesser extent, 
development) and social capital is covered in Chapter 6. Social 
capital was, of course, well established at an early stage within 
the World Bank, and this benefited from extensive coverage in my 
earlier book, which teased out the Bank’s own particular amalgam 
of scholarship, rhetoric and policy. The Bank warrants a return visit 
in this volume because of the extraordinary analytical acrobatics 
offered by its social capitalists, not least in both accepting, if after 
the event, the criticisms of social capital that had prevailed whilst 
social capital was heavily promoted by the Bank and justifying 
this as an honourable compromise in order to shift the Bank’s 
economists to take the social seriously. It is argued that these 
stances lie somewhere across the divide between dishonesty and 
delusion, with unwitting self-deception as possibly the kindest inter-
pretation. The chapter also offers the opportunity to treat social 
capital more fully as a buzzword within development, a peg that 
is constructed across a number of different aspects. Moreover, 
whatever the impact of social capital within the Bank, there is the 
broader impact outside to assess.
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Management studies and social capital are the focus for Chapter 
7. The pairing offers a different case study from history (a relative 
absence) and development and the World Bank (an early and 
heavy presence and promotion), since social capital appears on 
the management studies scene relatively late, and within the critical 
or heterodox branch of the discipline, but has more recently 
proliferated across the discipline’s orthodoxy. For this, as for the 
other case studies, it is found that social capital degrades the rich 
mix of elements, occasionally heterodox and radical, that have 
informed the discipline.
Both Chapters 8 and 9 give some indication of the recent 
developments across social capital, with greater depth of treatment 
in the first of the two. Chapter 8 begins with an account of what 
has been an accumulating, even overwhelming, weight of literature 
that is critical of Robert Putnam across any number of grounds – 
conceptual, theoretical, empirical, as well as in his representation of 
the past and past thinkers. Whilst Putnam, to deploy his metaphor, 
is far from bowling alone, there have been many willing to ambush 
him in the alley. These even include economists who are shown 
to have incorporated social capital into their own preconceived 
technical framework; but, narrow though this framework might 
be, it does expose both definitional and empirical conundrums for 
the concept. And this in turn allows for a consideration of the way 
in which social capital has conceived the individual and trust. As 
before, the lack of depth and sophistication is striking.
Chapter 9 covers in passing some new (and old) topics that have 
fallen within the social capital compass, from disaster relief through 
to religion. This is all offered both as a warning of what is to 
come and as an invitation to resist it. There is also an account of 
the extraordinarily limited impact social capital has had on policy 
formulation as opposed to furnishing rationalisation for it, a strong 
theme across critical literature. And the book closes with a renewal 
of the appeal to engage fully with social capital through critical 
rejection, itself a point of departure for more constructive analysis. 
This is primarily an appeal for a different orientation in collective, 
and thereby individual, action. For, as is already apparent, whilst 
there has been much critical work on social capital, including 
some that is of the highest quality, this tends to continue to accept 
the concept as legitimate as long as it is suitably modified and 
refined. But what is possible for the individual does not prevail 
across the literature as a whole, which can even be strengthened 
in its degradation of social theory by legitimising itself through 
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incorporation of dissent. The thrust of critical contributions taken 
together point to the need to reject social capital.
This is all the more urgent in light of current material and 
intellectual developments. Previously, for the latter, I have 
emphasised how social capital has been a particular contribution 
to, and reflection of, the dual retreat from both postmodernism 
and neo-liberalism. Scholars, and others, are concerned about the 
nature of contemporary capitalism, for which the virtual worlds of 
perfectly working markets and subjective interpretation are no longer 
appropriate. This has been brought home with extreme force in view 
of the current financial crisis. It has exposed the contradictions within 
neo-liberalism, with extensive state intervention being adopted 
precipitously to shore up the banking and financial systems.
Elsewhere, I have argued that financialisation – not only the 
proliferation of financial markets but also their increasing penetration 
into more and more aspects of our economic and social lives – lies at 
the heart of neo-liberalism (Fine 2007b, 2008c and 2008d). Initially, 
in a first phase of neo-liberalism, the state supported this financiali-
sation through a variety of interventions designed to promote the 
spread of the market in general and, as a consequence, of finance in 
particular. More or less synonymous with the rise of social capital 
has been the second phase of neo-liberalism, in which the state has 
been intervening, both to sustain financialisation and to respond to 
the excesses in economic and social life that this has brought about. 
The response to the current crisis is a sharp illustration of this.
This has significant implications for the location of social capital 
in the contemporary world. In rhetoric and scholarship it is not neo-
liberal, for it is not entirely anti-state, and it does not believe that 
markets work perfectly, although it primarily does seek remedies 
outside of, at most in conjunction with, both the market and the state. 
On the other hand, social capital, as already hinted, does offer an 
ideal frame for neo-liberal policy in its second phase – to improve the 
workings of the economy and society more generally by promoting 
ameliorative action within civil society – and without attention to 
the broader and deeper forces that both create dysfunction and 
constrain its correction.
This book has been a hard and, more than often than not, an 
unrewarding intellectual slog over many years. I hope to have passed 
on my stamina and commitment to the reader through the medium 
of good humour. Research is hard work but it can also be fun. The 
main title of the book is taken, with due modesty, with an eye to 
Marx’s Theories of Surplus Value. His monumental assessment of 
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the classical political economy of his time is full of insights that 
he gained from the material he covered, even if accompanied by 
sharp criticism. But there, as indicated in the subtitle of my book, 
the parallel begins to break down. Social capital is more interesting 
for what it excludes than for what it includes, and, for the latter, 
what it contributes to its own dissolution.





The purpose of this chapter is to offer an initial overview of some 
of the general features of the social capital literature, and to draw 
out the lessons that can be learned from doing so for undertaking a 
literature survey on other topics. Section 2.2 suggests that the best 
way to enrich a survey with some analytical depth is to organise it 
around one or more themes, or ‘pegs’. The particular theme chosen 
in Section 2.3 for social capital is how the literature has degraded 
the social theory that it has itself incorporated, reducing rather 
than enhancing scholarly value through its contributions. In Section 
2.4, this theme is explored in more detail by pointing to a number 
of other pegs and by selective reference to the literature itself. 
The concluding remarks point to the diversity of the content and 
direction of social capital across disciplines and topics, something 
to be addressed, if not fully, in the remainder of the book.
2.2  peGGInG a surVeY
The best starting point for research is a literature survey. This 
presumes that a topic has already been suitably identified, something 
that can prove difficult. And the topic has to be appropriately 
reduced to key word(s) or the like for a literature search. Mercifully, 
at least in most respects, such searches can now be undertaken 
electronically, with the corresponding need to identify a database. 
But one problem is to find key words and databases that do not 
overlook important contributions but also do not include too many 
that are irrelevant or marginal. Books might be found through title 
or subject search of the catalogues of major libraries.
Once in researching labour market segmentation (Fine 1998a), 
I employed ‘labour&segment*’ as a search string; this had the 
interesting result of throwing up numbers of articles on Caesarean 
section. On the other hand, the search in response to a request to 
12
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give a lecture on gender and consumption, using ‘gender&consu*’,1 
provided a disproportionate number of contributions on alcoholism, 
drug addiction (especially cigarette smoking) and eating disorders. In 
light of my interest in food, the latter fortuitously offered an avenue 
of research that I had not foreseen (Fine 1995a and 1998b).
In this way, the literature search can, at an early stage, change the 
topic of research in unanticipated directions. Subject to numbers 
of items from the search, it is best to make a quick skim of titles, 
followed by their abstracts, which are normally, but not always, 
freely available electronically. From this, a choice must be made 
of which pieces to obtain, hopefully easily, and to read in full. An 
obvious starting point is one or more survey articles if available. The 
sooner a ‘feel’ is found for the literature the better – what are its main 
methods, content, results, controversies and dynamic. The contrast 
between an early and a late contribution can be revealing.
Ideally, the literature search will yield a significant but manageable 
number of contributions. But just one article can be sufficient if it is 
good (or bad) enough. Looking at the South African coal industry, I 
found a piece that examined technical change through measuring and 
explaining total factor productivity over time. Although universally 
used, this technique is known to be flawed for theoretical reasons. 
But, in addition, it depends upon a number of assumptions that 
are totally unreasonable, such as full employment of all factors of 
production, and perfect competition in input and output markets. It 
was possible to take these assumptions as the point of departure to 
display an industry that depended upon an apartheid labour market 
system, tied government contracts to state-owned power stations for 
domestic markets, and state allocation of quotas for export through 
state-owned transport facilities (Fine 1992b)!2
At the opposite extreme to a single, judiciously selected 
contribution, is to be confronted with a mountain of literature. Such 
is the case with social capital. An IngentaConnect search on ‘title/
keywords/abstract containing “social capital”’ in December 2007 
offered 4,158 articles running back to 1968 – although, significantly, 
all but 18 of these are more recent than 1990! Here is a ready 
indication of the extent to which social capital is a phenomenon 
of at most the last 20 years;3 its imagined history prior to then is 
discussed in Chapter 3. Even so, despite its late start, the weight 
of social capital literature is formidable. Further, in debate with 
me over the intellectual origins of social capital, Farr (2007, p.54) 
reports that ‘[a]n internet search records some 6 million items, 
among them the names of the Social Capital Foundation, Social 
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Capital Partners, Social Capital, Inc., and a new self-help book, 
Achieving Success through Social Capital [Baker 2000]’.4 At a more 
academic level, I had previously undertaken full-scale literature 
searches on four occasions, 1999, 2002, and towards the ends of 
both 2006 and 2007. For each, I have amongst other means made 
use of BIDS, at www.bids.ac.uk, and I have sought to access as much 
of the material as possible and as seemed reasonable. But this has 
become increasingly taxing and difficult, with over a thousand new 
items for the third search, together with a hundred or more new 
books discovered through reference to library catalogues. And a fifth 
search, undertaken only a year later in view of my not being able to 
embark upon this book in the interim, left me 400 articles in debt, 
with numbers of new books at least in proportion.5 Keeping up with 
the literature has proved almost impossible.6 I have found that new 
literature is added faster than I can read it, let alone prepare what 
I am writing about it, and, inevitably, there must be a cut-off point 
in considering both old and new contributions. How this is done 
surely reflects the researcher’s degree of patience (or obsession), 
personal idiosyncrasy and sheer pragmatism.
When literature to be surveyed is so voluminous, this makes 
essential what is in any case something that is desirable, taking 
the feel for the topic one or more steps further forward. This is to 
filter the literature through one or more themes. These have to be 
selected in dialogue with the literature itself, and so there are no 
golden formulas for doing this as they will be research-topic (and 
researcher) specific. At least, though, some useful ideas of possibly 
more general applicability can be teased out from other literature 
surveys. For a review of new growth theory for example, which 
itself only dates back to the mid 1980s, the literature expanded 
exponentially in both empirical (so-called Barro-type regressions) 
and theoretical content, but the contributions for the latter could be 
organised into how various market imperfections were utilised to 
yield increasing returns to scale (Fine 2000, followed by 2003b and 
2006). Contributions were readily perceived to project randomly and 
speculatively selected microeconomic factors into macroeconomic 
outcomes. And, then, the Barro-type approach simply and illegiti-
mately ran multiple regressions across any combination of those 
microeconomic factors, including those drawn from outside the 
boundaries of economics traditionally conceived. In the most 
recent literature, the appalling nature of the empirical work is now 
recognised, but with the added irony that this literature draws critical 
conclusions from the evidence, which contradict the theoretical 
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assumptions on which that evidence is constructed – so that we need 
to explain why there are growth spurts and collapses, for example, 
when the theory is based on steady-state growth paths.7
Globalisation provides an even greater volume of literature 
than social capital. Both concepts originate from the early 1990s, 
with globalisation heavily in the lead initially and continuingly so, 
both in quantity, breadth and speed of take-off, although social 
capital has narrowed the gap, which remains large (see Chapter 
5). A BIDS search in December 2007 offered 10,319 articles with 
title/keywords/abstract containing ‘globali*’, if only going back to 
1991, with, interestingly, none listed for 1990, and only three before 
then in total. One way of organising and reading this literature 
was through its both representing and contributing to what I have 
termed the dual retreat from the extremes of both neo-liberalism and 
postmodernism (Fine 2004a most explicitly, but see also Fine 2002a 
and Fine and Milonakis 2009). In other words, contributions could 
be understood in terms of a wish to move beyond the analytical 
agendas of state versus market (set by neo-liberals) and of decon-
struction of meaning (set by postmodernism) and to get to grips 
with the nature of contemporary capitalism, especially in light of 
the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the emergence of the ‘new world 
order’. In addition, because of the rapid expansion of the literature 
as a form of academic fashion, it could be sifted through the extent 
to which it genuinely added new insight or simply refashioned the 
old, such as modernisation theory, through the prism of a new 
trendy term.
These two examples of globalisation and new growth theory 
have already offered a few themes, and there are many others, by 
which they might be critically assessed, such assessment itself ideally 
addressing both the nature of the literature in light of the themes 
and reflecting back upon the themes themselves. Before returning 
to the issue of themes, and in the context of social capital, consider 
the following advantages of deploying them. First, it allows the 
literature to be categorised and organised for the purpose of survey 
and, where the contributions are impossibly large, the researcher 
can weed out, or violently disregard, what is not wanted or not to 
be covered. This also helps to get through a voluminous literature 
more quickly and, in this respect, more efficiently. Texts can be 
read, even skimmed, for their relevance to themes, and notes taken 
accordingly, hopefully avoiding the need to revisit them at a later 
stage on becoming aware of a lack of appropriate earlier attention 
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(although this cannot and should not be avoided where knowledge 
of, and thinking on, the literature evolves).
Second, relative to the themes, both the strengths and weaknesses 
of the literature can be highlighted – what it does or does not 
do and, possibly, what it can or cannot do. Third, it avoids the 
dull presentation of the literature survey as a glorified annotated 
bibliography of who said what or as a simple descriptive narrative 
of the chronology of the subject matter (each of which does, 
nonetheless, require at least some simple form of selection). Fourth, 
there is the prospect of some originality in presenting the literature 
in these terms, especially through implications for the themes, and 
the weaknesses or even absences in the literature which can be 
highlighted. What is particularly pleasing is if these insights can 
then be deployed in your own contribution in moving beyond the 
literature survey, thereby offering some originality both in how 
the literature has been presented and in addressing what it has not 
presented or what it has misrepresented. You say, as it were, ‘the 
survey shows that the literature has these absences and faults; I will 
correct them and/or move beyond them’.
The advantages of early and judicious selection of themes are 
probably uncontroversial. But there are potential disadvantages 
that should be highlighted. Suppose, to go to the extreme, you 
have already made up your mind about the literature and you are 
convinced that your own approach is correct and appropriately 
exhaustive. There is then the clear danger of discarding what you 
cannot see through the prism of your own approach and interpreting 
all that you do see through that prism and through that prism 
alone. If you have decided that you are the enemy of functionalism 
(or instrumentalism or structuralism) then you are liable to read 
any text, especially if it refers to social functions (instruments or 
structures) as if it were functionalist. If you oppose the notion of 
Fordism, you will interpret any deviation from an idealised form of 
mass production as if it supported your case. It is essential to avoid 
reducing the literature to preconceived and rigid elements, although 
it is equally impossible to avoid preconceptions.8 At least the latter 
should be as transparent as possible both to yourself and to your 
eventual readers (who will, no doubt, however consciously, impose 
their own preconceptions upon you in any case).
I like to dub as ‘pegs’ the themes used on which to hang a literature 
survey. The preceding discussion has opened up the issue of how 
to select pegs in doing research, especially if wishing both to draw 
upon and contribute originally to what has gone before. As already 
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mentioned, there are no general answers and it is more a matter 
of the proof of the pudding being in the eating, leaving open the 
selection of the various ingredients that might be considered in 
making sure that we are at least eating the right, and a nutritious, 
pudding and not the dog’s dinner of scraps.
With social capital – and the same is even more true for 
globalisation, if not for the narrower methodological and analytical 
terrain of new growth theory – the literature is so extensive that it 
is a matter not of searching out appropriate pegs but of choosing 
between the embarrassment of riches on offer. When I began to 
categorise the literature from searches according to themes, I found 
that I had straddled four separate sheets of paper with a dozen or 
more themes on each. As such, the social capital literature does offer 
any number of examples that might be of use in other applications. 
Let me begin with two, lying at the opposite ends in time of my 
own work on social capital.
2.3  socIal capItal as McdonaldIsatIon9
My own interest in social capital arose accidentally, although it was 
possibly an accident waiting to happen. In the mid 1990s, I had begun 
to study the relationship between mainstream economics and the 
other social sciences. I had become convinced, on evidence that was 
initially casual but was soon to be cumulative, that the imperialism 
of economics (or the discipline’s colonisation of the subject matter 
of other social sciences) had entered a new, aggressive, wide-ranging 
and yet more palatable and successful phase. Consequently, I was 
understandably intrigued to find that two individuals at the opposite 
extremes of social science, a radical sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu, 
and one of the most orthodox of mainstream economists, Gary 
Becker, were both using the term ‘social capital’. Significantly, 
Becker was and remains the leading practitioner of an economics 
imperialism of an older, longer-standing kind. Becker’s form of 
economics treats all economic and social phenomena as if they could 
be reduced to optimising individuals interacting as far as possible 
as if a (more or less perfect) market were present. His so-called 
‘economic approach’ to social science has obvious affinities with 
rational choice, differing only in subject matter (and in the extent 
of its considered incorporation of non-economic literature).10
In this respect, social capital does offer an example of economics 
imperialism, which can be used as a peg, since it has served as 
a conduit for economics to incorporate the ‘social’. I have dealt 
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with this extensively in earlier contributions, not least as economics 
imperialism has itself progressed from the phase dominated by 
Becker (as if markets work perfectly and the non-market can be 
treated as if a market were present) to a new phase in which the 
social is seen as the response to market imperfections. But, like 
other examples of economics imperialism, whether by discipline 
or topic, the incorporation of the social through social capital 
has its own special features. One of these is the extent to which 
economics imperialism has other means of introducing the social 
on a generalised basis, through the new institutional economics, 
for example, with the result that the presence of social capital is 
thereby diluted; see Chapter 5 for implications for the otherwise 
surprising absence of social capital from economic history. But what 
is also special about social capital as economics imperialism is that 
the concept is itself colonising of social theory without the need 
for a push or even a contribution from economics. Indeed, social 
capital has flourished across the social sciences to a large extent by 
omitting proper consideration of the economic.
One peg for social capital, then, is to examine its presence in, 
and implications for, cross-disciplinary study. In my own work, 
from the simple question of how could the two Bs be deploying 
the same concept, I became embroiled in the meteoric rise of social 
capital across the social sciences. My investigation bordered on the 
obsessive as I meticulously sought out literature on social capital, 
ultimately culminating in an earlier book (Fine 2001a). After this, 
given the rapid growth and massive weight of the literature and its 
generally moderate quality in all respects, I tried to curb what was 
proving to be an intellectually unrewarding addiction to the topic. 
I limited myself to a casual watching brief, complemented by the 
occasional assault on the literature, usually prompted by specific 
requests to contribute. I was asked in the early 2000s, for example, 
to review social capital and its application to Africa as well as its 
then continuing adoption, if not fanatical promotion, by the World 
Bank (Fine 2002c and 2003c).11
By then, moving far beyond and away from the two Bs’ conundrum, 
I had already adopted and consolidated as an organising peg the 
idea that social capital represented first and foremost individual and, 
especially, collective degradation of scholarship. This is also fully 
documented in earlier work. I would have left it there but for further 
stimulus and invitation to engage, and this peg, in particular, has 
continued to be a guiding thread in assessing subsequent literature. 
Put more neutrally, the issue is one of how social capital has reflected 
Fine 01 text   18 26/11/2009   11:46
froM ratIonal choIce to McdonaldIsatIon  19
and drawn upon the strengths and weaknesses available within 
social theory.
Here the machinations at the World Bank around social capital 
have been especially revealing. First, in carrying the story of social 
capital forward, it is important to report that the social capitalists 
at the World Bank, stunningly and remarkably, responded to 
critics, including myself, by essentially accepting all the intellectual 
arguments that had been levelled against them, as if they had always 
been aware of them, but excusing their stance on the strategic 
grounds of civilising less intellectually rounded economists at the 
Bank (Bebbington et al. 2004; their book followed in 2006). As 
someone who was heavily embroiled in debating and comprehending 
the scholarship of the Bank and its relationship to rhetoric and 
policy, both for social capital and more widely,12 I felt obliged to 
respond to what I perceived to be apologetics for self-confessed 
scholarly degradation (see Fine 2008a and Chapter 6).
But, second, I would not even have known about the publication 
of this shift in the stance of the Bank’s social capitalists but for the 
request to contribute to a special issue on buzzwords in development, 
for which ‘social capital’ is a pressing candidate (Fine 2007d and 
Chapter 6). For, third, at more or less the same time, I was invited to 
address the topic of social capital as a plenary speaker at the biennial 
Critical Management Studies (CMS) conference. This all tipped 
the balance in drawing me back into undertaking a review of the 
literature once more, at the end of 2006 as previously indicated, both 
to see how social capital was progressing in management studies, 
and to situate this relative to the more general evolution of social 
capital across the social sciences (Fine 2007a and Chapter 7).
As chance would have it, one of the other two plenary speakers at 
the CMS conference was George Ritzer. He and I had long shared an 
interest in consumption, and he had achieved fame for his McDonald-
isation thesis, in which the humble hamburger serves as a model for 
understanding modern capitalism, and not just consumption (Fine 
2002a for some discussion; also Fine 2007c). As I had agonised 
over how to present something new to the conference, over and 
above the role of social capital in management studies, or how to 
present the same subject matter in a new and entertaining way, 
McDonaldisation offered an ideal solution. For my degradation peg 
could be translated into the plenary message that social capital is the 
McDonaldisation of social science; do not consume it if you value 
your intellectual health or you will be consumed by it. This is so for 
all, both as individuals and as collectives of scholars. There is, by 
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the way, a tradition of attaching mutually contradictory metaphors 
to social capital – the missing link, the glue that binds society, the 
lubricant that moves it, the bonding, bridging, linking and (relatively 
rarely) bracing, and so on.13 And you may already have realised that 
my pastiche places me in the role of film-maker Morgan Spurlock, 
famous for having suffered the ill health of relying on a diet of 
McDonald’s. I have been on a very heavy diet of this social capital 
stuff, and believe you me, it makes you intellectually sick if not 
soon rejected.14
And, just to reinforce the point, with apologies to Philip Larkin’s 
classically expressed antipathy towards children, the peg of 
McDonaldisation is poetically brought home by the following (first 
appearing in Fine 2002b, but also made available at ‘The Voice of 
the Turtle’,15 www.voiceoftheturtle.org/show_article.php?aid=387, 
accessed 20 March 2009).
They fuck you up with social cap.
They may not mean to but they do.
They fill you up with faults on tap
And add some extra, just for you.
But they were fucked up in their turn
By fools in rational hats and coats,
Who half the time were soppy-stern
And half at one another’s throats.
Man hands on social cap to man.
It deepens like a coastal shelf.
Get out as early as you can,
And don’t have any for yourself.
2.4  the McdonaldIsatIon Menu
To establish the legitimacy of the approach to social capital as 
McDonaldisation of social theory, it is only necessary to run the 
concept through the hamburger machine – but backwards in order 
to identify its ingredients. This is not as easy a starting point as 
might be imagined. For what social capital is, just as might be said 
of a hamburger, is not so easy to define. Apart from variation in 
ingredients and size from outlet to outlet, is it beef or mad cow 
disease, both or somewhere in between, and what about its cultural 
content and meaning (Fine 2007c)? For, the simple mantra from the 
university of life, ‘it’s not what you know but who you know’, which 
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is widely taken up as an initial definition of social capital, opens up 
a deluge of interpretations as far as what we mean by knowing and 
how we know, from family and neighbours to the whole of civil 
society, and from individual acts of reciprocity to cultural norms of 
trust. And, equally, applications of such knowing and known have 
blossomed without apparent limit, forming a corporate enterprise 
of many affiliates across the academic world.
As a result, social capital has developed a gargantuan appetite in 
terms of what it is, what it does, and how it is understood. Almost 
any form of personal and social interaction has the capacity to be 
understood as social capital. As a positive resource, it is presumed 
to have the capacity to facilitate almost any outcome in any walk 
of life, and to be liquid or fluid across them to a greater or lesser 
extent. And it is equally adaptable across subject matter, disciplines, 
methods and techniques, as far as the social sciences are concerned. 
In short, in principle, and to a large degree in practice, social capital 
can be anything you like. It has established a major presence in most 
of the major disciplines, especially sociology, politics, economics, 
and business, development, education, health and management 
studies, as well as within and across these as in sub-disciplines and 
topics such as crime, housing, the environment and migration.
So social capital is to social science as McDonald’s is to gourmet 
food. At the largest McDonald’s in the world, in Gurnee, Illinois, 
covering a floor space of 32,000 square feet, is to be found the 
spoofed ‘Not Quite Perfect’ (NQP) outlet (The Onion 2005). Here 
are sold at an eighth of the price the misshapen and mis-manu-
factured, from one-foot long chips to grey milkshakes. ‘I’ll never 
take my children there again’, said Anita, mother of three, ‘They 
opened up the Happy Meal and there were headless figurines in 
there. It scared the bejesus out of them’. But, equally for sale, are 
the misconceived, such as the ten-gallon buckets of McRib sauce 
for home consumption. Even the US appetite for obesity did not 
stretch this far, and the product failed and so was placed at the 
NQP counter. Are we to believe that such monstrosities cannot 
occur in the academic world, whether in the use or making of 
ideas? Of course, history teaches us otherwise, but we do tend to 
have a firmer belief in the infallibility of the present. And there is 
also the issue and temptation of whether NQP social capital can 
be made better if not perfect – something to be strongly challenged 
in subsequent chapters.
Further, with social capital, like McDonald’s, you can always 
find a local outlet unless you are very unlucky, even in the most 
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unlikely of places. My favourite examples shift over time with the 
spread of social capital itself, as the novel becomes mundane. In 
the past, it was that social capital could explain the differential 
survival of holocaust twins. More recently it has been the impact 
of social capital on the incidence of dental caries in Brazil (Pattussi 
et al. 2006). The more social capital you have, the better are your 
teeth, one of the most favoured applications of social capital being 
to health (Fine 2008e). Not having social capital makes you sick as 
well as having bad teeth. Although we might view the ingredients 
of the hamburger with some suspicion, I am reminded more of 
what might be termed the Coca-Cola-isation thesis, especially its 
advertising campaigns over the years and, at times, its self-repre-
sentation as the real thing, although what is real and what is the 
thing can be shifted to suit.
The most recently covered literature, though, has excelled itself 
in the bejesus stakes. Social capital has been tied to each of the 
following: whether second homes solicit keen neighbourliness or 
shunned newcomers (Gallent 2007); the colour of skin: the lighter 
it is the better you get on, especially with marriage prospects (Smith 
1995 and Hunter 2002); the language you speak, with Pomerantz 
(2002) locating Spanish as a form of economic and social capital, 
since it serves as a marker for status in an increasingly bilingual 
United States rather than as a genuine gain of linguistic competence;16 
in preventing deforestation (DesRoches et al. 2007); accruing gains 
from festivals (Arcodia and Whitford 2007), as well as whether 
casinos are good or bad for the community (Griswold and Nichols 
2006; Steffensmeier and Ulmer 2006 – presumably there will be 
a London Olympics and social capital study before long); and, 
my current leader of the pack, pets as a source of social capital 
(L. Wood et al. 2005 and 2007).17 Further, as I report across the 
literature on the reputed benefits for health from social capital (and 
so for those who network with me in the campaign against social 
capital), it will improve mental and self-reported health, health at 
work, life satisfaction and well-being, and children’s health; and 
lower risk of violence, accidents, suicide, coronary heart disease, 
cancer, teen pregnancy and ‘risky’ and pre-marital sexual activity, 
fatalism, being overweight, chances of drug (ab)use (apart from 
cannabis!) and addiction (but enhance successful withdrawal), being 
a depressed mother of young children, low birth weight of children, 
excessive alcohol consumption, and so on. Social capital is truly a 
wonder drug.
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The point here is not so much to mock the notion that such 
objects of study should be taken seriously but to question whether 
social capital as such serves the purpose of furthering knowledge 
in these instances. And, in the bigger picture, when we have so 
many of these studies of less esoteric subject matter, what do they 
do to the substance of social capital itself as a concept deployed so 
freely across the social sciences and other disciplines? First, though, 
from reading across the literature, it is very easy to see how social 
capital has spread and grown. It started off by way of ‘middle-range 
theory’, in which social capital is connected to outcome (see Figure 
2.1). The idea is that social capital, however it is defined (perhaps as 
having a ‘good’ family or living in a ‘good’ neighbourhood), allows 
you to gain a more favourable outcome: educational achievement 
for example. As a middle-range theory,18 that is one that is pitched 
somewhere between a systemic understanding and methodo-
logical individualism (especially rational choice), it is possible to 
ignore wider considerations and deeper determinants and other 
consequences. For social capital, and possibly more generally, this 
has the effect of allowing such omitted factors to be introduced on 
a piecemeal basis (see Chapter 4), whether drawn from the macro 
or the micro, and also to translate middle-range concepts more 
or less directly into observable and measurable categories so that 
empirical evidence can be brought to bear.19
Thus, middle-range theory has the practical advantages of 
putting aside a deeper understanding, of the nature of the family 
and of educational achievement for example, and of allowing 
the immediate investigation of hypotheses on this basis, subject 
to the availability of appropriate data. It has the corresponding 
disadvantage of its results being entirely subject to the qualification 
of what has been omitted. This simple observation is a devastating 
indictment of social capital for numerous reasons that will emerge 
through the rest of the book; for, at best, middle-range theory 
should serve as a mode of investigation as opposed to a mode 




Fine 01 text   23 26/11/2009   11:46
24  theorIes of socIal capItal
For the moment, though, consider that major parts of society have 
been collapsed into the simplicity of Figure 2.1. Such diagrams and 
those that follow are to be found in various forms littered across 
the literature, if not always with the same transparency and rarely 
with the same degree of critical interpretation. Not surprisingly, each 
of the boxes in the diagram is bursting to break out of its narrow 
confines and to restore the fragmented multiplicity of causes and 
consequences from which it derives. In deference to presentation, I 
have limited the number of these to three each, as presented in Figure 
2.2. But in the case of social capital, hundreds of variables have 
been used, ranging from whether you engage in communal weeding 
through to whether you trust your politicians, quite apart from the 
presence of pets, as previously indicated. And, as also observed, the 
favourable consequences of social capital have been equally legion, 
from holocaust (or Titanic) survival to good teeth.
There are now multiple arrows connecting the social capital box 
or boxes to the outcome boxes, with the metaphor of the mess and 
mass of telephone wires across a telephone exchange being apt. 
As Keating (2001, p.217) puts it, even if in the specific context of 
source of ‘leadership’ in local regional development, there is no 
simple relationship between ‘culture, institutions, social relations 
and leadership’, and so there can be no presumption that this is 
resolved by, or with the addition of, social capital. But, to revert 
to our mangle-of-wires metaphor, this immediately suggests, like 
a conversation, that the arrows could go in either direction – is 
social capital cause or consequence or even simply correlate (see 
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got to be put in place, and how conversations or effects get to be 
triggered. This has been recognised in the literature in terms not 
only of what social capital is, but also how it is created and how 
we distinguish what it is from what it does. Thus, Letki concludes 
from data from 38 countries that
confidence in political institutions and their objective quality 
are the strongest predictors of civic morality [i.e. social capital]. 
At the same time, the findings show that the recently popular 
claims about the importance of social capital for citizens’ moral 
standards are largely unfounded. (2006, p.305)
Similarly, Diani (2001) finds that social movements are a source 
of social capital (networks) rather than vice versa, and also for 
Rossteutscher (2002) associations are not the source of civic-ness 
but its reflection. Rothstein and Stolle ask:
What is the relation between, on the one hand, social capital in 
the form of norms about reciprocity and, on the other hand, the 
Social Democratic type of encompassing and universal welfare 
state? Is there something special about the types of mechanisms 
that are behind the abundance and maintenance of social capital 
in Scandinavia? (2003, p.1)
And they offer the following answer:
It is argued that the high level of social capital in the Scandinavian 
countries can be explained by (a) the high degree of economic 
equality, (b) the low level of patronage and corruption and (c) 
the predominance of universal and non-discriminating welfare 
programmes.
But, if accepting this to be so, would it not be the case that factors 
(a) to (c) would themselves have more direct impact on outcomes 
than would social capital as an independent influence?
Such issues have been addressed by Durlauf (2002b), 
predominantly in technical statistical terms. For him, the problem 
here is, for example, that differences in outcomes for those with and 
without social capital may be due to the differences in the factors 
that have created the differences in social capital in the first place. 
Are the (favourable) outcomes due to the presence of social capital 
or to some other variable (see also Chapter 8). This is not exactly 
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rocket science, but it has been overlooked all too frequently by the 
social capital literature. In addition, apart from the problem of 
presence and direction of causation, there is the matter of whether 
its effects are, indeed, positive. It is universally acknowledged, other 
than by those definitionally precluding this, that social capital is 
not necessarily a good thing, since it can be used for undesirable 
purposes or lead to undesirable outcomes. As such, it has variously 
been described as dark, perverse or negative – as with corruption, 
the Ku Klux Klan, mafia, racism, nepotism, etc.
One way of representing these conundrums is to recognise 
that, as a middle-range theory, social capital necessarily sets aside 
the qualifying variables, A and B, within which it is situated, as 
illustrated in Figure 2.3. For simplicity, the fragmentation of the 
social capital and outcome boxes have been erased. This is in order 
to highlight that outcomes are necessarily the consequence not only 
of the direct impact of social capital itself but also of variables A 
and B. A acts directly, and indirectly through B and through social 
capital. A variables are in some sense more fundamentally causal 
than both B variables and social capital that serve as parallel middle-
range variables. Of course, there are also interactions within the 
boundaries of the bundles of variables represented by A, B and 
social capital (and the outcomes). More specifically, if trade unions, 
classes and the state are important to outcomes alongside social 
capital, and do themselves create or condition social capital, then 
their exclusion from consideration (not, as will be seen, entirely 
hypothetical for much of the social capital literature) will tend to 
bias, probably overstate, the role of social capital. The latter might 
just be a proxy or a conduit for more important determinants. In 
crude and extreme empirical terms, this would be the case if social 
capital and outcomes were independent of one another but each was 
a product of something else – a situation derived from Figure 2.3 
by deleting variable B and its connecting arrow as well as the one 
between social capital and outcomes. Thus, Abom (2004, p.342) 
points to ‘a complex and diverse range of social, cultural, political 
and economic issues that contributed to low levels of “broad-based” 
social capital’, including violence, corruption, authoritarian state, 
and top-down non-participatory practices of NGOs in an urban 
settlement in Guatemala. This is a long list of A and B type variables. 
They are liable in and of themselves to have a much greater effect 
on outcomes than social capital itself!
From the point of view of organising a literature survey, this 
discussion offers the opportunity or peg of what is termed the 
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‘nesting of social capital’ hypotheses. Whether in theoretical or 
empirical terms, Figure 2.3 offers a more general theory in which 
those theories that involve social capital exclusively as an explanatory 
factor can be assessed as special cases. Thus, is it legitimate to set 
aside the independent and/or prior influence of A and B variables in 
the assessment of social capital? This is, in part, nothing more than 
a cautionary tale of not conflating correlation with causation and 
of taking full account of otherwise omitted variables and relations 
between them. In particular, there is the issue of how social capital 
is created and sustained, something that is recognised widely within 
the literature to have been subject to relative neglect. Inevitably, 
as the literature has evolved, the salience of A and B variables to 
outcomes has come to the fore, whether for theoretical reasons or 
because case studies or empirical work more generally have rendered 
accounts of these variables unavoidable.
But the response of the social capital literature to nesting has 
been somewhat unusual, both individually, and often consciously 
so, and collectively, if necessarily unconsciously, in terms of overall 
effects from individual contributions taken together. Essentially, 
rather than correcting for factors A and B in assessing the nature 
and impact of social capital, the latter has been widened in scope of 
definition to incorporate these factors. Rather than taking gender 
or ethnicity, for example, as prior or conditioning variables, these 
are seen themselves to be sources of social capital. In other words, 
the social capital box both internally fragments in terms of its 
constituent elements and expands to incorporate other elements 







Fine 01 text   27 26/11/2009   11:46
28  theorIes of socIal capItal
It follows not only that social capital has a gargantuan appetite 
in terms of its scope of application, but the same is true of its 
definitional content. And the more elements are added to what 
social capital is, the more it becomes definitionally chaotic, a feature 
widely acknowledged within the literature. For Johnston and Percy-
Smith, both using and deploring metaphor,20
[s]ocial capital is the contemporary equivalent of the philosopher’s 
stone. Just as alchemists pursued the secrets of turning base metal 
into gold, academics, policy makers and politicians have allegedly 
unpacked the mysteries of effective communities and collectivities 
… However, we would argue that the social capital debate lacks 
the level of minimal agreement about the meaning of the key 
operational concept to sustain meaningful debate and dialogue. 
Indeed, the status of social capital as a concept should more 
accurately be characterised as chaotic, while at times it operates 
as little more than a warm metaphor or a vaguely suggestive 
heuristic device. (2003, p.332)
Paradoxically, though, when this chaos is commented upon in the 
literature in a typical article, it is often followed by a new definition 
appropriate to the intended application, adding some new element 
or other, or selecting one as most appropriate. The effect is to push 
the chaotic momentum further forward. And there are two further 
immediate consequences of this definitional chaos. One is to expand 
social capital so that, as previously observed, it comes to incorporate 
any social variable. The other, as we have also already seen, is to 
homogenise unduly under a single concept what is an extraordinar-
ily wide range of diverse applications. It is as though not only are all 
hamburgers treated as if they were the same, but everything else is 
considered to be hamburger-like. Not surprisingly, then, in a late and 
unusually reflective special issue on social capital, Knorringa and 
van Staveren (2007, p.6) seem to observe approvingly as editors of 
their collection that ‘none of the contributions spends a lot of “ink” 
on defining social capital’.21 And Meulemann (2008a, p.9) agonises 
over how to define social capital, and eventually suggests that ‘social 
capital consists of the relations of persons, it basically is relational 
capital’.22 But then he proceeds to see it as underpinning ‘system 
capital’. Further, it is recognised that social capital is both cause 
and consequence. And the chapters that follow in the collection 
often make little reference to social capital as opposed to trust, 
citizenship or whatever, and point to the need for other variables 
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to be taken into account as well as the micro-, macro- and multi-
level linkages involved.23
Further, apart from adding to the definitional chaos surrounding 
social capital, some attempts have been made to reimpose some 
categorical order rather than positing their own further chaos-
inducing idiosyncratic definition. This is done through placing 
different types of social capital under broader definitional umbrellas. 
One popular form is the division into three types of social capital: 
relational, cognitive and structural. This is innocuous as far as it 
goes, presuming the divisions to be reasonably hard and fast, but 
it does not go very far and could be said to be characteristic of any 
approach to social theory. Even blander has been the attempt to 
re-aggregate across the hundreds of variables that have made up 
social capital. This has been done by reference to social capital 
as bridging (within groups), bonding (across groups) and linking. 
The latter is used variously, and at times ambiguously, to refer 
to links across hierarchies, power relations, and from ‘lower’ to 
‘higher’ levels, as in connecting the state to civil society or local 
government. There tends to be some presumption that bonding 
capital may be bad (as it can lead to coercion), but that bridging 
capital is good (as it signals cooperation), as is linking capital (since 
the state supports or sustains such cooperation). The problem is 
that bonding, bridging and linking, BBL, cut across the traditional 
variables of social theory – such as class, gender, race and so on 
– and, as a result, overlook the fact that one person’s bond is 
another person’s bridge, etc., depending upon context and issue. 
Such tensions and conflicts within society cannot be wished away 
by aggregating social divisions and complexities into the otherwise 
neutral, bland and universal categories of BBL. Further, as Arneil 
(2006, pp.179–80) argues, the desire for bridging to predominate 
over bonding social capital runs the potential risk of homogenising 
across rather than respecting minority differences.
This all adds up to chaos, not only in definition of social capital, 
but also across its favoured analytical framework or middle-range 
starting point of deriving positive outcome from some element of 
social capital (Figure 2.1). Expanding Figure 2.1 into Figure 2.3, 
by way of the intermediate step of the multifarious fragmentation 
across the various boxes barely hinted at in Figure 2.2, involves mul-
tiplicities of arrows with differing directions and signs of causation. 
It becomes apparent how much (often implicit) homogenising and 
flawed reasoning is involved in deriving results for the impact of 
social capital. More specific aspects of such flawed reasoning will 
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be taken up in later chapters. But, more generally, just as societies 
are divided along the lines of socio-economic and sociocultural 
status, so the potential to form ‘social capital’, however it is defined, 
and the potential to use it or for it to have an effect, will be highly 
variable, mixed and shifting according to what might be taken 
to be more fundamental underlying determinants – whether you 
are young or old, educated or not, male or female, employed or 
unemployed, rich or poor, rural or urban, and so on.
Of course, it is precisely the suppression of such variables, 
their location as conditioning rather than determining, or their 
incorporation into the universal notion of social capital, that 
imparts to the concept the property of being able to reinterpret all 
previous social science through its prism. Hence, social capital has 
been presumed to be a more general approach than that individually 
attached to notions such as networks, trust, linkages, and so on. 
Through its prism, though, these concepts and their lineages are 
bowdlerised. Social capital is equally at home as a residual or 
complementary category, putatively explaining what was previously 
inexplicable in its absence. Thus, for example, social inclusion might 
be a form of social capital, it might be explained by social capital, or 
it might reinforce the effects of social capital (with social exclusion 
as the corresponding dark side). Inevitably, though, the social capital 
prism filters out more light than it lets through, in drawing simplisti-
cally upon basic categories of social analysis, stripped of their rich 
traditions and contested meanings.
To a large extent, this homogenisation of social science is 
appropriately reflected and embedded in the term ‘social capital’ 
itself, since this refers to anything other than the individual (the 
social) that is a resource (the capital). In this respect, social capital is 
terminologically something of an oxymoron. If there is some capital 
that is social, there must be some other capital that is not social. 
Generally, the presumption is that what is presumably asocial capital 
is either personal or private or, very different, economic. Possibly, 
this is some terminological quibble, but it does allow the notion 
of social capital to gloss over a proper understanding of capital 
as attached to a definite historically developed form of economic 
and social organisation, and to a definite economic moment within 
capitalism. Both economic capital and personal capital are always 
socially situated. Otherwise, social capital is simply a resource, like 
physical or human capital, for example, and as such, paradoxically, 
it is weak in its understanding of itself, both as social and as capital 
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(Smith and Kulynych 2002a; Bankston and Zhou 2002; Roberts 
2004; Pawar 2006; and Arneil 2006, for example).
Social capital might, then, be the counterpart to economic capital 
(asocial?), the state, or even personal capital. In what respect it is 
social and/or capital, and hence distinctive as such, is underexplored, 
or, more exactly, overgeneralised and homogenised as the social and 
as a resource that is deemed to be capital-like (when, in fact, what 
is intended is something that is not capital at all, whether within 
capitalism or not). Significantly, this use of social capital reflects a 
more general syndrome of capitalising, if you like, on any resource 
used for whatever purpose or effect, and dubbing it capital, to give 
rise to what has been termed a ‘plethora of capitals’ (Baron and 
Hannan 1994). Within economics itself, we have physical, economic, 
human, personal, environmental, financial, natural capital, and so 
on. These have been complemented by a range of other capitals, 
garnered from across the other social sciences, such as the symbolic, 
cultural, organisational, intellectual (for which there is a dedicated 
academic journal), religious, moral (ethical and socio-moral), 
(embedded) career, bootstrap, and, in one contribution alone, club 
capital, envisioned capital, virtual capital, working capital, and 
black economy capital (McGonigal et al. 2007), although my current 
favourite is ‘mental capital’.24 And these capitals have also been 
variously combined with social capital, to give rise to a plethora 
of social capitals – bonding, bridging, linking, bracing (new on the 
block), expert, innovation, intellectual, organisational, cognitive, 
structural and relational and, most apposite, imagined (Quinn 2005) 
– the social capital you have with soap operas for example and, 
one suspects increasingly, reality television. As Kanazawa finds, 
women watch more TV than men and thereby believe they have 
more friends:
My contention and the supportive evidence presented here suggest 
that, contrary to Putnam, there is nothing shallow about the 
community we experience by watching TV, or so our brain thinks. 
Watching TV is our form of participating in civic groups because 
we do not really know that we are not participating in them. 
(2002, p.171)
This usefully raises the issue of whether social capital is, indeed, 
imaginary in our own minds let alone those of its scholarly 
proponents. Do we bowl alone and/or together in reality or in 
our dreams? And are our dreams enough to make us change our 
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behaviour and feelings, to trust one another (or not in case of a bad 
dream) and act accordingly?
In this proliferation of capitals – in which the failure to address 
capital as such, other than as a neutral resource, tends to be pervasive 
– social capital stands out as an exception in one major respect. 
Whereas the other capitals are more and more narrow in their range 
of application, in search of the specificity of the resources, exactly 
the opposite holds for social capital. It gobbles up all the other 
capitals, but for the economic, and treats them as special cases of 
itself. But the more social capital expands the less, certainly pro-
portionately and paradoxically, it addresses the economy – other 
than in economics itself (see Chapter 8).
This in part reflects another feature of social capital, the way 
in which its understanding of society is structured. Basically, it 
takes a tripartite division between economy (or market), the state 
and civil society as unproblematic. Its focus is within civil society, 
in and of itself, or in its (beneficial) interaction with the other 
two. There is a presumption that such is an appropriate way to 
undertake causal analysis as opposed to focusing initial attention 
on other variables such as class, gender, race, and so on as mutually 
determining the tripartite structure itself. Further, there is the issue 
of how the separate elements of the structure mutually condition 
one another, as already raised by Figure 2.3. Thus, Evans et al. 
(2006), Lowndes et al. (2006a and b) and Smith et al. (2004) 
all indicate that, in the context of local government/participation, 
social capital is always conditioned, if not dominated, by other 
factors such as institutional capability, vision and governance, with 
the state capable of promoting as well as of responding to social 
capital in a top-down process of engagement that runs against the 
grain of the bottom-up ethos of social capital. And, once again, 
there must be questions over whether the direct impact of the (local) 
state is more important than any effect it has indirectly through 
social capital.25
This all has the further consequence of endowing social capital 
with its McDonald’s-like ubiquity through its attachment to what I 
have dubbed hack academia or ‘hackademia’. With all social theory 
reinterpreted through its prism, a common feature of a typical social 
capital article can be its adoption of the form social capital plus X, 
or vice versa. Whatever I, or even somebody else, published before, 
I can publish again as if a new contribution (something equally 
characteristic of much of the globalisation literature). Of course, 
this may be disguised by new case study or empirical analysis, but 
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these could equally have been done, and often have been, before 
social capital had ever been heard of. In addition, social capital 
opens access to research grants and other marks and perks of 
academic life.
But, despite their mutual potential for hackademia, there are 
two features that social capital does not have in common with 
globalisation which, to some extent, explains why the latter is even 
more prominent and extensive. For, first, despite its wide scope 
of definition in principle, social capital in practice has exhibited 
a number of no-go areas, even though these are at the core of 
social interaction. Generalising unduly, these include class, the state, 
trade unions and the substance of politics (as opposed to neutrally 
perceived participation, especially voting and/or trusting).There 
has also been a neglect of gender, race and ethnicity, with these 
beginning to force their way onto the agenda after complaints of 
neglect alongside a number of other aspects of inequality.
The reasons for these omissions are to be found in the analytical 
location of social capital structurally. As a middle-range concept, 
it seeks to occupy a space within civil society, interacting with 
but having its own independent effect on some aspect of society 
more generally. Consequently, the more obvious and standard 
determinants of economic and social functioning fade into the 
background. And with them go the standard variables of socio-
economic analysis, such as power, class, conflict and hierarchy, as 
emphasis is placed upon the possibility and virtues of cooperation 
and collectivity. For the ideological and policy consequences of 
this, see Chapter 9.
Second, whilst the globalisation literature has stimulated extensive 
and continuing debate and critique across varieties of positions, 
much the opposite is the case for social capital. This is not to suggest 
that there has been little criticism. Quite the contrary, there has 
been much, even if only a small minority in terms of the number 
of contributions, and it has been devastating in many respects (see 
especially Chapter 8). But, again by drawing on a typical article, 
critical commentary, whether within or of social capital, has tended 
to be referenced piecemeal and in passing and as a rationale for 
justifying a further contribution. In other words, social capital has 
deployed criticism as legitimacy, a sort of repressive tolerance, and 
not critical engagement for analytical advance. My own treatment 
by the literature is significant here. References to my work, which 
are quite extensive, primarily fall into two types. One is to pick up 
a single issue of criticism as a point of departure for continuing to 
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use social capital by way of correction. The other is to place me in 
the position of being extreme for rejecting social capital altogether, 
thereby making the alternative of accepting social capital appear 
reasonable, albeit with reservations and/or piecemeal qualifications 
and modifications. But if there are two options – to accept or reject 
– each is as extreme as the other, even if it’s only one that is presented 
as extreme!
The issue ought to be settled on substance and through debate and 
not on whether one or other position is ‘extreme’ or not (consider 
rejection of cannibalism or racism for example). Personally, I have 
found lack of debate so frustrating that I began to preface the 
frequent seminars and so on that I have given on social capital with 
the explicit challenge to the audience that they indicate where I am 
wrong or where there is disagreement. This has rarely solicited a 
public response. But, in private, individuals say they agree with 
me, but that they are going to use social capital anyway as a 
means of furthering their own contributions, to which they would, 
nonetheless, make corrections in the light of my criticisms. And, it 
would be claimed, at least economists are being civilised by bringing 
non-economic factors into their considerations. The problem, 
though, is less a matter of persuading economists to be civilised 
by continuing their colonisation of the other social sciences and 
more one of constituting an alternative economics. In short, social 
capital has created a cordon sanitaire around itself through which 
criticism is ignored and incorporated, apparently strengthening the 
idea through acknowledging opposition. In place of the global, the 
economic, class, the state, conflict, gender, power and so on, social 
capital offers a bland alternative, highly conciliatory in principle 
and practice with more humanely presented forms of neo-liberalism, 
with token incorporation on narrower terms of other buzzwords 
such as empowerment and participation26 (see Chapter 6).
2.5  concludInG reMarKs
Jokes, like metaphors, should not be allowed to run and run as 
they become tedious and hackneyed. It is time to move on from 
the idea or peg of social capital as the degradation of social theory 
through McDonaldisation. With one irresistibly compelling example 
in Chapter 8 and more than a few passing references, I shall not 
follow this advice in the remainder of this book. For the McDonaldi-
sation peg for appraising the literature has a number of mini-pegs, 
ranging from nesting to hackademia, and, as will be seen, more 
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can be added more or less without limit. This is because whatever 
social capital is used to address (or to avoid) can be turned back 
upon social capital to expose its limitations. Nonetheless, for the 
moment, it is appropriate to observe that, like McDonald’s within 
and across locations, social capital does not get everywhere both 
within and across disciplines and topics. In some places, it is or 
has been excluded altogether, whilst in others it resides, if not side-
by-side, at least in parallel with other cuisines. And, where it does 
manage to locate itself across social theory, social capital does not 
have the same content and impact and, over its short life of 20 
years, nor does it have the same chronology. Possibly, it is helpful 
to move from the metaphor of social capital as McDonaldisation 
to that of Disneyisation (Bryman 1999). Social capital not only 
homogenises and degrades, it also attaches itself to theming across 
numerous products and outlets within the academic world and 
more widely, just as the film is accompanied by the DVD, the toys 
and artefacts, and so on.27
Where and how social capital goes in practice remains an open 
question, given that in principle it can be more or less anything 
and be universally applied. To some extent, an answer to where 
it does not go is to be found in the story of the omitted factors 
from the world of social capital, those mentioned previously: the 
state, trade unions, the economy, conflict, power and the standard 
socio-economic and sociocultural categories such as class, race and 
gender. But, as addressed in the next chapter, the story is a little more 
complicated than this, and the relationship between what is or is not 
included in the world of social capital is not only of interest, but is 
also both changing and waiting to be discovered as the literature 
and its applications evolve.




It is said, with unconfirmed attribution to Winston Churchill, that 
history is written by the winners. Whilst this has a strong ring of 
truth about it, there are exceptions. In economics and development 
studies, for example, the history tends to be retrieved as much 
as written by the vanquished, as the winners have little or no 
interest in recalling the past, or their interpretation of it, let alone 
in celebrating it. The orthodoxy’s own version of history could only 
be written by too transparent a misrepresentation of how it came 
to prevail (Milonakis and Fine 2009 and Fine 2007f). Sometimes 
the history is better for the orthodoxy if it is forgotten altogether 
rather than (re)written.
Such is both true and false of social capital and, to that extent, it 
does conform to the nostrum, suitably modified to allow for both 
rewriting and writing out. For the winners out of social capital 
certainly have offered a history in which, somewhat incredibly on 
the face of it, the explosive growth in use of the concept over the past 
two decades can apparently be traced back to its origins in earlier 
contributions. This can only be done, however, by not writing two 
other histories – one, as is already apparent, about how little social 
capital has been used in the past, and the other about how, when it 
was used, it was predominantly used in different ways than it has 
been recently. In particular, in the latter history, the main, if limited, 
use of social capital in the past was as an economic category (see 
Section 3.3). Since social capital, despite its name, has in its recent 
reincarnation tended to be located apart from the economic, its 
history as an economic category, other than as a benign influence, 
has to be overlooked in order to purvey a contemporary non-
economic alternative predominantly situated within civil society. 
Further, the relative absence of social capital in the past reflects a 
continuing and pervasive commitment to rejecting the attachment 
of ‘capital’ to anything that is not an economic category and to 
acknowledging, in any case, that the economic is itself social – so 
how can social capital be a non-economic category?
36
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Whilst this might suggest an alternative narrative for the history 
of social capital, it only partially explains why it should have had 
the (differently interpreted) rhythm and content that it does. Section 
3.2 suggests an answer in terms of a number of factors. The least 
important from a proximate point of view, though it is structurally 
decisive, derives from the discipline of economics and its relations to 
the other social sciences. Because the social (and the historical, meth-
odological and much else besides) had been taken out of economics 
by the beginning of the post-war period, this laid the basis for social 
capital to prosper within the other social sciences, but with a limited 
economic content. This could hardly have occurred to the extent 
that it did had a genuine interdisciplinary political economy exerted 
an influence within and from economics as a discipline. Nonetheless, 
it took time for social capital to emerge and, when it first did so, 
it was, uncomfortably for orthodoxy, associated with the radical 
sociology of Pierre Bourdieu from the early 1980s. But with the 
increasing influence of both neo-liberalism and a rational choice 
methodology, especially in US sociology and political theory, social 
capital abandoned Bourdieu for the rational choice perspective most 
closely associated with James Coleman. Ironically, for idiosyncratic 
reasons, this also placed crude economics imperialist, Gary Becker, 
in the forefront in the use of social capital. But the intellectual 
climate was already changing by the early 1990s, with the dual 
retreat from the excesses of both neo-liberalism and postmodernism. 
The result has been to allow social capital to emerge as a buzzword 
in social theory, chronologically alongside, and without intersection 
with, globalisation. Putnam becomes the leading proponent of 
social capital, and the opposite extremes of Becker and Bourdieu 
are discarded, as well as the rational choice overtones associated 
with Coleman.
The rest, as they are inclined to say, is history and will, to some 
extent, be charted in future chapters. We shall find that social capital 
seeks to compensate for its early history by bringing back in all those 
elements that it was necessary for it to take out, especially those 
associated with Bourdieu, in order to endow it with its own peculiar 
character. And, whilst a leopard cannot change its spots, it may 
be able to disguise them to deceive. As revealed in the concluding 
remarks, if we are to accept that social capital has a history, then it 
is one that might be traced back to a bearded gentleman with very 
different ideas of both the social and capital.
Very few have speculated on why social capital should have 
emerged to such prominence so rapidly. Even fewer have offered 
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sensible answers, since to do so almost inevitably requires a critical 
rejection of the concept and an acknowledgement that it has little 
earlier history and practically none of the sort that is now so 
popular. As a sociology of knowledge applied to social capital, my 
own explanation remains sorely inadequate. But it does have the 
positive features of bringing together both developments within 
the material world and the ways in which they are, or are not, 
captured in the intellectual world. As argued in Chapter 1, social 
capital offered a timely if limited response to the second phase 
of neo-liberalism. But this is not simply to conform to a relative 
theory of knowledge, that social capital is a reflection, a tool even, 
of neo-liberalism. The nature of neo-liberalism itself across time 
and across scholarship, rhetoric, policy and (mis)representation 
of reality is too contradictory to allow for this. But nor is this 
to subscribe to an absolute theory of knowledge, in which the 
emergence and evolution of social capital is determined by its own 
disciplinary logics. As may be useful for other concepts and topics, 
it is important to peg social capital to both relative and absolute 
accounts of the sociology of knowledge.
3.2  ’tWIXt BecKer and BourdIeu
My own personal involvement with social capital begins in the mid 
1990s with its paradoxically shared use by Becker and Bourdieu. 
As will be seen, these are no longer central figures in the concept’s 
evolution, with Becker enjoying at most a fleeting if significant cameo. 
By contrast, Bourdieu is universally acknowledged as a pioneer in the 
rise of social capital, before being joined, and sidelined, by rational 
choice sociologist James Coleman, who was then superseded by 
the more rounded if proselytising Robert Putnam as central figure. 
Currently, though, Bourdieu is experiencing something of a revival 
in the literature, even if predominantly at the margins and, to a 
large degree, in distorted form (Chapter 4). How is all of this to 
be explained?
Bourdieu was already deploying the term ‘social capital’, 
albeit in French, at the beginning of the 1980s (see Fine 2001a 
for a fuller account and Chapter 4 for a critical assessment of 
Bourdieu). He belonged to the tradition of high French theory. As 
implied in previous chapters, the dual retreat from the extremes 
of postmodernism and neo-liberalism was, at that time, only on 
the distant horizon. Bourdieu neatly if unwittingly anticipated this 
through combining material with cultural analysis, allowing some 
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concession to postmodernism by examining closely the meaning 
of categories of analysis, as in his classic work Distinction (1986) 
– why, for example, is culture high or low in terms of its class 
origins and practices? But he also remained resolutely opposed to 
the invented myths of mainstream economics and its presumed 
beliefs that the world could or should be left to the market as 
suggested by laissez-faire ideology.1
In this light, there is much to commend in Bourdieu’s approach to 
social capital. First, he sees it as one amongst a number of capitals, 
alongside the cultural, symbolic and economic, all but the last 
of which have tended to be subsumed under social capital in the 
subsequent literature. Second, whilst appeal to these different types 
of capital is generalised across a huge historical range, from the Sun 
King to contemporary French society, Bourdieu is adamant that 
each application is context-specific, for which he posits his own 
investigative apparatus involving habitus and field, corresponding 
notions notably absent from other social capital literature. Third, 
Bourdieu is focused upon questions of class, power, conflict and 
the way in which different capitals are formed and play a role 
in reproduction and transformation. Again, the contrast with the 
subsequent literature is striking.
In this way, it can be readily seen that Bourdieu’s construction of 
social capital belongs to a method of social theory entirely at odds 
with that associated with the other, equally universally recognised if 
slightly later, pioneer of social capital, James Coleman (Fine 2001a 
for full account). For him, the explicit rationale for social capital 
is the single-minded promotion of rational choice theory. But this 
does itself have to be set in intellectual context. For, despite the 
success of rational choice as promoted by James Buchanan and 
his colleagues and the interpretation of politics on this basis as 
public choice, rational choice initially garnered significant if limited 
scope of application across the social sciences even in its favoured 
location, the United States (see Amadae 2003 for an outstanding 
account of the context, origins and stumbling blocks in the rise of 
rational choice over the post-war period). Even economists, in a 
Keynesian era and a general climate of greater state intervention, 
were less than confident in extending the model of rational 
economic man beyond the boundaries of microeconomics, itself 
complemented by a macroeconomics and other fields not initially 
grounded in models of individual utility maximisation (Fine and 
Milonakis 2009). Instead, US social science was heavily endowed 
with much less theoretical content than its French counterpart and, 
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by way of compensation, depended much more upon statistical 
investigation and case studies.2 For Coleman, social capital helps to 
explain relative performance in educational achievement according 
to family and neighbourhood characteristics, a far-flung approach 
from a Bourdieu-type treatment as a field for reproducing hierarchy 
and power.
But, whilst Bourdieu’s approach to social capital can be seen 
to have anticipated intellectual developments, Coleman’s remains 
rooted in the past, in the effort to promote rational choice across the 
social sciences just as the intellectual and material environment was 
turning against it, if not closing it off. Here what is of importance, if 
totally overlooked in the literature almost without exception (other 
than in some references to his empirically flawed accounts of the 
relationship between social capital as family and neighbourhood 
and educational attainment),3 concerns the origins of social capital 
for Coleman himself. Coleman was a late participant in the social 
exchange debate that began in the 1960s and that sought to 
base social theory on aggregation across individual interactions, 
primarily basing its methodological individualism on psychological 
motivation. Over its short life, like rational choice, social exchange 
had the best chance to prosper in a neo-liberal environment. But 
it failed to establish itself, and the attempt exhausted the time 
during which neo-liberalism was both at its peak and its most 
extreme. Yet, just as the leading proponents of social exchange 
admitted defeat, for good reasons (the anatomy of society cannot 
be found in the anatomy of the individual), so Coleman adopted 
the remarkable expedients of switching from psychological to as-
if-(rational)-economic motivation, and terminologically switching 
from social exchange to social capital. This both launched the latter 
and detached it from the humiliation of social exchange, to which 
Coleman himself never made any reference in his promotion of 
social capital.
In addition, newly discovered for this volume are the earlier 
rational choice origins for social capital in the work of James 
Buchanan, the Nobel Prize winner in economics for public choice 
theory. For him, ‘[t]he simple exchange of apples and oranges 
between two traders – this institutional model is the starting point 
for all I have done’.4 Whether everything in politics, from corruption 
through to war, can be understood in terms of the market for fruit 
is a moot point but,5 significantly, Buchanan is not dismissive of the 
social as such as opposed to the individual as if trading fruit, for he 
is wary of the loss of America’s idealised tradition of liberty:
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My diagnosis of American society is informed by the notion that 
we are living during a period of erosion of ‘social capital’ that 
provides the basic framework for our culture, our economy, and 
our polity – a framework within which the ‘free society’ in the 
classically liberal ideal perhaps came closest to realization in all 
of history.6 (1986, p.108)
The essay in which this appeared was traced back and, revealingly, 
found to have first been published by Buchanan in 1981, almost 
a decade before Coleman offered up social capital. And the quote 
continues: ‘My efforts have been directed at trying to identify 
and to isolate the failures and breakdowns in institutions that are 
responsible for this erosion’.7 In effect, putting this provocatively, 
especially in light of a shared and reactionary nostalgia for an 
idealised America of the past,8 this makes Coleman a plagiarist of 
Buchanan (with Putnam to follow Coleman) – not least as Coleman 
and Buchanan were heavily involved together in the Public Choice 
Society from its origins, suggesting that it is unlikely that Coleman 
would not know of Buchanan’s account of social capital.
So, initially at least, there were two sources for social capital, 
Coleman and Bourdieu, essentially running in parallel, although 
they did come together for a dialogue of the deaf on one remarkable 
occasion (Bourdieu and Coleman 1991). Some of the early US 
literature did reference and even deploy Bourdieu in its own empiricist 
way, but there can be no doubt that Coleman had triumphed as the 
continuing inspiration for social capital into the 1990s. As a result, 
like the simple hamburger’s revenge on sophisticated French cuisine, 
social capital has tended to eschew certain classical ingredients of 
social theory, at least initially – those such as class, power, conflict, 
trade unions, the state, gender and race, and politics (other than 
participation in electoral democracy).
But, in this respect, Coleman’s successful influence is in part 
pyrrhic. For, as social capital was on the point of being adopted, and 
as a precondition for it to be so, both neo-liberalism and rational 
choice were in general if not universally on the wane, at least across 
the social sciences. In a sense, there is in any case a tension for 
rational choice in its application to neo-liberalism if it is going 
to adopt social capital. For it is necessary both to emphasise the 
perfect workings of the market, not least through individual pursuit 
of self-interest, and also to accept the imperfect working of the 
market as a rationale for the positive role that can be played by the 
non-market presence of social capital. Idahos and Shenton (2006, 
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p.68) perceptively point to ‘the historical moment of the 1980s and 
90s when, in the West, adherents of doctrines of neo-liberalism and 
communitarianism battened on to one another in a usually tacit but 
mutually buttressing fashion’.
Correspondingly, the use of social capital offers an unwitting 
replication of Buchanan’s neo-liberalism. Mayer too (2003) 
recognises that social capital is treated as if it were economic but 
is not so. But, as such, it fits neatly into a growing reaction against 
both excessive statism and excessive neo-liberalism, exhibiting a 
discomfort with adversarial politics (which is either ignored or 
implicitly perceived as a lack or decline of civility) and the causes 
for this for which community self-help serves as a remedy. So, in 
complementing the market with the community, a wedge was created 
for social capital to be interpreted and deployed in a fashion that 
was less complicit with neo-liberalism. In retrospect, the results are 
strikingly revealed by the rare but remarkable wish of modern-day 
neo-liberals Meadowcroft and Pennington (2007) to rescue social 
capital from social democracy and restore it to its rightful place, 
in a world in which the sparingly minimal non-market forms of 
organisation within civil society will spontaneously arise as long as 
the state remains heavily contained and constrained.9
In other words, with this contribution as the exception that 
proves the rule, and coming 20 years after Coleman first hoisted 
social capital onto the neo-liberal bandwagon (and nearly 30 years 
after Buchanan’s essay), social capital could both in principle 
and in practice best prosper upon entering the 1990s only in an 
environment in which pure forms of neo-liberalism and rational 
choice were rejected. As Castle (2002, p.347) almost accidentally 
recognises of social capital, ‘some [unattributed] sociologists have 
resisted embracing the concept because they regard it as based on 
rational choice modelling widely used in economics, and they fear 
the imperialism of economics’. But acceptance has predominated 
over resistance by the simple expedient of a collective amnesia over 
the rational choice and neo-liberal origins of social capital, and 
economics imperialism has also been studiously avoided rather than 
confronted (see below).
This is beautifully illustrated by the fate of Becker as pioneer, 
even more than and, to some extent, by comparison with the 
fate of Bourdieu (see Chapter 4 for bringing Bourdieu back in, 
BBBI). For, although this involves a digression into economics and 
economics imperialism, it is worthy of note that Becker himself is 
unambiguously a rational choice social theorist from a foundation 
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within economics. Significantly, he ran a joint seminar with James 
Coleman at the University of Chicago from the late 1980s. This, 
no doubt, introduced him to the term ‘social capital’. But, both 
for social capital and more generally, Becker has fallen entirely out 
of the picture. He is an embarrassment because of his honest and 
fanatical commitment to the principle of utility maximisation as the 
single explanatory factor for all economic and social phenomena 
in an as-if-perfectly-working market environment. As George 
Akerlof (1990, p.73) quipped, in line with Samuelson’s critique of 
Friedman’s monetarism, Becker knows how to spell b-A-n-A-n-A 
but does not know where to stop.
Nonetheless, there are features of Becker’s understanding of 
social capital, as opposed to his bananarama, that are shared by 
his supposedly more rounded fellow economists. These are that 
social capital should serve as a residual explanatory factor for any, 
usually collective, resource. As such, it can range over more or less 
anything in the context of a market imperfections approach to 
economic and non-economic phenomena, so that social comes after 
physical, natural, human, financial and any other type of capital that 
is attached to an individual. The major difference with Becker over 
the past two decades has been the emphasis on market imperfections 
as point of departure. These, especially asymmetric information 
between buyers and sellers, are used to explain why markets might 
not work perfectly – fail to clear, fail to be efficient, even fail to 
exist. As a result, the non-economic or non-market, everything from 
guarantee schemes for second hand cars through custom, culture, 
institutions and the state, are explained as the non-market response 
to market imperfections – as opposed to Becker’s explanation of 
the non-market as if it were a perfectly working market, as for 
human capital, intra-family relations, crime, even drug addiction 
and cultural preferences by generation.
Over the last decade, I have emphasised how the shift amongst 
economists in explaining the social from Becker’s as-if-perfect market 
to the as-if-non-market response to market imperfections has given 
rise to a new phase in economics imperialism.10 Becker’s is the self-
confessed old style – everything is reducible to utility maximisation 
in a world of as-if-perfectly-working markets, whereas the new 
phase is one of non-market responses to as-if-imperfectly-working 
markets. Without going into details, the results have been to unleash 
a tidal wave of economics imperialism, the colonisation of the other 
social sciences by economics, with a whole host of ‘new’ fields 
around the borders of economics – the new institutional economics, 
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the new development economics, the new political economy, the 
new economic geography, the new economic sociology, the new 
financial economics, the new industrial economics, the new labour 
economics, the new welfare economics, and so on – although these 
might be better termed newer (as if market imperfection) as opposed 
to new (as if market perfection).11 In addition, these are presented 
to colonised disciplines in more palatable forms, since it is now 
accepted that markets do not work perfectly and that institutions, 
habits, customs, history, etc, do matter (and we can prove it in a 
mathematical theorem).
Not surprisingly social capital has thrived amongst economists 
in this environment, not least for another reason: the increasing 
capacity to deploy econometrics so as to incorporate variables at 
will into a regression to explain economic performance, such as 
growth or poverty alleviation. Whilst I have probably written more 
about economics imperialism than I have about social capital, I 
want to bring this back to the previous chapter’s peg of McDonaldi-
sation. In putting forward the thesis, Ritzer perceives it to be a 
consequence of a Weberian drive for modernist rationality, although 
his later work tempers this with considerations of postmodernist 
aspects. Such a perspective can be extrapolated from the material 
world to that of social theory, for the drive to modernist rationality 
is the epitome of economics par excellence. But it also creates a 
tension across the social sciences with how the ‘irrational’, broadly 
conceived, is perceived and incorporated. That tension goes to the 
heart of economics imperialism in particular and the relations 
between economics and the other social sciences. This is especially 
so when we note the dualism within modernism itself – between a 
putative science and reason, on the one hand, and art and culture 
as its rejection, or alter ego, on the other.
In a longer perspective, with the marginalist revolution of the 
1870s, economics set itself the task of underpinning itself with the 
perfect (rational choice/utility maximisation) hamburger, although 
the old marginalists, such as Marshall, did realise that there was 
much more to an intellectual diet than this. In broad conceptual 
terms, this task was heavily symbolised by the redefinition of 
economics by Lionel Robbins in the early 1930s as the allocation 
of scarce resources between competing ends. At the time, this 
definition was so clearly inadequate to the nature of economics as 
it then was as well as to the economic problems of the day, that 
other branches of economics prospered, not least Keynesianism, 
American Institutionalism, and development economics, and were 
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recognisably mainstream at that time at least. Nonetheless, as a 
discipline, economics set itself the task of establishing itself as the 
science of economic behaviour through attention to the technical 
details of utility optimisation. This became a goal in and of itself, 
with assumptions being made in order to attain that goal irrespective 
of their realism and conceptual validity from other perspectives 
or aims. Individuals needed to have fixed preferences over given 
goods, with single-minded motivation, and with similar simplistic 
assumptions about the nature and role of (materially and culturally 
fixed) resource endowments and technology. On this basis, a 
perfected intellectual technology and architecture was achieved 
soon after the Second World War, with the duality of producer 
and consumer theory for the individual and general equilibrium 
for the economy as a whole.
In order to do this, everything else was stripped out to focus 
on rationality. This involved intellectual compromises at the time 
that were often acknowledged, both within economics and between 
economics and the other social sciences. At most, this scientific 
economics offered an account of one aspect of economic behaviour, 
that confined to a Weberian economic order. Systemic economic 
properties and the impact of the non-economic upon the economic 
(and vice versa) were to be studied elsewhere. In short, the marginalist 
revolution and its aftermath witnessed the division of the social 
sciences into separate disciplines, with economics appropriating the 
study of economic rationality, together with the presumption that 
its scope of analysis was to be confined to individual optimisation 
directed towards or even within the market.
As is already at least implicit, this outcome involved the resolution 
of a tension across a number of dimensions – rational/irrational; 
market/non-market; economic/non-economic; social/asocial; 
historical/ahistorical – and the division of subject matter and 
methods across disciplines, and so on. The strains across these aspects 
intensified once economics had established technical supremacy by 
its own standards. For, crucially, whilst the corresponding economic 
principles, such as utility maximisation, are in principle universal 
and without specificity of time, place and sphere of activity, in 
practice in the first instance a settlement was reached in which 
their scope was more or less confined to (the limited concept of) the 
market, to supply and demand. Once the technical apparatus had 
been established, however, and lay, as it continues to do, at the core 
of economics as a discipline, the potential boundaries attached to its 
scope of application are unlimited. If behaviour is to be rational, it 
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should be rational in all circumstances. At most, there is an accepted 
boundary between the rational and the irrational although where 
it lies has no fixed parameters. Hence is created the underpinnings 
of economics imperialism, whether in its initial as-if-perfect market 
phase or in its later as-if-imperfect market phase.
In short, the process of establishing rationality within economics 
(in the narrow technical form of utility maximisation as if a logic 
of choice) severely constrained the scope of subject matter, at 
least until a decade or so after the Second World War. But, once 
established, as a core part of the discipline, subject matter was 
open to an expanded coverage, both within economics itself and 
across other social sciences, with Becker as pioneer. But, by the 
time that social capital comes on the scene, Becker as economics 
imperialist is already in the process of being superseded in deference 
to emphasis upon a market imperfection approach, itself a more 
conducive housing, both for economics imperialism in general and 
social capital in particular.
3.3  departInG neo-lIBeralIsM?
The relationship between social capital and economics will be taken 
up again in Chapter 8. In major part, it is indicative of the much 
bigger story being played out around the rise of social capital across 
the social sciences more generally, for which Robert Putnam is 
universally acknowledged as the leading figure, reputed in the 1990s 
to be the single most cited author across the social sciences. His 
initial work on Italy, suggesting that differences in social capital 
between north and south had persisted from the twelfth century, 
thus explaining differential development, had been undertaken by 
him for at least a decade before he first used the term itself. It only 
first appears in the final chapter of his book Making Democracy 
Work (1993), and seems to have been picked up casually and oppor-
tunistically as a theoretical afterthought out of acquaintance with 
Coleman’s contribution on how social capital allows for better 
school performance.
But Putnam exploded into prominence, once he moved on to 
pastures new in the United States, with the use of social capital 
to emphasise the role of television and the loss of associational 
life in civil society as the source of the country’s economic and 
social decline.12 Whether for Italy or the United States, Putnam’s 
work has been subject to what can only be described as a deluge 
of criticism, on methodological, theoretical and empirical grounds 
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(see Chapter 8). Disregarding these criticisms for the moment, there 
are six elements of his approach that are of significance for the 
continuing evolution of social capital.
First, despite the nostalgia for a putative associational and civil 
life of the past and explicit acknowledgement of debt to Coleman, 
there is little or no reference to the rational choice origins of social 
capital, and even less to the alternative root (and route) offered by 
Bourdieu. This was essential in order to offer some appeal within an 
intellectual environment that was moving away from neo-liberalism 
and rational choice, and to appear progressive in relation to it, 
while nonetheless hardly breaking with its emphasis on the virtues 
of capitalism – though it was explicitly posed in these terms much 
more rarely than in those of liberal democracy (Blakeley 2002).
In short, Putnam’s break with rational choice is definite but 
limited. Second, this does itself involve a minimalist scope of 
analytical framework. In a sense, personal history aside and 
reflecting origins within his Italian work, it is otherwise more or 
less arbitrary what variable should form the focus for promoting the 
social capital hypothesis. For Putnam, associational life was most 
favoured, although, for example, for Coleman it had been family 
and neighbourhood. The addition of television as a significant factor 
neatly combined an explanation for the failure of civic involvement 
as well as appealing to the values and activities of the past in reaction 
against the (not so) new (albeit without reference to the substance 
of television programming and its commercialism in light both of 
its corporate source of provision and customers for revenue).
Third, the minimal scope of social capital has been complemented 
or accommodated through its structural confinement within civil 
society, equally narrowly defined. This has the effect of constructing 
social theory on the basis of a structural division between civil 
society and everything else, and isolating civil society for scrutiny of 
its impact within itself and upon other structures, most notably the 
state and the economy. The results, and limitations, are evident from 
Figure 2.3. Quite apart from whether it is appropriate, however 
natural (or fetishised), to structure understanding of society in 
this way – an alternative, for example, being an emphasis upon 
class and other relations and how they are expressed through 
these structures – state and economy might be thought to be more 
important determinants of civil society than vice versa (as A and/or 
B variables within the diagram).13
Fourth, there is heavy reliance upon an empiricist methodology, 
US pragmatism if you like, especially in the form of finding loose or 
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statistically grounded relations between variables – television and 
decline for example. This is in part a consequence of the continuing 
influence of the rational choice origins of Putnam’s social capital, in 
that this empiricism takes its categories of analysis (not least social 
capital and civil society) as unproblematic and universal in scope 
across time and place. There is little or no attention to the shifting 
meaning of the categories of analysis other than in the problems that 
this poses in measuring them or describing them for quantitative or 
(narrow) qualitative analysis, respectively. Just as civil society is civil 
society, so politics is politics, religion is religion, and so on.
Fifth, as previously argued in Chapter 2, this all involves a 
reductionism to social capital as explanatory variable. This takes 
the form of homogenisation of the diverse under the social capital 
umbrella, and the use of social capital as residual explanatory 
variable where it is not posed as prime mover. In this way, the 
potential is created for the unlimited scope of application of social 
capital. As Mohan and Mohan put it:14
Given these significant conceptual problems, one wonders why 
social capital has become so popular over the past decade … 
scholars are interested in it because it apparently offers the power 
to explain residual variance in models of several kinds of activity. 
(2002, p.200)
Last, and neatly reflecting the nature of the limited break with 
neo-liberalism, is the overwhelmingly positive associations attached 
to social capital. If laissez-faire involves leaving everything to the 
market, social capital suggests that the market does need to be 
complemented by a healthy civil society (as is accepted, as remarked 
above, by neo-liberalism). Whilst the possibility of dark, negative, 
tellingly perverse social capital is accepted, it is generally overlooked 
altogether or only acknowledged in passing as the abnormal. The 
self-interested, indeed atomised and selfish, individual of rational 
choice theory is allowed to evolve a little into a person with greater 
sociability and benevolence. If these can be consolidated into social 
capital within civil society, then market and non-market neatly 
complement one another in furnishing more effective outcomes. 
The nature of the individual constituted by social capital theory 
is, accordingly, remarkably thin, being deprived of the formative 
influences of class, gender, race, and so on (unless these themselves 
be seen as social capital). By the same token, the analytical structure 
connecting the formation of the individual to the formation of social 
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structures and outcomes is equally shallow. For it exactly parallels 
the previous approach of neo-liberalism, market versus non-market, 
but with the difference that for neo-liberalism an almost totally 
negative take is implicitly adopted on the social capital that is not 
spontaneous, in which it is associated with corruption and nepotism 
at the expense of the efficacy of the market.
These matters will be taken up in Chapter 9 in the context of how 
social capital has informed policy debates. For the moment, it is 
appropriate to observe that the Putnamesque stamp on social capital 
was decisive in precluding from social theory those variables that 
were previously associated not only with civil society itself but also 
with the state and the economy (understood as capitalism). These 
include power, conflict, class, gender, race and so on. As covered in 
Chapter 4, this has allowed the more recent social capital literature 
to gather an ever greater momentum, by the simple expedient of 
bringing back in what was left out in the earlier literature. One 
effect has been to build upon Putnam by criticising him and others 
for these omissions and adding all and sundry to the social capital 
juggernaut. Another effect has been to allow social capital to 
absorb all criticism by adding another variable or three rather than 
prompting fundamental reconsideration of the underlying approach 
and its continuing methodology and methods.
3.4  socIal capItal as plouGhMan’s lunch
In addition, having provided the platform on which to expand the 
universe of social capital in the future, Putnam also allowed for a 
particular reflection on the historical origins of social capital, an 
exercise in which he is wont to engage casually himself. This is 
less concerned with highlighting the embarrassing rational choice 
origins of the term than with a preoccupation with its use prior to 
Coleman (and the neglected Bourdieu). An academic micro-industry 
has emerged tracing out who used social capital when, but, it should 
be emphasised, confining itself to the Putnamesque meaning of the 
term, as opposed to other meanings that are even more disturbing 
for the social capitalists than the rational choice connotations (see 
the next section).
The corresponding literature has stretched back to highlight 
the work of, and presumed precedent set by, Lyda Hanifan, in 
particular.15 His focus was on rural school community centres, 
and he defined social capital as ‘those tangible substances [that] 
count for most in the daily lives of people’ (Hanifan 1916, p.130, 
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emphasis added). But, by far the most accomplished contribution 
in this vein of putatively retracing the origins of social capital has 
been made by Farr (2004). He has brought to the fore the use of 
social capital by John Dewey at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, implicitly accusing earlier fans of Hanifan of oversight. He 
has also highlighted how social capital was then used differently 
in many respects from how it is used today. He cites, for example, 
a definition of social capital in a book by Mary Austin that was 
commissioned by the YWCA and published in 1918:16
Social capital is the measure of group potentiality. It grows out of 
the capacity of men to combine. Ten men socially combined can 
do more than ten men working separately. This extra potentiality 
is the Social Capital of that group. But its value depends on the 
vitality of the spiritual organization of the group. Men are said 
to be spiritually organized when they are held together by some 
alikeness of aim of spirit. (Farr 2007, p.57)
With metaphorical emphasis on production (by men), married to 
spirit, Austin is shown to deplore the neglect of the potential of both 
social capital and, paradoxically, women by industrial managers 
in promotion of the US war effort. In this vein, so the search can 
go on for pioneers in the world of social capital and contributors 
would sparkle if doing better than Farr (but see below for a broader 
search of alternative uses).
In debate with Farr (2004 and 2007), however, I take an entirely 
different approach (Fine 2007e). His view is that social capital must 
have an intellectual history; let’s discover it. Mine is that social 
capital does not have an intellectual history at all (beyond the last 20 
years or so), although such a history can be and has been invented in 
light of those 20 years. In other words, the history of social capital is 
a fairy tale, pure invention. Significantly, for example, the librarian 
Forsman (2005) deploys the analogy of social capital as a conceptual 
Sleeping Beauty. Indeed, not only has the late-twentieth-century kiss 
awakened the princess, it has had the same effect on what were 
otherwise relatively obscure social scientists of the past, including 
Hanifan. Those precursors of social capital had hardly been heard 
of, let alone referenced, before social capital became popular. Far 
from signifying the source of social capital, they are themselves its 
ex post invention – Hospers (2006, p.723), for example, raising the 
profile through obituary of another social capital ‘pioneer’, Jane 
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Jacobs, ‘an early, maybe the first, evolutionary urban economist and 
modern inventor of the concept of “social capital”’.
In setting aside social capital as a concept with historical origins 
of its own, three arguments are of importance. First, as already seen, 
the volume and influence of the literature over the past two decades 
have been as extraordinary as their scarcity before that. This, then, 
is not to suggest that there is no intellectual history or context to 
social capital, only that this must be used to explain its absence in 
the past, not to trace its presence from there. And this must be set 
against its explosive contemporary growth, explanations for which 
have already been offered in terms of the intellectual climate and 
dynamic of the last 20 years.
Second, then, why is use of social capital so minimal in the past 
(especially when present-day proponents tend to argue that it was in 
there all the time, occasionally in name but more often in principle)? 
In part, this is explained by the oxymoronic character of social 
capital. If social capital is distinctive, there must be some capital that 
is not social. The vast majority of social theory, however, especially 
when we delve further into the past, tends to see (economic) capital 
in its social and historical context, as attached to capitalism. So 
there will be an aversion to adopting a term that at least implicitly 
regards the economic as constituted by a capital that is not social. By 
the same token, there will be an aversion to attaching the notion of 
social capital to something that is non-economic, especially once the 
economic is associated with capitalism and its market/non-market 
distinctions. The exception to this has been mainstream economics, 
but this has traditionally interpreted capital as being derived from a 
physicalist interpretation, often absenting social relations altogether 
in light of its methodological individualism.
Third, as is evident from the ‘search and find’ intellectual history 
of social capital (see the next paragraph), this conundrum has not 
entirely deterred its use in the past. Nonetheless, as Farr has accepted 
in his debates with me, those uses that do not conform to the present 
perspective of social capitalists have simply been overlooked. If we 
only look for an invented ploughman’s lunch of cheese, pickle and 
bread, that is what we will be liable to find. Yet there have been 
prominent and recent uses of the term ‘social capital’ that have 
been totally overlooked in its history and continuing use. This is 
especially true, for example, of O’Connor’s (1973) Fiscal Crisis of 
the State, once a standard contribution to the political economy 
of the welfare state, in which social capital essentially serves to 
represent state expenditures for social reproduction and, as such, 
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is both an economic and a social category, presumed functional for 
both capital accumulation and working-class acquiescence.
But, in addition, whilst researching the place of social capital 
within the discipline of history at the end of 2006 (see Chapter 5), I 
made a JSTOR search on ‘social capital’ at www.jstor.org. This has 
the advantage over the BIDS searches undertaken previously (see 
previous chapter) of allowing the user to specify history journals 
alone, the object of the exercise. It has the disadvantage of restricted 
availability: journals are subject to a variable moving wall of a few 
years, access being denied to those from more recent years; the most 
recent history journal reference on social capital was from 2004. 
The JSTOR search, though, is more comprehensive, covering the 
presence of the term anywhere in the text of the journals, and not 
just in key words, for example.
The JSTOR search through the social capital literature brings 
to light for the first time, if not surprisingly, other more refined, 
interesting and significant marriages of the social with capital, and 
ones that are appropriately teased out by historians. There has been 
a missing history of the history of social capital. For historians, and 
others, have been concerned with the social as economic capital, not 
as its antithesis – not least because differing social forms of economic 
capital are attached to what are often major processes of historical 
change. Leaving aside references to social capital in which ‘capital’ 
is used in the sense of ‘capital city’, the usage that is most common 
and least remarkable (other than in being overlooked in intellectual 
histories) is in the sense of economic infrastructure, especially but 
not exclusively transport. Such social capital is reasonably deemed 
in historical studies to be a key element in economic development. 
And it is but a short step from social capital as physical or economic 
infrastructure to its more general position as social and economic 
infrastructure, incorporating education for example.
Strikingly, then, Dubé et al. (1957, pp.1–2) suggest, in examining 
Canada’s economic prospects, that ‘[s]ocial capital is taken to include 
schools and universities, churches and related buildings, hospitals, 
roads and streets, airports, sewer and water systems, and other 
buildings and installations appertaining to public institutions and 
departments of government’, with some agonising over arbitrary 
boundaries in constructing statistical series and the presence or 
not of a direct or indirect profit motive (social capital as social 
or business services). But they ultimately settle on a definition 
that is essentially the opposite of its current location within civil 
society: ‘assets for which society as a whole, through the medium of 
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governments and other public institutions, desires to assume a direct 
and continuing responsibility’ (p.3, emphasis added). Inevitably, 
then, these considerations attach social capital to the role of the 
state, public expenditure and nationalised industries – the opposite 
of its use today.17 Indeed, McDougall (1966) sees social capital as 
state capital; Zobler (1962) sees it as being any economic capital 
other than physical capital; Simon (1983) argues that social capital 
in the form of roads is a major factor in reducing malnutrition; and 
Nast (2000) sees social capital as infrastructure, as the means of 
combating racial disadvantage by rectifying unequal provision.
On a different tack, social capital, as is entirely reasonable, 
has appeared in the history literature as the total or aggregate of 
economic capital. But, in general, such usage has been far from 
mundane because it has been endowed with an analytical content 
that goes far beyond adding up over individual capitals, and this 
is so in a variety of ways. In general, there is the presumption 
that the whole is more than or at least different from the sum 
of the individual parts. To a large extent, stepping outside the 
social capital literature, historical or otherwise, this is a matter 
of economic theory or political economy, one with a systemic or 
holistic bent. It concerns the workings of the economy as a whole, 
and the place of the social capital, or capital as a whole, within 
those workings. This is most obvious in the case of Marxist political 
economy, and of Marx himself, in addressing the laws of motion of 
capitalism, such as the tendency of the rate of profit to be equalised 
and to fall (see Fine and Saad-Filho 2004 for an overview).18 More 
generally, it is indicative of social capital in this sense that it has 
properties that are different from, or independent of, the individual 
components out of which it is constituted. By the same token, social 
capital once considered in aggregate, systemically, can be broken 
down again into its separate components in ways that differ from 
how it was made up out of individual capitals. Thus, themes that 
have occurred across the history literature with explicit reference 
to social capital include its national and international distribution, 
ownership and control, its monopolisation, and its impact upon 
the prospects for inducing productivity increase through spillovers, 
diffusion or whatever. These and other themes around the total, or 
social, capital are so well worn as to be obvious ports of call for 
occasional reference to them in the past as social capital.19
Another strand of the history literature lies somewhere askew of 
the infrastructure and total capital approaches. For the idea of social 
capital can be attached to the claims of society and not just to the 
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individuals who own it. For all forms of revolutionary socialism, 
this is an incentive to highlight the exploitation of those who work 
by those who do not, merely by virtue of (collective) ownership (or 
not) of a portion of the social capital. As quoted by Kelso from the 
French cooperative labour movement of the 1870s:
The social capital or the instruments of production, which is the 
same thing, should not be appropriated either by individuals or 
groups of individuals; but it should, by virtue of the principles 
of solidarity so resolutely asserted nowadays, be the impersonal, 
indivisible, and inalienable property of the masses of workers, 
considered either by trades, or by department, city, canton, or 
commune. (1936, p.179)
Such considerations, in the context of solidarity over risk of 
injury in South Wales coalmining, lead Bloor explicitly to reject 
social capital:
Resemblance to theorists’ social capital and policy-makers’ 
empowering partnerships is only a superficial one, that the 
improvements in pit safety stemmed from a collective impulse 
that owed more to class consciousness than to civic engagement, 
and that miners sought to improve safety in self-conscious 
opposition to owners and managers rather than in partnership. 
(2002, p.92)
Thus,
the Fed and the South Wales miners were not engaging in civic 
effort, rather they were engaging in a process of transforma-
tive conscientization … Only if the coalowners and managers 
[and government officials] are excluded from South Wales civic 
society can the collective health behaviour of the miners be linked 
positively with contemporary analyses of social capital.
Or, as Smith and Kulynych (2002a, p.169) put it more generally, 
‘for Putnam to conceptualize … [working-class] solidarity as a form 
of social capital makes a mockery of … aspirations that working-
class solidarity can help birth a new world not plagued by capitalist 
economic, political and social relations’.20
And, at the opposite extreme politically to critique of social capital 
as capitalism is the critique of the latter’s destructive implications 
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for the ancient regime. As described by Wilson of early-nineteenth-
century Action Française:
The Jew was here the ideal symbol of the evils of urban capitalism 
and of its disruptive mutability … However, if certain aspects 
of capitalist society were repudiated by the Action Française, 
notably any features that threatened to alter the social hierarchy, 
capitalism, as such was staunchly defended … on the contention 
that man was not an individual but an heir, the inheritor of a 
social capital. (1976, p.146)
Similar sentiments, but in favour of a reformed capitalism, are to be 
found in Catterall’s (1993) study of the interwar labour movement 
in the United Kingdom, especially once married to nonconformist 
socialism, and its corresponding use of social capital:
This objective, of a better society in which all God’s children 
will be able to live fulfilled lives without the blights of poverty, 
unemployment or poor housing and education, provided a moral 
vision of the purpose of socialism. The emphasis was thus on the 
better distribution of social capital. (p.683)
Once attached to the capital of society, social capital for the labour 
movement, and especially for nonconformist socialists, took on 
responsibilities of its own as well as requiring responsibility of 
individuals. Social capital must be put to the public and individual 
good through moderating the excesses of private ownership, even 
to the point of abolishing it.
Of course, milder stances can be adopted, as reported in Elwitt’s 
study of education and the social question in late-nineteenth-century 
France. Elwitt quotes a commentator on Comte:
The spiritual power, supported by a powerful public opinion, 
would then excommunicate the squanderer of social capital. 
Corporations will boycott him. These sanctions constitute 
sufficient force to prevent the industrial and financial patriciate 
from becoming a parasitic, corrupting, and tyrannical plutocracy. 
(1982, p.59)
This is an appeal to social capital to show its human face. As Elwitt 
suggests: ‘the summons to the rich held the hope that they would 
appear with generous purses’. The good news/bad news nature 
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of social capital is more pervasive and less overt for Smith in his 
account of the Tonypandy community in 1910:
Effluence poured into the river from works and houses, so that in 
the summer the high, rich smell of decayed matter and slaughtered 
meat was pungent indeed. Nevertheless the prevailing grimness 
of the environment was countered, in turn, by the very social 
capital which had brought it into forced being. Here a whirligig 
of sounds, smells and sights caught up a population barely a 
generation (and often not that) away from the land. Packaged 
foods and ready-made goods were consumer luxuries that made 
shops seductive enticers to debt as well as welcome centres of 
social intercourse. (1980, p.172)
Thus a truly social and antisocial capital!
But when it comes to those who still retain their attachment to 
the land, and traditional forms of ownership, social capital takes 
on a meaning that is incompatible with capitalist ownership, social 
or otherwise. For, as Fischbach observes:
In colonial settings such as India, this sometimes came into conflict 
with local ‘units of thought’ about land usage that understood land 
as social capital and not merely a tool for rational exploitation. 
The British honed their colonial land polices in regions such as 
India, Australia, Fiji, British Honduras, Egypt – and, in the case 
of Transjordan, neighbouring Palestine. (2001, p.536)
Thus, land as social capital is economic by departing from the 
principles of private ownership and use (see also Logan and 
Mengisteab 1993 for Africa).
Exactly the opposite is primarily the case in the most obvious 
collective and hence social form of ownership of capital, that 
attached to finance. As Bryer perceptively reveals in his study of the 
emergence of limited liability in the United Kingdom in the 1850s, 
this is not primarily a matter of exploitation, squander, effluent, 
access to land or whirligig, nor even of naked self-interest as was 
recognised by those in pursuit of, and opposed to, these. For:
As William Entwhistle, a banker representing the Manchester 
Commercial Association, and strident opponent of change, 
neatly put it, the choice on offer was between whether ‘we deal, 
and ought to deal, with men as individuals and not with an 
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abstraction called capital, which we are thus called upon to 
recognise as possessing a separate and independent existence’ ... 
this distinction between a world fit for individual capitalists and 
a world fit for social capital, was the axis on which the debate 
turned, a debate over, and choice between, different theories of 
political economy. (1997, p.44)
In short, limited liability needed acceptance of social capital both in 
practice and in principle and, for Bryer, this is itself best expressed 
by Marx, for whom:
With unlimited liability capital could not free itself from the idi-
osyncrasies of its owner and conform to the law of social capital, 
to be employed to earn the risk-adjusted general rate of profit. 
From the point of view of social capital, an ‘equal return for equal 
capital’ was of a higher moral order than the responsibility of 
individual capitalists for their debts. (p.49)
Thus, with limited liability, we have social capital without risk of loss 
of other assets contingent upon collective performance, something 
anticipated in the commenda of mediaeval Mediterranean trade, 
although Udovitch (1962, p.198) sees this as a reason for asserting 
that ‘in the commenda there is no social capital formed’ even though 
profits and risks are shared by investors and their agents.
Yet it is the stock exchange that is social capital par excellence. 
You share simply by putting up money to buy. Barsky and DeLong 
(1990, p.268) view it ‘as a social capital allocation mechanism’. 
This is hardly controversial although, from Keynes and after if not 
before, there have been different views than theirs over its efficacy 
in anticipating and generating the swings of the twentieth century in 
response to bull and bear markets. Does social capital in this form 
generate sufficient investment, allocate it efficiently, and temper 
rather than generate economic crises? Posing such questions, let 
alone answering them, is not to be found in the modern social 
capital literature despite the money-like properties of social capital 
in some respects, and its application to the recently highly prominent 
world of microfinance and Grameen banking (Chapter 4). Indeed, 
I do not know of even a single study of social capital, in this sense, 
that critically engages with that legendary network of associates 
known as yuppies, who drive the financial system or at least its 
inflated rewards.21
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3.5  concludInG reMarKs
One of the most remarkable examples of the McDonaldisation of 
social theory through social capital comes from my own experience. 
At the end of the 1990s, I had done my best to access everything 
written on social capital in preparing my book. I came across the 
World Bank website on social capital (see Fine 2001a, Chapter 9, and 
Chapter 6 of the present volume for a fuller account) and found it 
had its own annotated bibliography of hundreds of items compiled, 
interestingly, at the University of Michigan under the leadership of 
Professors Lindon Robison (Department of Agricultural Economics) 
and Marcelo Siles (Institute for Public Policy and Social Research). 
They are, to put it mildly, at the extreme end of rational choice 
(economics) and economics imperialism. They had done the work 
under a $27,000 contract from the World Bank. To my dismay, I 
soon realised that they had included a majority of entries that I had 
failed to acknowledge and, even more astonishing, these appeared in 
many cases to have preceded what I had taken to be the emergence 
of social capital over the previous decade. To my continuing 
amazement, it turned out that E.P. Thompson and Barrington Moore 
had been social capitalists. All was explained when at last I came 
across an abstract that confessed that the author being abstracted 
had not himself used the term but he could be interpreted as if he 
had! Everything could be, nay had to be, forced through the social 
capital mincer in view of its otherwise unfortunate absence from 
the literature.
Social science has long recognised the mutual interaction of, and 
tensions between, economic and social relations without ever having 
felt the need to collapse them into the notion of social capital. For 
the record, remarkably close to the earlier quote from Austin is an 
even earlier indication from Marx that he anticipated it all, if with a 
rather different audience in mind than the YWCA. It is to be found 
in the German Ideology of 1845/6:
It follows … that a certain mode of production, or industrial 
stage, is always combined with a certain mode of co-operation, 
or social stage, and this mode of cooperation is itself a 
productive force.22
Yet social capital is at best the second most prominent concept 
emerging to rapid prominence in the 1990s. It is heavily trumped 
by ‘globalisation’, which, nonetheless, shares many of the charac-
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teristics hypothesised above, not least that its substantive concerns 
if not its terminology have long been recognised by social science. 
Equally, though, there are some aspects that distinguish globalisation 
from social capital and which, in addition, explain why the two 
have extremely rarely been utilised in tandem. It has addressed 
the economy (with finance and, to a lesser degree, culture as key 
metaphors), the state (and whether its powers wither away or 
not), and issues of power, conflict and the systemic. To do so, it 
has broken with postmodernism, neo-liberalism and economics 
imperialism in ways that go far beyond the tame search for 
collective self-help that is attached to social capital. If the latter 
has a conceptual history, it can only be invented, for it begins 
with the last decade of the twentieth century, reflecting peculiar 
material and intellectual circumstances. Whether social capital has 
a conceptual future remains to be seen, but it is hardly a welcome 
prospect other than to social capitalists themselves.




As already revealed in earlier chapters, with the capacity to range 
over social theory, what constitutes social capital has expanded 
without limit alongside its preferred as well as its marginal domains 
of application. The manner in which this has happened has been 
to incorporate within the definition of social capital any variables 
that might otherwise be thought either to condition it or to be its 
underlying source. This creates a rolling momentum that even the 
metaphor of snowball, and certainly not that of a rolling stone, 
fails to capture, as each of these only moves in one direction at a 
time, and social capital gathers moss and all other scattered debris 
into its accommodating embrace. The result has been to render 
social capital definitionally chaotic, degrading the concepts that 
it incorporates – not least because of the conflation of cause and 
consequence. This glosses over the capacity for social capital to be 
both positive and negative, universalising across different situations. 
And, as revealed in Chapter 9, social capital fails to deliver on its 
exaggerated promises with regard to policy relevance, apart from 
offering a highly prominent rhetoric along the lines of creating 
and/or using more (positive) social capital to smooth rather than 
to determine, let alone enhance, the policy process.
But it is not only the scattered debris of social theory that has 
been incorporated by social capital. As a result of its ultimate 
origins in civil society and the hidden, even discarded, figure of 
the (rational) individual, it initially necessarily set aside the major 
and traditional variables of social theory. Whether by personal 
disposition, changing intellectual climate (against neo-liberalism), 
partial response to criticism, or the sheer unavoidable weight of 
presence in specific case study, major variables could not be set 
aside fully and indefinitely. In other words, there has also been a 
strong and irresistible motivation for expanding the definitional 
scope of social capital to correct for the absence of the decisive 
and, let’s be honest, the obvious. Given the broad and broadening 
definitions of social capital, the inclusion within its scope of the 
60
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all-embracing relational – distinctions by class, gender and race, for 
example – cannot be overlooked. As a result, their glaring absence 
in defining social capital in the first instance becomes apparent. Yet 
there is a simple remedy. Far from starting over with these variables 
to the fore, the solution is to bring back in what has necessarily been 
left out in order to get social capital going in the first place. This 
has now become commonplace within the literature across a wide 
range of variables, so that it warrants an acronym, BBI, ‘bringing 
back in’. Section 4.2 discusses some general aspects of BBI by social 
capital, although specific instances are unavoidable.
In Section 4.3, the process of BBI gender is focused upon, a 
previously omitted factor that has possibly reappeared more 
strongly than most others. This is then followed by consideration 
of a couple of other variables that have been reintroduced, race and 
community. Across each of these, as also with gender, the presence 
tends to remain limited, often unconscious or unquestioning in 
terms of its wider implications and, not surprisingly, the manner 
of reintroduction can be both token and generally degrading of the 
rich literature and understanding that had previously been forged. 
This follows from the attempt to fit the variables into social capital, 
thereby offering a degrading by the degraded. Social capital tends 
to detract from rather than to add to whatever it incorporates. 
This is particularly brought home by the main focus of Section 
4.4, the BBI of ‘context’. Here, it is shown that the literature does 
acknowledge that the universal claims of social capital are, indeed, 
shallow since it has different effects in different circumstances. The 
consequence, as already mentioned above and addressed in Chapter 
9, is to preclude policy implications – it all depends upon everything 
else – but the response of social capital as such is simply to add 
context as a variable, thereby degrading the meaning of context 
itself to the presence or not of other variables.
This is illustrative of the wonderfully flexible response of social 
capital to any criticism. In case of omitted variables, no problem, 
add them. It is like punching a pillow, or a cross between a pillow 
and a flabby balloon, since there is some, but little, reshaping of the 
literature as it evolves. Nor is it without irony. For the reintroduction 
of context breathes memories of bringing Bourdieu back in (BBBI). 
As demonstrated in the concluding remarks, this is a Bourdieu who 
is degraded too, with limited attention being paid to the analytical 
richness deployed in his (partially flawed) understanding of the 
contextual reproduction of social stratification.
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4.2  socIal capItal as BlacK hole
The previous chapters have brushed a broad picture, with the 
occasional detail, of the nature and dynamic of social capital. In brief, 
it has become a surrogate for social relations/interaction and, as such, 
has evolved a gargantuan scope of application, become chaotic in 
definition and theory, and has degraded the social theory with which 
it comes into contact and absorbs. Its diversity of scope and content 
reflects its serving as a universal category of analysis, necessarily 
homogenising over diversity and extinguishing complexity across 
time, place and circumstance. Further, in practice, social capital has 
incorporated a core content that has shifted away from Bourdieu 
through Coleman to Putnam, at the expense of marginalising more 
radical, even some conventional, perspectives.
These features of social capital have not gone unnoticed in the 
literature. Indeed, they have allowed it to flourish, as a typical 
response has been to focus on one or more of the aspects of social 
capital or to add one or more of those that have been omitted. 
The latter is almost inevitable in any considered account, especially 
case studies, where specificities involve either qualifying the role 
of social capital in light of conditioning variables or redefining it 
to incorporate them. The result is the BBI of variables that have 
previously been disregarded, despite what has previously been 
their prominence within social theory. It involves the paradox that 
attempts to address the deficiencies of social capital have the effect 
of worsening the chaotic definitional conundrums, and so on.
At the grand level, this situation is in part graphically summarised 
by Montgomery (2000, p.228), for whom ‘social capital remains 
a black hole in the astronomy of social science’. But, at least as a 
starting point, it should be added that ‘civil society [is] the sea in 
which social capital swims’ (Heffron 2000, p.483). And, as observed 
by Edwards and Foley (2001), this is a big ocean which conceals at 
least three monsters – socialisation, public or quasi-public functions, 
and representation and contestation other than through the state. 
Accordingly, Inkeles astutely comments that,
[c]oming on the intellectual scene only after material capital and 
human capital had staked their claims, social capital is a residual 
category. It gets what is left over. But the situation is not that bad, 
because there is a great deal left over. (2000, p.246)
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This places demands upon social capital to address, to BBI, the 
big stuff. Thus, Radcliffe (2004) argues that social capital is dead 
unless it brings back in the appropriate elements with which to 
address the geography of development, civil society and inequality. 
Mohan and Mohan (2002) suggest that a geography of social capital 
would need to filter the discipline’s concerns – with demography, 
location, uneven development, institutions, context, process, and so 
on – through the concept. Johnston and Percy-Smith (2003, p.332) 
seek to resolve the chaos and confusion that surrounds social capital 
by closing with the suggestion that there be ‘a re-engagement with 
historical context, structural considerations, path dependency and 
the role of the state at the local and national level’. Keating (2001, 
p.217) points to the need to untangle the relationships between 
‘culture, institutions, social relations and leadership’ in addressing 
local regional development, and so the same would apply to social 
capital. And Chandhoke (2001), starting from the dark side of 
social capital, suggests that both civil society and social capital are 
sites of struggle over the democratic nature of the state, not just a 
complement or substitute for it. Accordingly, specific attention needs 
to be paid in depth to gender, class, race, and so on.
And dynamics means BBI social processes, the mechanisms 
by which social capital is attached to outcomes (Keele 2005). 
Interestingly, such an imperative has been raised in contributions 
that are individualistic in outlook, precisely because attention is 
focused on how the individual is translated into, or reproduces, 
the social. Thus, for Rothstein and Stolle,1 political institutions and 
embeddedness are essential for addressing the creation and diversity 
of social capital. Indeed,
[g]enerally, the struggle to distinguish the ‘good, the bad and 
the ugly’ in the world of social interactions underlines the lack 
of theoretical parameters that define a micro-theory of social 
capital. In sum, so far we know that the use of membership in 
voluntary associations as a measurement of social capital should 
be handled with caution [in explaining why one interaction should 
lead to another]; and that its use as a producer of social capital 
is misplaced. (2002, p.6)
However, ‘we argue for a methodological individualism which 
emphasizes that it is necessary to account for the motives, intentions 
and beliefs that makes the individuals act in a certain way’. It 
follows that ‘institutional explanations must be combined with an 
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explanation of the social mechanisms that induce individuals to act 
in accordance with the demands of the institutions and therewith 
reproduce them’ (p.14).2 The issue of the how of social capital is 
also addressed by Torsvik (2000, p.453) through game theory; he 
observes that ‘the machinery of social capital resembles a black box’. 
He draws attention to two different mechanisms that might deliver 
the goods – the ‘trust’ that derives, for example, from repeated 
prisoner dilemma games with punishment for opportunism, and 
pro-social moral principles that may or may not be induced from 
self-interested behaviour.3
But this is just one amongst many ways of explaining individual 
and social action. Stone (2001) argues that social capital as trust 
does not really move beyond the micro-level to get to grips with civic 
capacity, for which what is required is initiative and innovation in 
new, difficult and conflictual circumstances rather than in mundane 
repetitive daily life. In addressing the environment, Pretty and 
Ward (2001) extend social capital to range over trust, reciprocity, 
exchange, common rules, norms, sanctions, connectedness, 
networks and groups, the latter making up the local, internal, 
external, vertical and horizontal – with three phases of development 
from ‘reactive-dependence’ through ‘realization-independence’ to 
‘awareness-independence’. Myant and Smith (2006, p.168) point 
to the limitations of social capital as an approach to regional 
development, especially in transition economies, unless it addresses 
‘the importance of actors playing active roles, initiating ideas, 
reaching compromises and forming coalitions that enabled them 
to exploit complementary assets’. Krishna (2002b), in a study of 
participation in 69 village communities in India, stresses the need 
to disaggregate into glue and ‘gear’,4 structure (such as caste) and 
action respectively, with the need for a capable agency for the latter, 
in part dependent upon personal attributes. In an entirely different 
context, Murphy echoes Krishna in attaching social capital to the 
presence of an agency to deploy it:
a firm’s capacity for innovation is related not only to the quality 
of the social structures available to it … but that innovation is 
also driven by the social capabilities or competences of the agents 
managing change within the enterprise. (2002, p.614)
So it is recognised that, ‘it is imperative that we more closely examine 
and better elucidate the cognitive processes that enable individuals 
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to trust outside narrow groups’ (p.615). And in the context of 
violence, Goodhand et al. conclude of social capital that
the concept has value in providing a unifying interdisciplinary 
discourse, which may counterbalance the overemphasis … on the 
economic functions of violence at the expense of social analysis. 
However, the critical factor is the interaction between social, 
economic and political processes, rather than notions of social 
capital divorced from the wider context. Rather than focusing 
on engineering social capital, external agencies need to focus 
on understanding better the preconditions for social capital 
formation … This requires as a starting point a rigorous analysis 
of political and economic processes. (2000, p.405)
As is apparent, social capital is either being forced or is flowing 
naturally onto the terrain of individual and social action. For 
Thompson (2003, p.7), approaching social capital through networks 
involves ‘conduct’, itself comprised of ‘attributes, rules, conventions, 
habits, routines, standards, and “qualities” of networks’. Inevitably, 
social capital is subject to social construction (embedded within but 
not determined by its milieu); assemblages of diverse components; 
discourse as formative of but not determining linguistic practices; 
relations; self-reflecting practices, and so on. Significantly, Tuan et 
al. (2005), in investigating social capital as structural (networks) 
and cognitive (beliefs), seeks to validate the concept through asking 
interviewees how they themselves respond to the notion. If it is in, 
and of, use would not agents themselves be conscious of it? Such 
self-referential validation of social capital is extremely rare, despite, 
or possibly because of, doubts about the transferability of its diverse 
substance between diverse contexts. Precisely because the different 
elements in the social capital portfolio have different effects and 
in different ways, agents themselves are not liable to see them as 
common elements of the same thing.
There is, for example, a distinction to be made between 
emotional and instrumental supports and connections. Schmid 
(2002), following Sen, sees a norm of behaviour as being based 
on commitment and/or sympathy as distinct from self-interest. 
Consequently, both emotions and motives become a form of capital. 
This has implications for (national) trust surveys, since responses 
may reflect feelings as opposed to assessments. Whilst each may or 
may not affect action, they will do so in different ways, also in part 
dependent upon the radius or scope of trust. In case of the return 
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of a wallet left in a taxi, for example, this may not reflect honesty 
but levels of confidence in whether the police will pass it on if it is 
handed in.
So from the elements of grand theory down to the motives and 
emotions of individuals, there is no apparent limit to what has been, 
or may be, brought back in by social capital. Here are some more 
examples, with key words in bold, chosen for being representative 
of the literature and the process of BBI. Cattell (2001) finds social 
capital alongside social exclusion useful in explaining well-being and 
health, not least for a tower block resident who had been thrown 
out of home at the age of eleven.5 This is because deprivation can 
serve both as a source of despair and of motivation for the action 
and empathy that underpins social capital. La Ferrara (2002) puts 
forward a model of group membership, including potential for 
excludability, in which benefits from group membership increase 
with level of wealth and, testing it against rural Tanzanian data, 
finds that greater inequality means less social capital in the form 
of group membership.6 Brinton (2000) distinguishes personal and 
institutional social capital, the latter provided by Japanese schools 
that can serve as a conduit for screening entry into the labour 
market, in part as a form of social control.
Schafft and Brown (2003, p.331) tartly observe that ‘despite the 
occasional protestations from theorists that social capital theory 
can meaningfully account for power … in practice this is seldom, if 
ever, the case’. Similarly, Bowles and Gintis (2002, p. F419) suggest 
that social capital is popular with those on the right for correcting 
market imperfections and with those on the left for accepting that 
the market is not enough. They want something more than self-
interested behaviour, especially reciprocity, but also shame, over 
and above punishment, and honour. They prefer ‘community 
governance’ as a term in place of ‘social capital’. This is primarily 
because of the problems of making explicit contracts, even where 
conflicts of interest are limited, but these are worse the greater 
is the inequality and privilege that also serve to undermine the 
possibility of community governance. Drawing on a 1998 survey 
of 39,211 visitors to National Geographic website, Wellman et al. 
(2001) show that the Internet has an ambiguous effect on social 
capital, depending upon ‘community commitment’ and whether it 
is connecting or alienating (see Chapter 9 for further discussion of 
the Internet).
And all of this, and more, can be wrapped up in the appeal to 
culture. For Kliksberg, seeking to mobilise both for development 
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and poverty alleviation, sees culture as being a component of social 
capital: ‘Culture extends across all the dimensions of the social 
capital of a society, underlying the basic components of social capital 
such as mutual confidence, responsible civic behaviour, and degree 
of associativeness’ (1999, p.88).
In Kliksberg’s first case study, however, association, mutual 
confidence and civic behaviour arise as follows:
In 1971, several hundred poor people invaded some publicly-
owned land on the outskirts of Lima. They were joined by 
thousands of slum-dwellers from that city. The government 
stepped in to expel them, but finally agreed to let them settle on 
an extensive sandy wasteland. (p.89)
Of his second, he writes:
Underlying the [Venezuelan cooperative] Markets is a conception 
of life which, according to the actors involved, gives priority 
to solidarity, personal and group responsibility, transparency in 
relations, the creation of mutual confidence, personal initiative, 
and a readiness for hard work. (p.92)
Indeed, as recorded by a participant in the cooperative, ‘[t]he large 
numbers of hours spent on meetings might be seen as a loss of 
productivity, but in fact they are the main means for achieving 
the dedication, enthusiasm and commitment of the workers in the 
organization’ (p.93).
Whether such labour is appropriately deemed to be a source of 
social capital, it certainly is not (economic) capital and might even 
be thought to be its antithesis! For Campbell, writing of social 
capital in Africa,
the usefulness of the concept is limited by insufficient attention 
to differences of culture, history, and politics between western 
and non-western societies … In effect, the term operates as a 
metaphor rather than an analytical construct. Many writers using 
the concept of social capital tend to assume its existence (i.e. as 
a value or norm, as something that inheres in particular social 
actions or institutions, as a pre-requisite for specific social and 
economic transformations), and/or they see it as conceptually 
equivalent to solidarity, participation, co-operation or trust. 
Few studies define the term with sufficient clarity that might 
Fine 01 text   67 26/11/2009   11:46
68  theorIes of socIal capItal
allow social capital to be observed or measured, with the result 
that research findings are contradictory and policy analysis is 
confused. (2003, p.161)
There is a need to distinguish the cultural and structural forms 
of social capital, its historical dimensions, and ‘analysis needs to 
demonstrate and measure the manner in which social action is 
deployed within and across institutions, localities, social groups 
and socio-economic activities’ (p.162).
There are two tensions that arise for social capital in BBI, in 
relation to which it is worth highlighting differences with economics 
imperialism – which, equally, initially excludes as the basis for 
restoring (within a weakened, degraded and degrading framework). 
In the case of economics imperialism, though, the result of reducing 
everything to optimising individuals is to provide a limited but 
universal theory that explains everything in BBI on the basis of 
a universal (axiomatic deductive) methodology and technical 
apparatus (organised around production and utility functions, 
equilibrium and efficiency).
By contrast, for social capital, BBI has, on the one hand, been 
extraordinarily catholic across methodologies, techniques and 
conceptual apparatuses. These cannot be reconciled any more than 
can the definitional chaos involved. And, on the other hand, there is 
a parallel tension in the universal claims of social capital as a concept 
and, yet, its highly contextual specificity from one case to another, 
not least as different variables differentially benefit from BBI.
4.3  BBI Gender on the darK sIde
In the recent social capital literature, there have been a substantial 
number of contributions, paradoxically from a cumulative point 
of view, arguing for the need to BBI gender. How many articles 
do you need deploring the absence of gender before it is accepted 
that gender has, indeed, been brought back in? Unfortunately, in 
other areas of study over the period since gender studies have risen 
to prominence more generally, there is an accepted sequence of 
progress through three stages: pointing out the omission of gender; 
BBI on the basis of existing theory; and rejecting that theory as 
inadequate in light of its failing to be thoroughly reconstructed to 
take account of gender-blind (or male-dominated) origins. Social 
capital and gender seem to have stalled, perhaps inevitably, as will 
be seen at the second stage.
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This might be explained by the extent to which the literature is 
replete with familiar tensions and varieties of responses once social 
capital considers gender. The simplest and most unsatisfactory is to 
neglect gender altogether, to treat a male-populated and -dominated 
world as if it were natural, and not demanding of notice, let alone 
interrogation. This is true, for example, of the following example of 
social capital, which has been cited so often – from Coleman (1988) 
to Halpern (2005) – that it has become a cliché. This concerns the 
community of trusting traders that make up diamond dealers in 
New York, and elsewhere, who rely upon one another not to cheat 
over the quality and quantity of these valuable commodities. Yet 
no mention is made of exclusion from this community by religion 
or gender, for example, or of the advantages of tax evasion and 
avoidance, and no account is ever given of the current and historical 
circumstances that allow the community of traders to be reproduced 
(and which sustain the diamond price itself). For the market is 
attached to the longest-standing international cartel, organised by 
de Beers and its predecessors, without which the diamond price 
would simply collapse. The cartel grew out of the control gained 
over the Kimberley mine from the 1870s onwards, and has equally 
long been attached to the crudest forms of colonial and post-colonial 
exploitation of labour. Take all this away and away go the trusting 
traders too. Further, as DeFilippis suggests of the Jewish community 
that controls the New York diamond market:7
Aside from the complete denial of exploitation that takes place 
within ethnic enclave economies, the problem with this, and 
every other enclave like it, is that it completely closes off the 
market, to anyone who is not part of the ethnic group creating 
the enclave. A brilliant, hard-working, innovative Irish Catholic 
immigrant (for instance) who wanted to enter the diamond trade 
in New York would have an exceptionally difficult time doing 
so. (2001, p.792)
Presumably, DeFilippis has in mind an Irish Catholic female 
immigrant. The committed social capitalist might respond that 
bonding capital within the male traders has to be complemented 
by bridging with women, the Irish, Catholics, and so on; and, 
further, the state should enact linking legislation to ensure equal 
opportunity. But this is bordering on the ridiculous, leading to 
preconditions for such changes that would render the world itself 
an entirely different place.
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A second response to gender and social capital is to acknowledge 
that women are different, but to perceive their role or situation as 
given, often stereotyped in light of the role of the family as a site 
of social capital and as an antithesis and alternative to the market 
or economy. Continuing the theme of traders, for Fafchamps and 
Minten, the more agricultural traders in Madagascar know and 
interact with one another, the better they do. They do specify a 
mechanism of sorts:
a reduction in the high transaction costs typical in agricultural 
commodity markets … social capital enables traders to deal with 
one another in a more trusting manner, allowing them to grant 
and receive credit, exchange price information, and economize 
on quality inspection. (2002, p.152)
But there is an enormous degree of fungibility presumed here – from 
familial or other relations, through trust, to credit, price and quality, 
quite apart from the uncritical acceptance of beneficial effects. Why 
should the association not be for price-fixing and the creation of 
entry barriers?
Further, though, they simply report without comment from their 
detailed survey of 850 traders (729 in a second round) that ‘[o]n 
average, Malagasy traders are thirty-seven years old, male, and 
married with three children’ (p.127). But, leaving aside age and 
number of children, why is the fact that the typical Malagasy trader 
is male (68 per cent) so much taken for granted that it warrants no 
further investigation, with one comment by way of exception?
Other variables have little effect on the development of social 
capital … The gender of the trader shows a negative sign in all 
regressions, but it is significant in only one. Women may be less 
successful than men in developing social capital in Madagascar 
because they have to spend more time on household chores and 
childrearing. (p.144)
No doubt,8 but here the entire broader context of gender relations is 
simply set aside, necessarily undermining policy conclusions, which 
are inevitably designed to reduce (the 68 per cent male) trader 
transaction costs.9
Not surprisingly, then, in view of these two responses, Lowndes 
(2004, p.47), noting the absence of gender in Putnam’s study of 
Italy, concludes: ‘In short, “a disciplining discourse” has grown up 
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around the social capital concept that renders women’s citizenship 
“invisible”.’ And, where they are visible, they are liable to be 
transparent or superficial in the sense of not being substantively 
situated. So the absence of gender cannot be rectified by adding 
women and stirring, as the weaknesses of social capital at the micro-
level (50 per cent?) are revealed. For Lowndes, there are compelling 
questions around whether women have the same amounts and types 
of social capital and whether what they do have has the same impact 
as for men. Her conclusion is hardly surprising: there are differences, 
especially in moving from community action to formal politics, but 
these depend upon context (see below).
Third, then, the tensions between social capital and gender have 
been negotiated by taking gender as a starting point and, inevitably, 
to a greater or lesser extent and in different ways, highlighting the 
subordination of women, in which social capital necessarily plays an 
ambiguous role. This is marked in the women-as-traders literature. 
For, as reported by Kusakabe et al. in their study of female micro-
vendors in Phnom Penh, those with more (associational) social 
capital do prosper. But this comes at the expense of accepting gender 
subordination. In conclusion, they write:10
Creating association itself even if it is a women’s association does 
not in itself make the members challenge the existing unequal 
gender relations. Even though collective action might foster 
social capital, it does not necessarily lead to higher awareness 
of women’s subordination. It can even work for the opposite. 
With the effort to be integrated into the mainstream society and 
economy, members can opt for acting and thinking that conforms 
to a [sic] dominant gender norms and identity. (2001, p.35)
Similarly, Mayoux, in the context of microfinance in Cameroon, 
points to rosy views of household, kinship and community, ‘the 
uncritical treatment of relations within households, families and 
kin groups’ (2001, p.450).11 Indeed,
men’s social capital within communities frequently serves to 
reinforce gender subordination in relation to access to community 
resources and markets as well as within the household … This 
meant in effect that women’s savings were being recycled as low-
interest loans to men. (p.454)
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Further, there is the need to address ‘power relations between 
women themselves’, which leads to exclusion of the poorest and 
most disadvantaged women and ‘increased inequalities within 
communities and within groups because of the emphasis on group 
repayment’. Also in the context of microfinance, Rankin (2002, p.3), 
points to ‘the instrumental role of associational life and collective 
norms and values in producing and maintaining existing gender (and 
other social) hierarchies’. In this sense, social capital is complicit in 
putatively locating corresponding inequalities in a zone of activity 
outside of formal politics, potentially consolidating hierarchies 
along the lines of class, caste and gender.12
All this has begun to put social capital in the much wider context 
of the restructuring both of gender relations and the broader 
economic and social reproduction to which they are attached. For 
women traders in Tajikistan for example, Kanji (2002) suggests 
that neo-liberalism has undermined both economic and other 
opportunities for women and their social capital. It is, therefore, 
something of an irony that social capital should be seen as the 
instrument through which women traders should enhance their 
financial circumstances, not least as those engaged in trade would 
prefer secure employment.13 In any case, any positive results out of 
the creation of social capital have to be set against the intensified 
burden across formal (cash payments) and informal (domestic) care 
and the like that remain women’s responsibilities.
So Molyneux (2002, p.172) sees the gains of the women’s 
movement as having been compromised by the neo-liberal 
Washington consensus (see Chapter 6). Whilst social capital is 
indicative of a new paradigm, it offers a less critical assessment of 
the role of women within civil society than the notions of social 
cohesion and inclusion, which it has displaced. For, ‘[s]ocial capital 
is arguably weaker, both as a conceptual construct and as a policy 
instrument, than either of these alternative conceptual clusters’ 
(p.174). This is because social capital is conducive to a loss of the 
traditions associated with anti-authoritarian forms of struggle, and 
views civil society from a perspective outside the broader context of 
development, inequality and politics. And gender studies and social 
capital primarily adopt parallel tracks, especially within the World 
Bank, which has organisationally separate units for the two topics 
– with the major exception of microfinance (see below):
Thus, the social capital of bowling clubs and sewing groups in the 
United States is clearly not the social capital of the poor in Latin 
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America … [and] can only be adequately grasped in relation to 
specific political and social formations and development strategies, 
both local and global. (p.170)
Much of the preceding discussion has focused upon gender and 
social capital in the context of development, where, to some extent, 
the idea of improving the lot of women through social capital has 
rationalised neglecting to tackle continuing structured inequalities. 
In particular, the discovery of social capital as something that can 
enhance the economic and social lives of women (so that being 
female can even be akin to a form of social capital) either ignores 
the downside of oppression by gender or locates it at most as a 
qualification. Correctives to this way of thinking, for micro-credit 
and Grameen banking studies, have been more or less overlooked by 
the social capital juggernaut, with Ito (2003) for example offering an 
outstanding critique of how social capital focuses on the horizontal 
benefits of microfinance at the expense of vertical hierarchies and 
powers, and takes the credit for any positive benefits from micro-
credit, irrespective of what the causes may be. For developed 
countries, however, there is more of a presumption that gender 
inequalities will be found and that they are unacceptable in and 
through social capital. Thus, Brynin and Schupp (2000) find that the 
level of education of a (marriage) partner brings advantages of social 
capital, but more so for men than for women. For Warr (2006), in a 
study of voluntary work in children’s schools, social capital is found 
to be gendered in the context of class and disadvantage, whether 
in getting by or getting ahead, with ‘art and craft’ required by the 
disadvantaged by contrast with the easy availability of options for 
those who are more privileged.
Yet it is in paid work that the weakness of social capital as a 
remedy to gender inequalities is at its most obvious, even though 
some, such as Timberlake (2005, p.34), viewing social capital as a 
commodity to which men and women have unequal access at work, 
project that, in this respect, ‘untold benefits and rewards may be 
generated once workplaces are democratized and equalized’. Others 
are less sanguine.14 For Livingston, for example,
[c]ontrary to conventional wisdom, women who use network-
based job searches are less likely to obtain formal sector 
employment than women who find work without network 
assistance. Conversely, using network-based job searches increases 
the likelihood that men will find work in the formal sector. Since 
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employment in the formal sector is correlated with wages, as well 
as nonwage benefits, this suggests that using networks in the job 
search has markedly different effects on the overall economic 
well-being of male and female Mexican immigrants in the US. 
(2006, p.43)
And Morokvasic (2004) points out that social capital in migration 
can be disastrous for women subject to (sex) trafficking.
At the top end of the labour market, Valentine and Fleischman 
(2003) suggest that women lawyers are liable to do better where 
tolerance for diversity and corporate goals are in place (treating these 
as a form of social capital) since they militate against traditional 
gender outlooks. For Perna (2005, p.277), ‘[t]he analyses reveal that 
the contribution of family ties to tenure status and academic rank 
is different for women than for men’.15 Collin et al. (2007) show 
that career progress in Swedish auditors is gendered through social 
capital, and the same applies to the careers of athletics coaches in the 
United States (Sagas and Cunningham 2004). And the potentially 
gender-neutral Internet does not compensate for female disadvantage 
in creating working links for scientists (Miller et al. 2006).
Significantly, and unsurprisingly in view of its origins and dynamic, 
the literature incorporating gender has tended to see social capital as 
a source of gender inequality or as a potential way of compensating 
for it (although gender is more or less confined to a male/female 
dualism, with a focus on women). Otherwise, to a large extent, the 
structured inequalities experienced by women remain unexamined, 
although addressing these absences can be pushed to the limits 
within a social capital framework. This is especially so of the volume 
edited by O’Neill and Gidengil (2006), in which the major benefit 
of social capital is somewhat inconsistently seen, in that ‘it signals a 
rediscovery of the importance of social relationships and intercon-
nectedness … a direction that many feminist researchers have been 
advocating for some time’ (Gidengil and O’Neill 2006, p.379). In 
conclusion, they point to two questions that have been addressed: 
‘What can a gendered analysis tell us about social capital? And 
what can social capital theory tell us about gender and politics?’ 
They conclude that ‘the findings reveal the extent to which women 
disproportionately bear the costs of social capital creation, while 
deriving fewer benefits’ (p.380), leading them to question how social 
capital is measured, whether it has, indeed, been declining and is 
beneficial (as opposed to being ‘a hindrance that holds women 
back’), and where the boundaries of politics lie. They close:
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The goal is ultimately to improve upon the usefulness of social 
capital as a conceptual tool; it should be inclusive in scope, 
specific in definition, and yet sufficiently flexible to accommodate 
variation in the sources, development, and effects of social capital 
in both private and public spheres.
Whilst the specific goals are laudable, there is little reason to 
believe that social capital can fulfil this agenda either conceptually 
or strategically. It is instructive to substitute the equally universal, 
if deterministic, notion of patriarchy into the preceding quotation. 
Arguably, it would perform better in all respects!
As Adkins has suggested, in a rare contribution explicitly rejecting 
social capital from a gendered perspective,
[it] has provoked much concern for feminist theorists … because 
the concept appears to reinstate many troubling assumptions 
about women and gender which for the past thirty years or more 
feminist social scientists have sought to excavate, problematize 
and go beyond. Thus, on the part of feminists, we see strong 
critiques of and attempts to rethink the social capital concept. But 
do these critiques really go beyond the social capital paradigm? 
(2005, p.195)
Her answer is no, for the result has been to ‘fall into … a 
“correctionist” mode of thinking, where there is an emphasis on 
correcting and modifying existing socio-theoretical discourses to 
include the interests of women’. In short, BBI gender to social capital 
is indicative of the degradation of feminist scholarship, additional 
correctives for which are only liable to degrade further as other 
elements of economic and social life also need to be incorporated 
on unsound foundations.
4.4  socIal capItal In conteXt – or VIce Versa?
In previous sections, attention has been focused upon the BBI of 
what has been omitted from social capital in establishing itself as 
a category of universal application. Section 4.2 pitched this at a 
general level, and Section 4.3 addressed the BBI of gender. Not 
surprisingly, the BBI of other major variables of significance across 
the social sciences is also to be found in the literature, not least 
in explicitly noting their absence or in the less conscious and dull 
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compulsion of needing to take them into account by virtue of the 
particular case study involved.
Thus Navarro (2002, p.427), in criticising Putnam, observes that 
social capital replaces the language of race, class and gender, leading 
to a ‘remarkable absence of power and politics’. And Muntaner 
et al. report:
In social epidemiology, more specifically, social capital presents 
a model of the social determinants of health that excludes any 
analysis of structural inequalities (e.g., class, gender, or racial/
ethnic relations) in favor of a horizontal view of social relations 
based on distributive inequalities in income. As a consequence, 
political movements based on class, race/ethnicity, or gender are 
also ignored as explanations for reducing social inequalities in 
health. (2001, p.213)
In case of BBI race (and the distinct category of ethnicity), then, 
the literature has offered two separate, if occasionally overlapping, 
strands.16 One is to find at least a residual if not a determining 
role for racism, with a need to address the corresponding issues 
of power, conflict, culture and the role of the state – BBI on a 
grand and wide scale. Thus, Crozier and Davies (2006), noting 
the relative absence of gender and ethnicity in social capital (and 
family) studies, conclude that the extended family, community and 
religion cannot necessarily compensate for the deleterious effects 
of institutional racism on educational achievement, whatever the 
motivation to succeed.17 James (2000) finds, after correcting for 
human capital, that in financial services blacks experience a slower 
rate of promotion than whites, but that this is due not so much to 
social capital (closeness to colleagues), of which they do have less, 
but to the fact that this leads to less psychosocial support in career 
advice and advancement. Cross (2003) suggests that the legacy of 
slavery should have offered considerable bonding capital for Afro-
Americans as a basis for integration, but Arriaza (2003) finds that 
this legacy creates tensions in the role of black teachers – how both 
to engage with the disadvantaged and incorporate them into an 
oppressing culture. For Hays (2002), charitable provision of housing 
is better at building social capital amongst providers than for 
beneficiaries, furnishing ‘an organization overwhelmingly governed 
by white, college educated persons making over $75,000 a year’ 
(pp.265–6). And McGhee (2003, pp.376–7), in the context of social 
capital as community cohesion in Bradford, points to ‘the relative 
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de-emphasis of material deprivation and socio-economic margin-
alization … [and] the criminalization of young male British–Asian 
“rioters”’ and the corresponding ‘criminal justice system which is 
perceived by the Asian community in Bradford (and not without 
foundation) as not offering them equal treatment’ (p.401).
Not surprisingly, the vast majority of the social capital literature 
steers clear of racism as a starting point (and other elements irreducibly 
attached to power, oppression and conflict) and emphasises the 
diversity and complexity of outcomes whenever race and ethnicity 
are involved. Anderson and Paskeviciute (2006) study the impact of 
linguistic and ethnic diversity on civic participation across a large 
sample of countries, and conclude there are no uniform effects as 
such. This is hardly surprising since the associational life of ethnic 
minorities may be either defensive and introverted or engaging, 
and may or may not lead to greater political participation (see 
special issue of Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, vol.30, 
no.3, 2004).
As is apparent, the nature, incidence and impact of social capital, 
in the presence of race or otherwise, depends upon the ‘community’ 
to which it is attached and how that community is located and 
interpreted.18 Through the prism of social capital, community 
becomes, at least potentially, a positive resource in developing the 
local economy (Kay 2005), although the promise far exceeds the 
action. As Kilpatrick et al., vigorous promoters of the relationship 
between social capital and lifelong learning, put it:
Social capital is an appropriate analytical framework for 
diagnosing the strengths and weaknesses of the social assets 
of a community … and identifying aspects where intervention, 
for example, by community development practitioners, could 
usefully build community capacity to manage change and 
develop. (2003, p.431)
But, as McClenaghan suggests in concluding her response,
[t]he challenge … is not, therefore, to ignore or obscure economic 
and power relations under a blanket concept of the social as 
capital but to identify … the economic and political discourses 
constituting the social field in which community development 
action takes place … and [shift] system imperatives and practices 
in the interests of economic and social justice and equity.19 
(2003, p.438)
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Where does this lead social capital and the community? In the 
extreme, social capital has displaced community,20 which has 
itself been a highly contested notion but one with long-standing 
traditions of critical scholarship. These are liable to be lost by the 
shift in terminology. To guarantee otherwise, Onyx (2005, p.4) puts 
forward the idea that the study of social capital and community 
must involve their dark sides, including power, political economy, 
inequality and exploitation, conflict, bonding and bridging, and 
wider structural economic and political forces operating at the state 
(provincial), national and global levels. In similar vein, Forrest and 
Kearns review social capital in light of neighbourhood literature:
The current fashionable search for evidence of, and measures to 
enhance, the stock of social capital in a neighbourhood needs 
therefore to have a sensitivity to the different forms of social 
capital that may exist with different purposes. Coping with 
social problems is not the same thing as overcoming them and 
renewing neighbourhoods … will not necessarily reform society. 
(2001, p.2141)
To contribute analytically, social capital must ‘set out to situate the 
neighbourhood within more general debates about social cohesion 
… and to illustrate how contested and complex these discourses 
are’.21 Following Morrow (1999), Forrest and Kearns refer to 
‘“deficit theory syndrome” – something lacking in individuals 
or communities’ (p.2141, emphasis added), and they finish with 
an appeal ‘to embed conceptions of social capital in a more 
general exploration of human, cultural and economic capital, all 
within a wider audit of neighbourhood resources and dynamics’ 
(p.2142).22
From race to community, then, social capital tends to be subject 
to a deluge of traditional variables once it embarks upon BBI one 
or other of what has been omitted. The preferred approach to 
such challenges is to situate them within a partially disaggregated 
framework of bonding, bridging and linking social capital, with 
its negative versions thrown in for good measure, and otherwise 
to stress context as a conditioning factor. The remaining purpose 
of this section is to illustrate how and just how much this has been 
done in terms of the BBI context itself, selectively drawing upon 
the wealth of case studies and the analytical framework laid out in 
Chapter 2. But, as will be seen, context is as difficult to pin down 
as social capital itself.
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The most obvious way in which to interpret context is as the 
presence of conditioning variables which are external to social 
capital but which affect its impact by their presence (variables A 
and B in Figure 2.3); although it is important to recall that A and 
B are subject to capture by social capital in its own definition. 
Thus, Polèse and Shearmur (2006) argue that social capital is a 
factor in local regeneration, but that many other preconditions 
are also essential, leading them to conclude that ‘[t]he proposition 
that geography and exogenous forces can overwhelm even the best-
conceived local economic development strategies should now be 
uncontroversial’ (p.43). Similarly, for rural redevelopment, social 
capital is insufficiently sensitive to the complexity of micro-politics 
(McAreavey 2006), and Morrison (2003) suggests that impoverished 
European neighbourhoods may be further impoverished by 
‘inward looking initiatives’, as opposed to those that address wider 
social integration.
For neighbourhoods, Saegert et al. (2002) point out that physical 
environment is important to the incidence of crime and that social 
capital within one location may deter crime by merely displacing it 
elsewhere. Significantly, Leeder (1998, pp.3–4) notes that Coleman’s 
(1990) example of neighbourhood safety built on social capital 
between families in Jerusalem (in contrast to Detroit) depends 
upon neglect of ‘how many Israeli soldiers, armed to the teeth, 
were needed to achieve this level of social capital within fortress 
Jerusalem … at the expense of the rest of society’.23
In the case of economic performance, Engstrand and Stam (2002) 
find that social capital can be associated with either impeding or 
promoting the process of sector restructuring, in part depending 
on location (Sweden versus the Netherlands, for example) and 
sector (shipbuilding versus electronics). Not surprisingly, Bresnen 
et al. (2005) suggest that in construction team-working cannot 
build social capital, because of the casual (sub-)contractual nature 
of the business, just as Bakker et al. (2006) conclude that social 
capital as trust is less important for corporate knowledge sharing 
than longevity of team-working. The presence of the state leads 
to ambiguous results for social capital. It needs to be there for 
conservation projects to be effective (Peterson et al. 2006), but it 
may crowd out altruistic and cooperative behaviour amongst local 
businesses keen to preserve their symbolic identity as independent 
of the state (Phillipson et al. 2006). On the other hand, Marger 
(2001) finds that successful business migrants to Canada with pre-
migration human capital show ‘a minimal reliance on social capital in 
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establishing and operating their firms’, in contrast to the importance 
they attach to state support (p.439). And, similarly, for Chinese 
immigrant entrepreneurs in Toronto, Ooka (2001) finds that ethnic 
firm linkages and employment do not raise business income.
Thus the impact of social capital depends upon context, in the 
sense of what other variables interact with it. This is so to such an 
extent that social capital can be positive in one instance and negative 
in another, or even both simultaneously, for different processes 
and connections. In the case of urban regeneration, Bull and Jones 
(2006), comparing Bristol and Naples, find that more social capital 
is not necessarily better, given contextual complexity, conflicts and 
corruption. For sustainable local community development, Newman 
and Dale (2005) believe that excessive bonding social capital can 
lead to enforcement of social norms that hinder innovative change 
(although bridging capital can do otherwise). Fyfe and Milligan 
(2003, p.408), in the context of voluntary work, argue that ‘high 
levels of social capital … may be divisive, exclusionary restrict 
individual freedoms … [and] would simply favour those who are 
already powerful and articulate, and who already enjoy a greater 
capacity to engage’. Chase (2002) finds that donor funding of local 
infrastructure in Armenia has a negative effect on the completion of 
non-funded projects – social capital for some at the expense of others. 
Cleaver (2005) suggests of Tanzania that social capital involves 
inclusion and exclusion, with inequality, power and conflict where 
there is inclusion, and the need for material resources, especially 
for the poorest of the excluded. Mitchell and LaGory (2002) show 
that children and employment mitigate stress in impoverished 
communities, but that social capital in the form of interpersonal 
networks raises stress levels due to a network of obligations in 
helping others in ‘getting by’, with social capital allowing user costs 
for health services to be paid through financial solidarity among the 
poor (Aye et al. 2002). By the same token, Jacobs and Kemp (2002) 
discover that the social capital amongst Bangladeshi traders means 
they have no need to keep records, precluding economic calculation 
on the basis of these. And Field (2003, p.71) explores ‘A Walk on the 
Dark Side’ of social capital by targeting how it reinforces inequality 
and supports antisocial behaviour.
As should already be apparent, context also involves attention 
to detail and complexity. This can include the disaggregation of 
social capital into its multifarious elements. Thus, Saxton and 
Benson (2005) show that the different dimensions of social capital 
have different impacts on the growth of the not-for-profit sectors 
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of the economy. For Ferguson (2006), in a case study of Mexico, 
children’s educational performance is affected by social capital, but 
successful supportive intervention needs to be specific to individual 
families and children. Warde and Tampubolon (2002) find that 
social capital in leisure consumption is rendered chaotic in light of 
the different types of friendships and networks involved. Dinovitzer 
(2006) studies five different types of social capital, each having 
different effects, not always positive, on Jewish lawyers’ careers. 
And for Flap and Völker (2001), different types of network have 
different content and give rise to different levels of job satisfaction. 
They conclude, quoting Podolny and Baron (1997, p.674), that ‘the 
network structure that is most conducive to maximize access to 
information and other resources is not the structure most conducive 
to social identity, and vice versa’, indicating the tensions not only 
across the diversity of social capitals but also in what social capital 
can be used for.
This is all compounded by acknowledging context in terms of 
social capital as a process. Bankston and Zhou, then, in a study of 
academic achievement by family structure and ethnicity, emphasise 
social capital as a conditioned process, and the limitations or 
tautology of analyses in case such conditions and processes are 
excluded or included respectively. They conclude, ‘it is difficult to 
judge on purely theoretical and a priori grounds just what aspects of 
social groups and social settings qualify as capital and as liabilities’ 
(2002, p.312). And also:
If networks and norms are not identical but are two steps in 
a process, with what degree of confidence can the existence of 
the first step assure us of the existence of the second? Do closed 
networks lead to effective norms sometimes, most times, or only 
under the proper conditions? (p.290)
Similarly, John finds that social capital is not necessarily good 
for school performance for those from lower socio-economic 
backgrounds, and hence that ‘social capital is thus not a simple 
good, nor has universal benefit – much depends on the context … 
Rather than being an independent factor, the impact of social capital 
is intimately bound up with the processes that generate inequalities 
in societies’ (2005, p.652).
With social capital as a conditioned, diverse, heterogeneous, and 
complex process, Staber, in addressing regional clusters, observes 
‘the neglect of the situational context’, concluding that ‘acontextual 
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studies can lead to analytical error and flawed conclusions concerning 
the performance outcomes of social capital’ (2007, p.505). He 
points to five contextual effects: the impact of social capital may 
only prevail over a limited range; the effect may differ at different 
levels of development; it may change sign; it may change direction 
of causation; and it is conditional on the presence of other variables. 
Hence analytical remedy is sought through
(1) thick description of the research setting; (2) a context-sensitive 
sampling plan; (3) a focus on processes and events; (4) attention 
to co-evolutionary processes at multiple levels; and (5) attention 
to the social mechanisms that link actions at multiple levels. 
(p.513)
This is to push context as far as it can go without explicitly adding 
culture as an element in its own right, subject to varieties of inter-
pretation across time, place and application.
Thus, in a study of career progression and mentoring through 
guanxi networks in China, Bozionelos and Wang suggest that,
in contrast to the Anglo-Saxon context, interpersonal relationships 
in the Chinese cultural context cannot exist in instrumental form 
only; as the establishment of expressive elements is a pre-requisite 
for the development of instrumental aspects in a relationship 
within the Chinese cultural environment. (2006, p.1541)
For Norchi (2000) traditional knowledge of the Onge people (from 
the Indian Nicobar and Andaman Islands) is social capital that 
must be kept intact as multinational pharmaceutical companies 
seek to exploit knowledge-derived products. Chapter 2 has already 
indicated that, for some, imaginary social capital (derived from, 
not obstructed by, television) is as potentially significant as the 
real thing. And the same might be said of religious capital, as 
knowledge of its rituals and traditions allow clergy to bond with 
one another, potentially at the expense of the laity, with seminaries 
providing both instruction and interpersonal attachments (Finke 
and Dougherty 2002).
But what of other ‘religions’, new and old? For the cultures 
and practices attached to the Internet have recently prompted the 
emergence of a rapidly growing literature. Is Internet use alienating 
and isolating and at the expense of social capital? Or is it not only 
conducive to the formation and use of social capital but even social 
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capital as network itself? Significantly, the role of the welfare state, 
that old religion of social democracy, occupies an analytical place 
similar to that occupied by the Internet. For the culture and practices 
attached to the welfare state are of importance in conditioning both 
the presence and the influence of social capital. Do they create, 
undermine or work in tandem with it?24
All this, however, is intended to push towards a deeper 
understanding of the relationship between social capital and 
culture (as context), one in which culture is endowed with specific 
meaning. Thus, in a comparison of Istanbul and Moscow, Secor 
and O’Loughlin (2005, p.80) demonstrate ‘how social capital is 
constructed within and through particular historical and local 
conjunctures’, with those lower socio-economic groups that are 
less engaged in civic activity being more trustful of government in 
both cities. This is hardly surprising given that such engagement 
may expose those involved to the nature of government (or even 
induce an oppositional response to it).25 But trust in fellow citizens 
is more associated with civic activity in Istanbul and less so in 
Moscow. Silverman (2002, p.164) examines the interaction between 
race and religion and, in looking for mechanisms of racial recon-
ciliation in Mississippi, finds that ‘all forms of social capital are 
not alike, and the degree to which various forms of social capital 
are compatible is structured by local history and context’, with 
mobilisation on the basis of race incorporating ‘historical baggage’ 
and the alternative basis of faith limiting the scope of what can be 
addressed. Marjoribanks and Mboya (2001) find that South African 
youth’s self-concept depends upon familial human and social capital, 
but equally on parenting style. Style is of importance to youth, as 
highlighted by the study of Lovell (2002), which explores how to 
get drug addicts to be more socially responsible in needle behaviour 
through social capital. But different people have different roles in 
the drug scene, from the reformed evangelist through to the user–
dealer. With addicts’ role playing potentially to the fore, substance 
abuse can have different meanings to abusers, depending upon 
familial and cultural background (p.816). Lovell concludes (p.819): 
‘Fundamental social conditions … define social space and shape the 
circumstances of risk taking that drug researchers should now target, 
alongside the individual-level characteristics already examined in 
published studies.’ And Kreuter and Lezin accept that ‘failure to 
take social and political context into account is a major barrier 
to the effective evaluation of community-based health promotion’ 
(2002, p.251). They conclude that
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there are different ways of knowing, and different interpreta-
tions of ‘reality’ … an epidemiologist, an anthropologist, a health 
educator, and a layperson are likely to view a given problem 
through different lenses. More importantly, each is quite likely 
to detect a glimpse of reality that others may miss. All … need 
to seriously explore how their various views of reality can be 
combined to give us new knowledge.
In postmodern words and worlds, social capital is socially constructed 
even if it is rarely deconstructed.
4.5  BBBI BY WaY of concludInG reMarKs
The purpose of this chapter has been to chart the necessarily chaotic 
fashion in which social capital, as a universal category of analysis 
that is of general application, has inevitably been forced to bring 
back in what has been left out. It has incorporated missing and 
conditioning variables (as important as gender, race and class), 
complexity and diversity, heterogeneity, culture and, ultimately, 
context. To some extent the last serves as a symbol of the tensions 
involved – the more we examine social capital, the more we find it 
depends upon context, however broadly and deeply it is defined. 
But the more we appeal to context, the more social capital loses 
its appeal as a universal category. Consider carefully the extent 
to which the case studies covered in this chapter are addressing 
the same analytical category, social capital, in anything other than 
name. Often it is even apparent that the conclusions drawn do not 
depend upon social capital at all. Social capital merely serves as a 
diversion in identifying underlying and more important causes.26
The strategy of BBI missing elements is exemplified by Simon 
Szreter (2002a and b). He seeks to rescue social capital from 
criticism by BBI class, power, politics, ideology, mass unemployment, 
globalisation, inequality, hierarchy, the state and history, alongside a 
whole array of other analytical fragments.27 Continuing weaknesses 
within British society are perceived to arise out of ‘a surplus of 
bonding social capital, only, among the comfortably-off, and a 
deficiency of bridging and linking social capital’; thus Szreter poses 
the problems to be resolved by New Labour. As he puts it, with a 
stunning clarity:
It is implicit in this reading of social capital theory that there is 
an optimal dynamic balance of bonding, bridging, and linking 
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social capital, which simultaneously facilitates democratic 
governance, economic efficiency and widely-dispersed human 
welfare, capabilities and functioning. (2002b, p.580)
It is a moot point whether this reading is able to BBI the critical 
elements of social theory associated with power, conflict, hierarchy, 
and so on.28
This observation is brought home by one further element char-
acteristic of the more recent social capital literature, BBI Bourdieu 
or BBBI. Not surprisingly, in light of some of the other BBIs, 
Bourdieu is now making a small but significant comeback. This has 
induced Szreter (2002b, pp.616–17) to accuse me of inconsistency 
in observing both the omission of Bourdieu and the subsequent 
claim of BBBI. In doing so, he does himself miss the point that this 
is not the restoration of the status quo ante. The vast majority of 
current social capital studies continue to overlook Bourdieu even if 
restoring context and other elements that had been taken out of his 
pioneering studies. Further, those that appeal to Bourdieu explicitly 
often do so only partially and with distortion.
Indeed, those who do genuinely restore Bourdieu to social capital 
studies are not only the exception, they also tend unavoidably to 
be highly critical of the vast bulk of other studies. Thus, Campbell 
and McLean (2002, p.645) distance themselves from studies that, 
‘frequently draw on survey items which superficially match Putnam’s 
“laundry list” of networks and norms’, preferring research that 
focuses on ‘the forms taken by social capital in various contexts, and 
[research] into the mechanisms underlying the link between social 
capital and health’, thereby appealing to Bourdieu and concepts 
both of social capital and social identity. They conclude that social 
capital has neglected race, class and gender, and that it is better seen 
as a material and symbolic source of inequality. In other words, 
though this is not explicitly stated by Campbell and McLean, social 
capital needs to be sensitive to the nature and incidence of racism 
and other forms of oppression.29
In short, Bourdieu’s use of social capital involves class, elites, 
power, hierarchy, conflict and how these are reproduced. In its 
early founding phase, Bourdieu’s social capital did benefit from 
some attention, especially from those engaging in cultural studies. 
But the rapid expansion of social capital, and the shift of its core 
to a Coleman–Putnam axis, quickly marginalised the substantive 
content of social capital from the perspective of Bourdieu. And the 
different capitals to which Bourdieu and others have pointed have 
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tended to be rounded up into a single social capital, homogeneous 
in name but heterogeneous in content. Paradoxically, as indicated in 
Chapter 3, Bourdieu was sidelined during social capital’s meteoric 
rise, but he is now being brought back in on a piecemeal basis 
as an incoherent fixing device for context for the unduly abstract 
social capital, so diverse and contingent is its scope of application. 
Significantly, Bourdieu’s other types of capital, and his emphasis on 
class, conflict, power, and so on, remain notable for their absence 
other than occasionally as a token ex post addition of context. 
The point, as emphasised, is that whilst Bourdieu can be brought 
back in, this does not mean you get Bourdieu back by doing so, as 
is evident from the attempt by Svendsen and Svendsen (2003 and 
2004) to construct a social capital with ‘Bourdieuconomics’ that 
moulds him in a market imperfection direction, entirely compatible 
with mainstream economics. By contrast, for Bourdieu, context 
is intimately related to practice and, as such, is highly specific 
in constructed material and cultural content and meaning – a 
somewhat inconsistent position that undermines the generality of 
his own use of terms such as social capital (see below), let alone 
that of others.
There is, then, much to commend in Bourdieu’s approach to social 
capital, as discussed in Chapter 3. First, he sees it as complemented 
by, not including, cultural and symbolic capital. Second, despite 
its huge range of application, social and other forms of capital are 
seen as contextually specific, in the richest sense. And, third, as 
emphasised, Bourdieu is focused upon questions of class, power, 
conflict and the reproduction of hierarchy and oppression as 
opposed to positive-sum, collective self-help.
Despite these qualities, though, there is a triple buffer protecting 
social capital from the impact of BBBI. The first is to ignore him 
altogether. The second is to bring him back in on a piecemeal and/or 
false basis. And the third is that, despite, or even because of, more 
favourable elements in Bourdieu’s notion of (social) capital, there 
are still the continuing weaknesses of his own approach, even if 
social capital gets past the other two buffers. As Swartz (1997, 
p.6) suggests, he is attempting a general theory of his own in which 
power comes to the fore: ‘For Bourdieu power is not a separate 
domain of study but stands at the heart of all social life.’ For ‘[t]he 
exercise and reproduction of class-based power and privilege is 
a core substantive and unifying concern’ (p.7). Indeed, ‘[i]t is his 
ambition to create a science, applicable to all types of societies, 
of the social and cultural reproduction of power relations among 
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individuals and groups’. In this, crucial for Swartz is that Bourdieu 
rejects ‘the subjectivist and objectivist forms of knowledge and the 
substantialist view of reality that he believes pervades them … his 
concepts shift in emphasis and scope depending on the opposing 
viewpoints they address’ (p.5). Thus, whilst Bourdieu is seen as 
applying material interests to all activities, economic and cultural, 
these are seen as being practical and dispositional rather than as 
narrowly goal-oriented, and also as being defined by positions in 
the social hierarchy. This is to allow for a distancing from Marxism 
in an effort to avoid reduction of culture to the economic, even 
though culture is nonetheless tied to material interests (p.72). As 
a result, Bourdieu’s notion of capital is universal and designed to 
express all forms of power (p.73).
This all leads, first and foremost, to a limited understanding in 
Bourdieu of economic capital, not least as attached to capitalism. If 
this were there, for example, then it would be impossible for other 
capitals to range so freely historically across contexts where capital 
has yet to develop its modern forms and play an influential role on 
the symbolic, cultural and social. For, once capital as such is pinned 
down, it is necessary to have distinguished between capitalism 
and its economics, and that of other historical periods where it 
does not prevail, as well as between the world of capital within 
capitalism and its own non-economic counterparts. As Swartz puts 
it (p.80), ‘Bourdieu’s concept of capital does not permit him to 
distinguish capitalist from noncapitalist social relations’. This is 
true both of economic capital across different historical periods 
and of the different types of non-economic capital within a given 
society. These concepts remain general until they are complemented 
by the notions of habitus and field, invented by Bourdieu in order 
to allow for specificity in the role of different capitals, both within 
and across different societies. This is all put precisely in Némedi’s 
account of Bourdieu:
The Algerian experience was very important in the formation of 
Bourdieu’s social theory. The recently published fragments of an 
autobiography and L. Addi’s analysis of Bourdieu’s anthropologi-
cal theory allow a more detailed evaluation of the contribution 
of Kabyle ethnology to the Bourdieusian conceptualization of the 
society. The concepts of habitus and social capital both have their 
origin in the analysis of Kabyle peasant economy while they are 
central to the examination of the reproduction of modern French 
society. In this way, Bourdieu reduces the differences of modern 
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and archaic society. This difference was constitutive of classical 
social theory. Bourdieu’s social theory shares the ‘timelessness’ of 
much modern social theory, including that of [Talcott] Parsons. 
(2005, p.35, emphasis added)
The timelessness of Bourdieu is something shared not only with 
Parsons but also with Coleman and Putnam, even if with a very 
different analytical content.
Further, it is precisely the peculiar nature of ‘economic’ capital, 
and its attachment to capitalism, that has inspired social theory to 
comprehend the special relationship between the economic and the 
non-economic, ranging over Weber’s Protestant ethic and rationality 
and order, Polanyi’s embeddedness and double movement, anthro-
pology’s gift versus commodity, and so on. Despite his emphasis 
on context, Bourdieu’s notion of capital floats too freely across 
history as an embodiment of power, thereby failing to identify the 
structures, processes and relations to which capital and capitalism 
are attached as opposed to non-capitalist societies.
There is, however, an exception that proves the rule of the absence 
of an economics of capital in Bourdieu. It is a feature of (economic) 
capital on which he heavily relies. This is the fluidity that it enjoys, 
its capacity, even its necessity, of changing from one form to another 
– value as market exchange relations. Specifically, for Bourdieu, if 
not exactly as if a price relationship, each capital is money-like in 
the sense of being exchangeable to a greater or lesser degree into 
another type. As the qualitative and quantitative natures of such 
relations are so diverse and variable, with the exception of money 
capital itself, it makes little sense to treat the cultural, symbolic and 
social as if they were capital even within a capitalist society – they 
are not value relations in the economic sense, from the perspective 
of almost all economic theories other than the most reductionist. 
Significantly, Swartz (1997, p.8) acknowledges of Bourdieu: ‘He 
conceptualizes culture as a form of capital with specific laws of 
accumulation, exchange, and exercise ... These are not tidy, well-
delimited theoretical arguments but orienting themes that overlap 
and interpenetrate.’
The weakness and timelessness of Bourdieu’s economics, his 
notion of capital, are an attraction for social capitalists, who are less 
concerned to incorporate power, class, hierarchy and conflict, other 
than, at most, as context to case study. This also courts the risk of 
taking the economic not only as given, but as non-social, as opposed 
to the non-economic. By contrast, for Marxist political economy, 
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for example, (economic) capital is profoundly social with definite 
relations, structures, forms, processes and laws of development of 
its own, as well as with profound implications for corresponding 
impact upon the cultural, symbolic and social (as non-economic). 
This is not a matter of reducing these to the economic but of not 
reducing the economic to the asocial. Of this, of course, Bourdieu 
is not deeply guilty, if only because of his insistence upon class, 
power, conflict, and so on, and context, even if he does not draw 
heavily upon a political economy of capitalism. If the social capital 
literature had confined itself to Bourdieu-type analyses, there would 
be something, but only little, about which to complain, and we would 
have received a bag of disparate case studies with nothing to connect 
them to one another other than a common and peculiar terminology. 
Such was the situation before Coleman trumped Bourdieu, after 
which the common terminology is taken to suggest that the different 
case studies share something substantive in common – the social as 
represented by social capital.




In his contribution, ‘Do Social Historians Need Social Capital?’, 
Dario Gaggio (2004) correctly observes that historians have ignored 
the academic, and more general, bandwagon that has accompanied 
the meteoric rise of this concept from the mid 1990s to a position 
of extraordinary prominence across the social sciences. Implicitly 
at least, Gaggio offers good reasons why the attractions of social 
capital should have been disdained by historians. It is because for 
him, drawing upon the work of Bourdieu, there is only one version 
of the concept that is acceptable. This involves him in a radical 
critique of Putnam, who, departing from Bourdieu’s approach, 
takes rational choice sociologist James Coleman as his source of 
social capital. As a result, the bulk of the literature that Putnam 
has inspired is dismissed as methodologically eclectic, seeking a 
third way out of the individualistic orgy of the 1980s, negligent 
of political economy, unduly reifying the separation between civil 
and political society, and insensitive to the salience of context. 
Gaggio entirely approves my own critique and deconstruction of 
social capital on these grounds but, at the last breath, comes to an 
opposite strategic conclusion. Whereas my position is uncompro-
misingly to reject social capital in all its forms and applications, 
he encourages historians to participate in its use in order to drive 
out its erroneous manifestations.
The purpose of this chapter is to challenge Gaggio’s stance in 
the specific context of history and historians. I seek to explain in 
full why social capital should have been neglected by historians, 
rather than, as with Gaggio, leaving this explained implicitly, 
partially and, to some extent, erroneously. For, if social capital is 
so bad, why has it been taken up by other disciplines, unless we 
are to privilege the intellectual acumen of historians? And what 
underpins such beneficial conceptual discrimination on their part? 
Essentially, history’s position depends upon the evolving features 
of social capital itself as well as the intellectual environment of the 
late twentieth century in which it has prospered. Again, reaction 
90
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against individualism aside, Gaggio offers little attention to the more 
general analytical trends at work that have inspired social capital, 
on the one hand, and historians on the other. By coupling these 
with the specificity of social capital itself, I fully support Gaggio’s 
exhortation for historians to engage with social capital, but by 
way of critical rejection and the offering of alternatives, drawing 
upon their own expertise and their situation in relation to the social 
sciences. My starting point in the next section, though, is to provide 
some background to the story of how social capital came to be 
the way it is and my own preparations, only conscious in part, for 
this chapter.
This means revisiting some ground covered earlier concerning 
economics imperialism, but setting it within the context of history. 
In this way it can be shown why social capital, for very different 
reasons, is found in neither of the two broadly parallel fields (and 
methods) within the discipline. For economic history, at least to 
the extent that it succumbs to the unsubtle charms of mainstream 
economics, it is because the new institutional economics has 
provided an alternative catch-all for the non-economic, and that 
field got there first. And for social history, the sensitivity to historical 
change, and traditional and richer ways of understanding it, have 
not been conducive to the deployment of social capital in anything 
other than a casual fashion, just as for economic history, if for 
different reasons. Accordingly, Section 5.3 finds that the limited 
presence of social capital within history is something of a scattergun 
affair, sporadic and unsystematic. The same is so, as suggested in 
Section 5.4, of the application of social capital to the contemporary 
historical processes of transition and development (see Chapter 
6 also for the latter). The final section argues that, as for other 
disciplines, there is an alternative strategy that historians might 
adopt in relation to social capital. This is neither to accept nor to 
ignore it, but to engage with it through active critical dismissal – or 
risk the penalty of being besieged or overwhelmed by it.
5.2  the hIstorIcal doG that dId not BarK
As outlined in Chapter 3, in 2006 I made a JSTOR literature search, 
covering the period up to 2004, to investigate the usage of the term 
‘social capital’ in the discipline of history. The exercise confirmed the 
relative absence of social capital from the history journals. Whilst 
the JSTOR search threw up 292 items, only 161 of these were 
articles, with many book reviews and front and back pieces (such as 
Fine 01 text   91 26/11/2009   11:46
92  theorIes of socIal capItal
advertisements) making up the numbers. Only 19 items scored for 
‘social capital’ in title or abstract, over half of these from the special 
double issue on social capital of the Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History (see below). Many of the items arose from area publications, 
such as the Journal of Southern African Studies, or publications 
only related to history, such as Economic Geography, which were, 
nonetheless, classified in the JSTOR archives as history journals. 
Further, social capital’s ‘relevance ranking’ in the articles (an artefact 
of the search engine provided as a service to readers) proved to be 
extremely low. One element in relevance is the number of times the 
term appears and, in the articles covered, this soon degenerated into 
one or two alone, frequently as a term in a cited reference only. 
By way of contrast, general JSTOR searches in history journals 
for ‘postmodernism’ and ‘globalisation’ returned 3,430 and 1,558 
items respectively, and ‘consumption’ scored 216 hits even on the 
narrower search by title or abstract.
The absence of social capital from history is confirmed by a 
useful, and independent, study of the concept’s birth and growth 
by Forsman (2005), a librarian offering a bibliographic study for 
social capital of some quantitative and qualitative sophistication. 
She divides the diffusion of social capital across the social sciences 
into three waves: the first to economics and sociology; the second to 
education and medicine; and the third to business and psychology. 
History is notable for its absence but, as seen in Chapter 3, where it 
does make a presence, it offers insight, even if only as the exception 
that proves the rule. In the past, prior to the period covered by the 
Forsman study, historians used the term ‘social capital’ in an entirely 
different way – as the systemic or aggregate properties of capital, 
an economic category within capitalism, as opposed to some aspect 
of civil society floating free of the economy.
As a result of its gargantuan appetite, and not surprisingly, social 
capital has been applied to historical case studies of great diversity. 
By analogy, we can find it in history as easily as, if not more easily 
than, we can find money, commodities and exchange more generally 
(and social capital is often seen as a precondition for these to be 
present). But, as already indicated, historians themselves have not 
sought out and deployed social capital in this way. Why is this? 
A full answer will only emerge subsequently, but, with respect 
to social capital as gourmand, historians of today are liable to 
view the functionalist/structuralist/deterministic underpinnings of 
the social capital juggernaut with considerable distaste, as have 
social theorists more generally in the past – to the extent that its 
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history as a concept has had to be invented in order that it could 
be discovered (Chapter 3).
One reason why social capital and history should not mix is 
because of the distance between social capital and the economic, 
the previously preferred arena for historians (with the economic 
understood here as infrastructural or systemic economic properties). 
For the vast bulk of the social capital literature, other than within 
the discipline of economics itself, the economic does not figure 
at all. Where it does, it sits unexamined in the background, at 
most, or it is the object favourably enhanced by the presence of 
social capital as a cure-all for growth, poverty alleviation, and 
such things. Significantly, this does imply a breach with the purest 
commitment to laissez-faire. Markets work imperfectly in the 
absence of social capital or, putting it more positively, markets work 
better in its presence. But, crucially, and reflecting its middle-range 
character, such putative economic benefits are presumed, and are 
not based on any actual economic analysis. However the economy 
performs, and whichever economy it is, it does better if supported 
by social capital.
This has placed social capital in a particular relationship with 
mainstream economics (see Chapter 8). It has meant that the 
concept has been treated with suspicion, since, from an orthodox 
perspective, a capital should be a stock purposively built up by 
deliberate investment and underpinning a return. However, this in 
part physicalist interpretation of capital has also been the basis for 
broaching (social) capital as those (productive) resources that depart 
from this simple formula. Whilst natural, physical, human (and, 
more generally, personal) and financial capital serve as the core in 
resource allocation, efficiency and equilibrium, social capital stands 
for anything else not private or tangible that might contribute to 
economic performance. Social capital neatly falls within the realm 
of this economic framing of the rationale for the non-market or 
non-economic.
There are, though, three important aspects of the incorporation of 
social capital into economics. First, as argued in Fine and Milonakis 
(2009) and Milonakis and Fine (2009), the highest priority within 
an orthodoxy that excludes alternatives to an unprecedented degree 
is its commitment to its technical apparatus of production and 
utility functions and, to a high if lesser extent, its commitment to 
its technical architecture of optimisation, efficiency and equilibrium. 
As a result, social capital is treated, and often appears formally, as 
an element in a production or utility function, as if a material input 
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or consumption good respectively. Alternatively it is presumed to 
reduce transaction costs or to smooth the operation of the market. 
Second, mainstream economics purports to assess theory against 
the evidence through econometrics. This has rendered social capital 
a particularly attractive avenue for investigation, as its many 
dimensions and corresponding data sets, generally available or case-
study constructed, fit readily into professional practices.
Third, social capital has emerged across the social sciences just as 
economics imperialism, or the colonisation of the other disciplines, 
has entered a new phase, corresponding to the shift away from 
Becker’s economic approach, reducing the social to the narrowly 
conceived economic rationality in as-if-perfect market conditions. 
By contrast, the market imperfections approach to economics has 
opened up the social as never before, both in scope and palatability, 
to the other social sciences. Not only is the market no longer seen 
as primarily perfect, but the non-market or social is also seen as 
significant as the endogenised response to those imperfections. To 
put it in the vernacular, institutions, customs, history, culture and, 
of course, social capital now matter to economic performance, and 
economists can prove it by mathematics, and especially through 
game theory!
This new phase of economics imperialism has spawned a range 
of new fields in and around economics, or developments within 
them: the new economic sociology, the new institutional economics, 
the new political economy, the new economic geography, the new 
financial economics, the new development economics, the new 
welfare economics, and so on. These have offered corresponding 
incursions into the other social sciences. But the nature and extent 
of the impact of economics imperialism across the social sciences 
is uneven, reflecting both the continuing dynamic of colonised 
disciplines and, in particular, the acceptability of the methods 
and content of mainstream economics. For, whilst the new phase 
of economics imperialism does accept the salience of the non-
economic, it continues to rely upon the technical apparatus and 
architecture of the methodological individualism associated with 
economic rationality.
All this is pertinent to the general reception of the new economics 
imperialism within history, and of social capital in particular. The 
discipline became marked by a division between ‘economic’ and 
‘social’ history, whose origins derive from the earlier assault of 
mainstream economics upon history in the first phase of economics 
imperialism, giving rise to the cliometric revolution or aptly named 
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new economic history (Lamoreaux 1998). Inevitably, social history 
has either steered away from the economic altogether (on which see 
below), or has deployed an entirely different basis for its economics 
in its understanding of capital, capitalism, class, power, institutions, 
and so on.
With the new phase of economics imperialism, however, cliometrics 
has itself gone through a corresponding reform and has advanced 
on its own terms to give rise to what can be dubbed the ‘newer 
economic history’ (Fine 2003a, Fine and Milonakis 2003 and 2009 
and Milonakis and Fine 2007, 2009 and forthcoming). This purports 
to accept the criticisms of the new economic history for its neglect of 
institutions, culture, and so on, and to re-engage with social history 
on these terms. Some time after this initiative had been launched, 
one of its originators, Peter Temin (1997), felt it appropriate to 
suggest to the readers of the Journal of Economic History that it is 
‘Kosher to Talk about Culture’ as a force of economic history. He 
made explicit reference to Putnam and to social capital, seeing it as 
a force for industrialisation and as a reason why ‘historians need 
to make these connections themselves to get through the plethora 
of information and communicate with economists’ (p.282, see also 
p.272). Indeed, in a claim only a little less modest than Putnam’s, 
that social capital is the key to differential development between 
the north and south of Italy over the best part of a millennium (see 
below), Temin argues ‘that the particular form of social capital I 
call Anglo-Saxon culture was uniquely suited to the progress of 
industrialization over the past two centuries’ (p.268).
This is very big history on a very wide scale, and there are good 
reasons why the corresponding overtures to social historians will and 
should have failed in light of the continuing antipathy to mainstream 
economics, even in its market imperfections version. Most telling 
in Temin’s casual use, apart from its exaggerated claims, is the 
limited extent to which social capital has been used by economic as 
opposed, paradoxically, to social historians (see below). If, indeed, 
Temin and his culture are the historical handmaidens of mainstream 
economics, social capital should have been adopted within (the 
newer) economic history itself at an early stage and used extensively 
(even by Temin himself), just as it has been across the other social 
sciences. Why has this not been the case?
The simple and compelling answer is that an equally flexible 
and all-encompassing category was already in place within the 
new(er) economic history prior to the emergence of the social capital 
juggernaut. This was the idea of institutions and its corresponding 
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attachment to the new institutional economics (see Hadiz 2004 
for a critique of the new institutionalism and social capital as a 
component part in the context of decentralisation in Indonesia). 
And, just as the single figure of Putnam more than any other has 
symbolised social capital, so institutions as the residual explanatory 
factor for economic history have been associated with Douglass 
North. As a leading figure in founding the new economic history, he 
subsequently refined his analysis to incorporate property relations, 
followed by institutions. Significantly, these are defined as the formal 
or informal arrangements through which society governs itself and 
the economy, either more or less efficiently, through customary 
behaviour and ideological beliefs. There is an exact analytical cor-
respondence with social capital. North’s treatment of institutions 
in this way attained its analytical pinnacle and point of reference 
for the new institutional economics and economic history with the 
publication of Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance in 1990.
Thus, just as social history has had scant regard for social capital, 
especially in light of the direction it has taken, so economic history 
has had no need for it. In the case of economic history, this is an 
accident of the division of the discipline into these two camps, the 
evolution of the new(er) economic history around the trajectory 
taken by Douglass North, and the new institutional economics more 
generally. In the case of social history, the more palatable version 
of social capital for social historians associated with Bourdieu 
was already in decline by the mid 1990s as the concept took off 
(see previous chapter). At most, social capital for social historians 
occasionally retained that link whilst discarding (or being squeezed 
out of) the uses that had equally occasionally arisen on an entirely 
different basis in the past, as social and economic infrastructure or 
systemic economic properties (see Chapter 3). Social capital might 
prove more attractive to social historians by bringing Bourdieu back 
in, but this cannot fix context so easily as for other disciplines and 
topics that see BBBI as simply confined to path-dependence, initial 
conditions or presence and/or strength of contingent variables (as 
opposed to historically situated meaning).
5.3  froM socIal capItal to hIstorY
It is evident that social capital can, in principle, address almost any 
topic and, especially, do so across a wide range of methodologies 
and within, and across, disciplinary boundaries. This does not, 
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however, mean that its presence has been universal and uniform 
across the social sciences, as has already been illustrated by its 
marginal importance to history, which is far from being alone in its 
relative lack of interest. In part, this unevenness is explained by the 
substantive evolution of the content of social capital as a concept. 
For, whilst it has incorporated any consideration in principle, it 
has proved at least partially selective in practice in terms of subject 
matter, disciplines, content and methodology.
Indeed, insofar as social capital has exhibited a number of no-go 
areas (such as the state, class, conflict and power), despite these being 
at the heart of social interaction, it is liable to prove unattractive 
to historians, since the salience of these factors is integral to their 
understanding and, unavoidably, to major historical change itself, as 
opposed to short-term positive-sum improvements. Not surprisingly, 
even on its own preferred terrain of civil society, there are grander 
approaches, which are familiar to, and deployed by, historians, than 
that offered by social capital, although these have been almost if not 
completely neglected by the social capital literature. One of these, 
the gift relationship, a supposed antithesis to commodity relations, 
derives primarily from anthropology (see Fine 2002a and Lapavitsas 
2003 for critical overviews). Whatever the validity of the distinction 
as an analytical starting point, the opposition between gift and 
commodity is at least as rich as social versus other types of capital 
as a means of approaching the historical as a relationship between 
the economic (or the market) and the non-economic.
Thus, on just one occasion, Bestor (1999, p.39) refers to social 
capital in passing in her study of fifteenth-century Florentine marriage: 
‘The groom’s ornaments magnified the bride, transforming her into 
an iconic symbol of the material and social capital she brought to 
her marriage.’ But this is embedded within a contribution that is 
firmly composed, and entitled, around such marriage transactions 
as reflecting a (Maussian) gift. Similarly, Cooper’s (1995) study of 
wedding gift exchange in twentieth-century Niger prefers ‘gift’ to 
‘social capital’, the latter again appearing just once (p.138): ‘The 
giving of the gifts continues to create not only material wealth but 
also (and perhaps more importantly) social capital: the recognition 
of worth and value, social personhood, dependency and patronage.’ 
Benedict (1996, p.61), on the other hand, in studying seventeenth-
century Montpellier, again refers to social capital only once, in a 
table concerned with its contribution to dowry, but finds no need to 
mention gift. Basically either concept can be freely, even extensively, 
deployed by historians, but it is hardly surprising if social capital is 
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pushed into second place. Elsewhere, if only in passing, the history 
literature has brought gift and social capital together, with the latter 
in a subordinate position, by reference to Chinese guanxi (Kipnis 
1996 and Yang 1989; see also Chapter 9).
A second alternative to social capital which is of appeal to 
historians is the analytical framework posed by Polanyi, and the 
interaction between the commercial and the traditional. Once again, 
despite its potential affinities with the subject matter and the strength 
of this tradition, Polanyi has been studiously ignored by the social 
capital literature, although Granovetter and embeddedness has had 
some, predominantly indirect, presence through appeal to networks. 
Interestingly, in the broader critical literature on social capital, Craig 
and Porter (2005) and Robison (2004) have explicitly seen it both 
as an impoverished contribution relative to Polanyi and as a way 
of promoting some form of compromise between neo-liberalism 
and Third Wayism (see Chapter 9). As Craig and Porter put it 
(pp.257–8), in part referring to social capital, such concepts ‘are 
hardly substitutes for the engines of social contest and embedding 
Polanyi described … Thus, a Polanyian perspective also encourages 
the prising apart of these consensual domains and rationales, to see 
whose interests, contests and voices are being smothered’. And, for 
Robison, social capital is simply the technocratic and neo-liberal 
reflection of Polanyi’s double movement in the era of globalisation 
under US hegemony. In a JSTOR history search on Polanyi, the 
score is at least double that of social capital, indicating where the 
discipline’s preference lies! But, possibly, the greatest put-down for 
social capital in this respect comes from Granovetter. As a modern 
pioneer, he is the least sophisticated proponent of embeddedness, 
confessing to having drafted his classic contribution (1985) without 
any thought of Polanyi; but he also describes how he sought unsuc-
cessfully to push Putnam to be more refined when the latter first 
mooted the use of social capital (Krippner et al. 2004). If social 
capital lies to the other side of Granovetter in the understanding of 
the relationship between the economic and the social, it is hardly 
surprising it has had little appeal to social historians.
This all provides the context within which to review in more 
detail, if selectively, the impact of social capital on the discipline 
of history. The obvious starting point is the special double issue 
of Journal of Interdisciplinary History, reprinted as Rotberg (ed.) 
(2001) and, presumably, there must have been some social capital, as 
it were, in putting this together, not least with Putnam contributing 
as an author. At the time of its publication, I wrote as follows:
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It is edited by Rotberg ... in an introductory essay entitled ‘Social 
Capital and Political Culture in Africa, America, Australasia, and 
Europe’ that, together with the chronological span of the articles, 
indicates the putative geographical as well as historical scope of 
the notion. (Fine 2001a, p.83)
Two footnotes are added, one to the effect that ‘Almazán (1999) 
[‘The Aztec States-Society: Roots of Civil Society and Social 
Capital’] addresses social capital in 15th and early 16th century 
Aztec society but only uses the term in the title to his paper!’, and 
the other observing that, ‘[r]ather than taking opportunity here as 
well as elsewhere to address critiques, Gamm and Putnam (1999) 
[‘The Growth of Voluntary Associations in America, 1840–1940’] 
is primarily a descriptive and statistical account of associational 
activity in the United States’.
This all points to features that remain characteristic of the 
literature incorporating social capital into history. The range of 
topics is more or less unlimited, reference to the term is casual, 
and Putnam proceeds apparently oblivious of devastating and 
mounting criticism, much of it from historians or those dealing in 
historical topics. His account of Italy borders on the ridiculous and 
is readily undermined on its own terms (associational activity in 
the south caught up with that of the north within a decade of his 
own study), his use of social capital is itself an afterthought, and 
its transposition to the United States is dependent upon analytical 
and empirical acrobatics (Fine 2001a, ch.6). Over the past decade, 
the critical literature on Putnam has reached deluge proportions, 
his work often being taken as the critical point of departure for 
the typical article, due to his erroneous methodology, his limited 
understanding of social capital itself, as well as of civil society, his 
misunderstanding or omission of relevant variables, their interaction 
in ways that negate his approach, and so on (see Chapter 8). More 
specifically, if selectively, contributions to McLean et al. (2002) 
show how Putnam has only partially understood and also misrep-
resented de Tocqueville; Edwards et al. (2001) question his limited 
interpretation of the nature of civil society; and Boggs (2001 and 
2002) finds his understanding of politics to be a ‘fantasy’ (see 
Chapter 8). Arneil (2006) demonstrates his rosy, uncritical view of 
US civil society in the past (racist, sexist and religiously conservative 
and intolerant).
Whilst some of the articles in the special issue do fully embrace 
social capital, others can be perceived to be offering criticisms of 
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this sort, pointing to what social capital cannot do as much as 
what it can. Much more significant for our purpose, however, is 
that the double special issue is the exception that proves the rule. 
Presumably, this should have been the launching pad for social 
capital within history. If so, it has failed miserably, with no further 
special issues (which are common across the other social sciences) 
and limited numbers of contributions that do fully embrace the 
notion as opposed to casually mentioning it in passing.
In this vein, contributions from within history have tended 
to fall on either side of the discipline in economic or social 
orientation, flirting with the new institutional economics and its 
analytical foundations in offering an alternative in line with the 
new economics imperialism, or doing likewise with the cultural 
without economic content respectively. Some fall across the divide, 
as social capital is a recipe for eclecticism, and the motivation and 
origins for contributions in using, or referring to, social capital 
are idiosyncratic and not always transparent. What follows is a 
cursory overview, drawing predominantly upon the JSTOR search 
introduced above.
On the economic side of the divide, Allen and Reed (2006) 
construct duelling from 1500 to 1900 as a ‘screening device’, a means 
of demonstrating commitment to, and gaining, patronage, a way 
of overcoming informational imperfections with regard to loyalty 
to the crown. Carp (2001) points positively to social capital as 
constituting the bonds between firefighters in the eighteenth-century 
United States, not least in Charleston and the south more generally, 
as a consequence of the firefighters’ defence of private property and 
their connections with local politicians. This allowed them to take 
a lead in the fight for independence from Britain, and even to start 
fires in order to prevent property from falling into British hands. 
But one cannot help but wonder about the implications for slavery 
and racism, see McNamee and Miller 2004, p.76 on contemporary 
New York, and the exclusive employment practices involved. For, 
citing Waldinger (1995, p.557), ‘social connections utilized by white 
ethnics in the construction trades and the fire and police unions 
of New York effectively kept racial minorities out’. Carmona and 
Simpson (1999) deploy social capital in their account of the rise 
and fall of sharecropping in Catalonia, but essentially rely upon 
the moral hazard, opportunism and principal-agent discourse of 
the new information-theoretic approach to economics. This has 
itself been prominent in new literature on sharecropping, offered 
as an alternative to analyses based on class and power (and, it 
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would appear, to sharecroppers’ own self-perception). As Carmona 
and Simpson put it, ‘contemporaries often considered the contract 
synonymous with “exploitation” and “impoverishment”, terms 
frequently found in the more traditional literature on sharecropping’ 
(p.290). Contracting is also perceived to have been difficult across 
scattered Australian gold mines at the end of the nineteenth century, 
resulting in less social capital by which to come to amicable 
agreements and, hence, more costly litigation in the courts (Khan 
2000). In an early application in this vein, Majewski et al. (1993) 
deploy the notion of social capital, referencing Coleman, to explain 
the laying of plank roads in New York for public use as a reflection 
of the ability of community spirit to overcome the problem of free 
riders. Unfortunately for them, despite being published contempo-
raneously with Putnam on Italy, they do not seem to have been able 
to project a metaphorical absence of planks to present-day US civil 
society and to have shared in Putnam’s social capital glory.
Not surprisingly, moving towards the other side of the divide 
from the economic, social historians have referenced social capital 
when dealing with gender and marriage. For Brightman (1996), 
social capital facilitates foraging and hunting in primitive societies, 
but offers more in terms of standard anthropological concerns with 
taboo and gender politics. In Kapteijn’s (1995) study of northern 
Somali, with reference to gifts, bridewealth and reciprocity, women 
are social capital for their men, and children for their mothers, 
relations that tend to be undermined by commercialisation and the 
state. Pouwels (2002) sees marriage as the social capital by which 
merchants could integrate themselves into local society and promote 
their business along the African east coast prior to 1800.
In an unwitting anticipation of a rapidly growing literature on 
the connection between (lack of) social capital and crime (or any 
other deviancy), McIntosh suddenly imports the idea into her 
response in a debate on the controlling of misbehaviour across 
the medieval–early modern divide. Social capital accumulates with 
the formation of the nation-state, again anticipating social capital 
as modernisation. She wishes to incorporate religion and social 
factors. To do so, she draws ‘upon the powerful concept of “social 
capital”’. Her analytical opportunism, freely referencing Bourdieu, 
Coleman and Putnam as an unproblematic troika of sources, is 
scarcely concealed:
Regardless of whether one prefers a definition drawn from 
sociology/political science or a more anthropologically focused 
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usage, social capital is produced by interactions between people, 
either informally or through more structured associations … 
Because social capital serves to link individuals and groups, 
operating both laterally and vertically, it is an important 
explanatory tool when examining the development of a 
participatory nation-state. (1998, p.294)
And, also, one that controls ‘misbehaviour’. Significantly, as Gaggio 
(2004, p.509) also recognises, her contribution to the special issue 
of the Journal of Interdisciplinary History is one that emphasises 
the positive gains and role of women in medieval and early modern 
England, as opposed to their exclusion and oppression (McIntosh 
1999).
Other more sophisticated uses of social capital are explicit about 
their ties to Bourdieu-type interpretations and uses of the concept. 
Shetler (1995) focuses on an object as limited as a Kiroba text 
of popular history as a form of social capital in Tanzania, since 
it depicts a constellation of networks and social relations that 
can inform and sustain those who draw upon it. Pellow (1991) 
perceives the powers and legitimacy of chiefs as representing their 
shifting social capital in response to shifting circumstances in 
turn-of-the-last-century Accra, not least in being contingent upon 
British patronage. Smith (1995) allows for intersection between 
race, ethnicity and gender, as colour of skin as social capital allows 
for a better marriage in Guatemala. Franklin (2002) has inspired a 
number of studies of the way in which Afro-Americans have used 
their social and other capital to promote community education 
and other advances, although the social capital of racism is equally 
important in the history of ‘exclusion’. MacHardy (1992 and 1999) 
does deploy the entire repertoire of Bourdieu’s capitals to address 
dissent amongst Protestant nobles in sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century Habsburg. The same is so of Schoenbrun’s (1996) account 
of gendered relations around the east African Great Lakes before the 
fifteenth century. Without explicit reference to Bourdieu, Muldrew 
(2001, p.111) rounds up ‘the social capital of display’ as a feature of 
early modern England, both in and of itself, and in acts of generosity: 
‘[silver] plate was also an important item in gift exchange’. But such 
social capital is perceived to have been under threat from money 
or moneyed capital, for ‘the hoarding of money, and the advantage 
it gave one person to do what they wanted, were always seen as a 
threat to trust, sociability and the circulation of social capital upon 
which early modern exchange depended’ (p.119). Literature on 
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the modern period sends this antithesis between social capital and 
money into reverse, with the one serving to support the other in 
light of the need for trust of the borrower on the part of the lender. 
Interestingly, this theme within the newer economic history and the 
newer financial economics has been muted as far as social capital 
is concerned, except when it comes to Grameen banking and the 
like, for the new institutional economics suffices for the purpose. 
Yet, for van Leeuwen at least, such money allowed an entrée into 
higher status:
Poor relief was a many-sided litmus test: vis-à-vis one’s peers, 
apropos subordinate members of society, and, in fact, toward 
God and one’s own conscience. In another respect too, charity 
could be useful; the nouveaux riches, economically successful 
but socially inferior, could exchange money or time for social 
capital. (1994, p.596)
But the poor themselves are perceived to have had less honourable 
motives, displaying ‘an intuitive knowledge of the value of what 
sociologists and anthropologists call social capital’, creating norms 
of mutual support, ‘not solely [as] a form of spreading risks over 
time’ but also as a means of accessing information on support from 
others (p.603). In short, as far as social capital is concerned, ‘[t]he 
virtual certainty that an investment would pay off in the future 
naturally increased the willingness to invest’.
This is to return to social capital and economic history, or 
even economic and social history proper. And, in this vein, by a 
long way, by far the most accomplished use of social capital in 
history is to be found in Ogilvie’s (2003) book on women in early 
modern Germany and the role of guilds. Her starting point is social 
networks, and these are used to frame the creation and significance 
of social capital (which only really appears in her book after page 
340). Networks only become social capital through closure, by 
restricting membership as well as allowing it (p.341), whether by 
gender, ethnicity, religion or whatever. Just as inclusion can benefit 
those who are members, so exclusion can harm those who are 
not. She concludes: ‘social networks generate social capital, which 
not only facilitates collective action but also sustains commonly 
shared norms … these norms not only penalized women in each 
generation, but perpetuated and entrenched themselves, penalizing 
future generations’ (p.352). Ogilvie seems, however, to go further 
in her article (2004), recognising that
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guilds achieved or lost power not as a function of whether their 
social capital offered efficient institutional solutions to market 
failures, but as a function of whether it endowed them with a 
powerful bargaining position within the local institutional and 
political framework. (p.329)
In other words, ‘social capital’, and she herself uses inverted commas, 
is a consequence of the social networks of power, and not the more 
or less effective correction of market imperfections, as would be 
proposed by economic theory and its extrapolation to history. With 
this approach and its application, I have no complaints. But it is far 
from clear what light is shed by appealing to social capital, nor that 
it is open to generalisation from one case study to another.2
5.4  the present as hIstorY
Whilst there has been a significant degree of application of social 
capital to historical topics, if predominantly by non-historians, the 
vast weight of the literature has focused upon contemporary topics. 
Nonetheless, in this respect, there are two broad areas of application 
in which historians might take more than a passing interest, in view 
of concern for major socio-economic change. First and foremost is 
development, for which there is an extensive social capital literature, 
pioneered by the World Bank (see Chapter 6). It is difficult to believe 
that historians could take this literature seriously as a contribution 
to the history of the present.
Second, from humble beginnings, social capital has mushroomed 
in its application to transition economies. The World Bank 
sponsored a social capital initiative to explain ill health in Russia by 
distribution of social capital – this modest aim to be set against the 
drama of mortality rates having risen over the country’s transition, 
unprecedented for a relatively developed economy. In this vein, 
absence of social capital at all or of the right type has been seen 
as the cause of malaise within transitional societies. The inevitable 
conclusion is that successful transition depends on creating the 
right type of social capital, and/or that social capital is seen as 
amelioration of some for the negative excesses of an otherwise 
unexplained transition. For Korosteleva, Eastern Europe is subject 
to hierarchical social capital (blat):
the shadow societies of vertical networks [are] based on blat … 
rendering the official ‘democratic’ settings inefficient and often 
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invalid. Such a system is also a good method of keeping discontent 
under control by diverting the grievances and dissatisfaction to 
informal infrastructures that can deal with specific concerns more 
efficiently. (2006, p.186)
It all becomes a matter of, ‘How can a society break through to 
the “virtuous circle” that produces positive social capital?’ (p.187). 
Significantly, then, the bulk of this literature has regressed to the 
modernisation framework, taking some sort of ideal western market 
(and social capital) democracy as its goal. Whether in the form of 
secure property rights (free from state interference and continuing 
oligarchies), political participation through a well-functioning 
electoral system, or a vibrant civil society, social capital offers an 
analytical and policy panacea. Yet even the social capital literature 
itself, mercifully, has recognised that social capital has become unduly 
homogenised over a highly diverse set of transitional societies, for 
which individual histories and continuing context are of decisive 
importance.3 As the most comprehensive and sophisticated review of 
the literature puts it (Mihaylova 2004, p.136): ‘The use of the term 
can be pseudoscientific and lead to poor quality research … problems 
with its definition, operationalization and measurement, as well as 
with determining its sources, forms and consequences.’ But there is 
still seen to be scope for continued use of social capital in avoiding 
‘cultural essentialism, ahistoricism, functionalism, blind rational 
choice adherence, apolitical attitude and reductionism’, if only 
because ‘it is obvious that social capital has now firmly established 
itself in scholarly discourse and development practice and has a life 
(or many lives) of its own which cannot easily be dismissed’.
More generally, the issue is not about what sort of social capital 
is needed, and what sort of effects this will have in transition but, in 
the first instance, about what sort of transition is desirable – even if 
inevitably this is to some form of capitalism. The latter serves as an 
ideal against which to describe divergence (inadequate social capital 
or of the wrong type) and as the basis on which to advise a target 
for transitional convergence. But, for Uslaner and Badescu,
the bumpy transition to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe 
challenged three of the core tenets of social capital theory. First, 
democratic regimes should stimulate participation … Second, 
democratic regimes should breed trust in others … Third, civic 
engagement leads to more trust. (2003, p.219)
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It may be that with such conundrums in mind, historians of transition 
have been protected against the Putnam phenomenon by previous 
experience of Fukuyama (2002, p.34), who quickly jumped onto 
the social capital bandwagon himself, perceiving it as bountiful 
in developing countries, but as not corresponding to modern 
political and economic organisations, and hence as an obstacle to 
development. This is because for Fukuyama (1999, p.3), familial 
‘groups have a narrow radius of trust’, and also, ‘[t]he economic 
function of social capital is to reduce the transaction costs associated 
with formal coordination mechanisms like hierarchies, bureaucratic 
rules, and the like’ (p.4). So, for him, globalisation is the antidote, 
having become the bearer of social capital to developing countries, 
creating the functional new and destroying the old (Fukuyama 
2001). Does (modern) social capital also bring the end of history, 
and a recognisable euthanasia of the historian?4
5.5  there Is no alternatIVe?
In this light, whatever the inducements for historians to address 
the contemporary, social capital is unlikely to appeal as conduit. 
And this is no more than the condensation of the deficiencies of 
social capital from the perspective of historians as laid out above, 
something explaining its absence in their deliberations over the past 
decade. Will this continue to be the case? Across the profession, 
there are three potential directions, and these are not mutually 
exclusive. One is for social capital to gather strength and prosper, 
contingent in part upon how it evolves. BBBI apart, its evolution is 
most likely to be confined to the newer/newest economic history, as it 
opportunistically complements or displaces institutions.5 The second 
direction, at the opposite extreme, is for historians to continue in 
the main to ignore social capital, although, as and when it does 
prosper on or across the discipline’s boundaries, it will prove both 
irksome and potentially a Trojan Horse for the previous outcome. 
Significantly, the recent book on civil society edited by Hall and 
Trentmann (2005) fails to address the social capital phenomenon. 
When I asked why, I was told that social capital was not to be taken 
seriously. At the very least, historians can hardly be expected to take 
seriously the claim by social capitalists that they are BBI civil society 
or civilising economists. For whatever the validity of the claim that 
civil society is absent across other social sciences, this is laughable 
as far as (social) history and historians are concerned.
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Nevertheless, the third direction, and the one I favour, is for 
historians to engage fully and uncompromisingly critically with 
social capital by exposing its legion deficiencies and offering 
constructive alternatives that reject it rather than proposing new, 
improved versions. Here, of course, I depart from Gaggio. Although, 
as already observed, there is considerable overlap between the two 
of us over the poverty of the bulk of the social capital literature as 
it is, there are also differences. His stance is one of acknowledging 
the limitations of social capital and of putting these right in 
individual case study. His own study (Gaggio 2004 and 2007) of 
the Italian gold jewellery industry is exemplary, and one of the 
most rewarding and sophisticated amongst those that cling to social 
capital despite acknowledging its legion deficiencies. Although, 
from my own perspective,6 he relies insufficiently critically upon 
the industrial district/clusters paradigm for the sources of success, 
he does so through recognising that Putnam fetishises civil society 
and associational life as a source of economic success without regard 
to other causes and consequences (not least the organising power of 
politics, whether through socialism or fascism, pp.35–6). He charts 
the passage of a particular local entrepreneur, Carlo Balzano, from 
social capital to fraud and embezzlement (p.49), and, indeed, as has 
been revealed on a grander scale in many countries, it is far from 
clear whether the two differ. And, in perceiving an industrial district 
as a form of social capital,7 he breaks with Granovetter in viewing 
social networks as cultural and political, ‘not as static structures 
but as historical processes forged in conflict’, with the capacity of 
actors ‘to reflect on their own lives and embed economic action in, 
or disembed it from, other realms of action’ (p.324).
I do agree, then, with Gaggio himself as illustration, that the 
presence of social capital is sufficiently fluid conceptually that it 
can take on any mantle, including excellent critical and constructive 
analysis. But to rely upon this alone is to take an unduly narrow 
view of the intellectual dynamic of social capital, for the following 
reasons. First, Gaggio takes insufficient account of the collective 
weight of the critical deficiencies of social capital that have been 
exposed here and which explain the historian’s reluctance to engage. 
Its capacity to absorb each and every variable has provided it with 
the separate but related property of being more or less immune 
to criticism. As argued in Chapter 2, this often takes the form 
of pointing to an anomaly in light of an omitted variable, itself 
often related to a specific context. So criticism, acknowledged in 
a piecemeal fashion, is readily perceived as seeking the addition 
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of an otherwise missing variable or method, so that the remedy, 
within the loose bounds previously indicated, is to incorporate 
what is otherwise absent and move forward. On the other hand, 
where criticism is offensive to the core values of social capital, 
it is usually simply ignored, especially in relation to the points 
already elaborated. This is so much so that those contributions 
that do acknowledge criticism do so selectively, for the purpose 
of supporting their own particular contributions, adding to the 
collectively chaotic but all-encompassing nature of social capital. In 
this respect, at least, if not by extent of criticism, Gaggio conforms 
to a typical article – BBBI and proceeding on this basis to promote 
social capital amongst historians.
Second, then, this means that individual contributions, however 
scathing and reconstructive, will be deployed to legitimise social 
capital and not to move it from its current trajectory. The dead 
weight of continuing hackademics is too great. Third, and most 
important, Gaggio takes no account of the broader intellectual 
environment that has spawned social capital. For, as laid out in 
Chapter 1, social capital thrived in that intellectual context peculiar 
to the 1990s in which there was a dual reaction against the extremes 
both of neo-liberalism and postmodernism. Like its counterpart, 
globalisation, but as its complement and opposite in many respects, 
social capital has rejected the idea that markets work perfectly and 
embraced the idea of getting real about how people go about their 
(daily) lives (Fine 2004a). The global, though, is notable for its 
absence from the world of social capital (Schuurman 2003), with the 
exception of a recently burgeoning literature on global management 
(see Chapter 7). Social capital is more about communities accepting 
the world as it is and bettering themselves on this basis.
Thus, whilst globalisation and social capital parallel one another 
in seeking to come to terms with the nature of contemporary 
capitalism and extend their insights into the past, they otherwise 
differ considerably in content and direction (although each is 
equally promiscuous, if selective, in range of application, method 
and impact). For globalisation has been won away from the neo-
liberal agenda that the market is benevolently triumphant over the 
state. Instead, globalisation has been situated systemically, as a 
matter of power and conflict, where the role of the state remains 
significant, and context by time and place is paramount (as neatly 
captured by the notion of glocalisation). By contrast, social capital 
has compromised with neo-liberalism, is middle-range at the expense 
of the systemic (with roots in methodological individualism), and is 
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most uncomfortable if not self-destructive about BBI power, conflict, 
and so on, and, most significantly, the contextual. In this light, it 
would appear that historians do not have the choice of accepting 
social capital and then simply reforming it with the removal of a 
wart or seven.
On the whole, history’s disregard for social capital is a reflection 
of its own positive qualities. But it is precisely because of these 
that it should critically engage with social capital, shedding light 
on the methodological and theoretical lessons that can be gleaned 
historically for understanding the past as well as contemporary 
capitalism. The point is not only to halt social capital in its tracks and 
send it back to where it has come from, but also to offer alternatives 
to social science, currently as open as it has ever been, in the dual 
retreat from postmodernism and neo-liberalism. Otherwise, there 
is the prospect of a creeping, if not a rapid, march of social capital 
across the newer/newest economic history, and a corresponding 
reduction in the scope and influence of a genuine economic and 
social history.





In September 2006, a panel chaired by Angus Deaton published 
a major evaluation of the World Bank’s research, covering the 
period from 1998 to 2005. As well as the report itself, 20 or more 
background papers were commissioned from assessors across the 
various topics that were felt to represent the Bank’s work (Deaton 
et al. 2006). The Deaton assessment was extremely damning, one 
major criticism being that poor-quality research and questionable 
results had been promoted whenever it suited the Bank’s position. 
Just to pick out one of many statements to this effect:
the panel has substantial criticisms of the way that this research 
was used to proselytize on behalf of Bank policy, often without 
expressing appropriate scepticism. Internal research that was 
favorable to Bank positions was given greater prominence, and 
unfavorable research ignored … balance was lost in favor of 
advocacy … there was a serious failure of the checks and balances 
that should separate advocacy and research. (p.6)
The report goes on to perceive this as deriving from an internal 
institutionalised system of commissioning and delivering research 
within the Bank that needs to be reformed, not least with regard to 
the incentives offered to individual researchers and the independence 
of the research process from the needs of advocacy.
Despite its trenchant and welcome criticisms, the Deaton report is 
also extremely limited in certain respects. First, its own assessment 
of quality is more or less entirely based on the criterion of what 
would be publishable in a mainstream economics journal (with 
some deference towards taking into account development and 
policy implications). Second, then, this means a failure to get to 
grips with interdisciplinary and heterodox approaches, especially 
those derived from developments studies. Third, there is also a 
110
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notable absence of any explicit and fully specified concept of 
development against which the contributions to research might be 
assessed. Fourth, the criticisms offered by Deaton have been made 
many times before and, to some extent, in much greater depth and 
breadth. These earlier contributions are not simply overlooked by 
the report, but there is a failure to address why the Bank is so 
unresponsive to what are often devastating critiques of the quality 
of its research and other practices (other than to suggest different 
incentives for researchers and their greater independence). Fifth, 
and possibly most surprising of all given the report’s conclusions, 
there is little or no reference to the apparently dramatic changes in 
the Bank’s own research and policy ethos over the period covered 
by the report’s assessment. In particular, this period witnessed the 
apparent demise of the Washington Consensus and the rise of the 
post-Washington Consensus, coupled with the Comprehensive 
Development Framework and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs). No consideration is given to these shifts, even though they 
are generally acknowledged to have been the leading elements in 
the evolution of the Bank’s advocacy and scholarship (if not of its 
policy) over the previous decade.
In my previous book (Fine 2001a), I devoted two chapters and 
more to social capital at the World Bank. I carefully distinguish 
between the roles played by scholarship, rhetoric and policy in 
practice, arguing that these are not unrelated, but that they are not 
necessarily mutually consistent, and that the relationship between 
them varies over time and topic (and, it should be added, place). 
Social capital has primarily played a legitimising role for the Bank 
in rhetoric and scholarship with very limited impact upon policy 
(and, as with other areas of research, a particular and usually 
peculiar relationship to reality is implicit in the vision and sources of 
development that it offers). In an extremely prominent and heavily 
promoted fashion, social capital was being used to legitimise the 
shift from the Washington to the post-Washington Consensus, with 
the design of incorporating both the non-economic (or civil society) 
and the non-economist (development studies) into the process, at 
the expense of the (developmental) state that had proved so effective 
in questioning the Washington Consensus, especially by reference 
to the East Asian NICs.
Yet, necessarily, as a special case of what has already been argued, 
Deaton seems to be blissfully unaware of these shenanigans, despite 
its emphasis on the gap between research and advocacy. Despite the 
extraordinary rise of social capital at the Bank over the last years 
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of the millennium, the main report only mentions social capital 
once. It could not be more dismissive of the concept (p.81): ‘There 
is much political correctness, including mindless cheerleading for 
cultural touchstones such as women, trees, and social capital, as in 
“women are an important engine of growth”.’ Clearly, the report 
has scant respect for research on social capital since it is seen as a 
mere ‘cultural touchstone’ (like women, let alone trees!). As a result, 
the report misses the opportunity to reflect upon how and why 
such a concept could be so heavily promoted within the Bank, and 
outside by it, in the arenas of both research and advocacy.
This is all the more unfortunate since the decline from prominence 
of social capital at the Bank, as will be seen, has been as rapid as was 
its rise. In the context of scholarship, advocacy (or rhetoric/ideology) 
and policy, why should it have been subject to such an experience? 
The last major publication from the Bank on social capital, at least 
as scholarship/advocacy to promote it, appeared as Grootaert and 
van Basterlaer (eds) (2002). Its view of social capital could not have 
been more different than that purveyed by Deaton. In his two-page 
foreword, Robert Putnam asserts that ‘experts in the field are now 
converging toward a “lean and mean” definition of social capital, 
focused on social networks and the associated norms of reciprocity 
and trust’ (p.xxi). It is to be suspected that this unsubstantiated (and 
false) view, one that classifies as experts only those who hold to 
Putnam’s own approach, reflects both a pride in and a nice-to-be-
scared horror at the conceptual monster that Putnam, more than 
any other, has been responsible for releasing. Putnam himself refers 
to ‘one of the hottest concepts in social science globally … a very 
far-reaching expansion – virtually an explosion’ (p.xxi). So it’s time 
to get lean and mean, in order to defend social capital against the 
charge of a definitional chaos that is even acknowledged, and yet 
consolidated, by its ardent proponents, as they shift its use to suit 
their own particular purposes.
But, on the second page of his foreword, at least indirectly, Putnam 
is unable to restrain his predilection, and that of the literature, for 
a plump and benevolent definition of social capital. He welcomes 
the correctly observed burgeoning scope of application:
While early work had focused primarily on governance, 
macroeconomic rates of growth, and (in closely related work) 
school performance and job placement, we now are beginning 
to see how social capital can influence everything from infant 
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mortality rates to solid waste management to communal 
violence. (p.xxii)
Leaving aside what is both a selective and self-serving early history 
of work on social capital, is it surprising that its definition should 
career out of control when it simultaneously seeks to encompass 
so many aspects of economic and social life?
This chapter, then, charts the rise and fall (or benevolent but rapid 
neglect) of social capital at the World Bank. It does so against the 
background, covered in Section 6.2, of the shift from the Washington 
to the Post-Washington Consensus, in which social theorists at the 
Bank saw an opportunity to promote social capital as a lever in 
persuading Bank economists to take the social more seriously. The 
results are at best mixed, in light of close examination of Grootaert 
and van Basterlaer (eds) (2002). It could be argued that it was 
the economists that were doing the levering and welcoming social 
capital, as a way of legitimising their unreconstructed economics 
and its extension to the non-economic. As documented in Section 
6.3, the World Bank’s own social capitalists think otherwise and 
consider themselves to have successfully and strategically deployed 
an admittedly flawed concept in moving the Bank’s economists 
to more progressive and rounded positions. As far as they were 
concerned, social capital had done its work at the Bank and attention 
could move on to other issues.
But Sections 6.3 and 6.4 offer a rather different interpretation 
of social capital’s fall from prominence at the Bank. First, if the 
economists were moved by social capital at all, it was only to use the 
concept as a means to address the social with otherwise unchanged 
methods. Second, whilst this meant that the social capitalists had 
done as much as they could with the economists, it was little if 
not nothing of substance. Third, economists themselves had little 
further use for social capital, not least because, within the wider 
literature, it was becoming more irksome in its social content than 
they could accommodate.
Thus, in a brief if glittering career, social capital has had at most 
a peripheral impact at the Bank – primarily one that has smoothed 
the transition from Washington to post-Washington Consensus and 
sidelined attention to the developmental state. But there has also 
been a much wider impact of social capital in development studies, 
where, as unpicked in Section 6.5, it has attained the status of a 
‘buzzword’. This means that the impact of social capital has been, 
and remains, far from negligible. As suggested in the final section, 
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the concept should be rejected in development studies, as in other 
applications, with the lesson to be drawn from its use at the World 
Bank that even apparently good intentions are perverted when 
attached to it.
6.2  socIal capItal’s IrresIstIBle rIse …
It is hardly surprising that social capital should have been applied 
to development, especially as it has been applied to so much else. 
But the prominence of social capital within development has been 
considerably strengthened by its heavy promotion from an early stage 
by the World Bank. Why should this have been so? Like participation 
and empowerment, social capital offered a dream concept for the 
challenges faced by the World Bank in the 1990s, enabling it to 
offer a more radical rhetoric whilst retaining flexibility in policy 
substance. Thus, in retrospect, Porter and Lyon (2006) see social 
capital as having been a means of BBI culture for the World Bank and, 
for Watts (2006, p.36), it has been a matter of ‘domesticating’ the 
concept, although it was already pretty well domesticated ab initio 
once Bourdieu had been discarded in favour of Coleman and Putnam. 
For the previous decade had brought a growing crisis in the Bank’s 
(and the IMF’s) legitimacy, with mounting criticism of the neo-liberal 
conditionalities attached to loans. The Comprehensive Development 
Framework (CDF) and the post-Washington Consensus (PWC) were 
designed to restore that legitimacy (Fine et al. 2001). The rejection 
of the Washington Consensus at the rhetorical level was evident. 
Yet it is arguable whether these shifts had any impact on policy 
itself, as an even wider range of market-supporting interventions 
than under the Washington Consensus became legitimised through 
a rationale of correcting market and non-market imperfections (van 
Waeyenberge 2007).
These shifts also reflected changes that were under way within the 
discipline of economics in general and development economics in 
particular (Jomo and Fine 2006 and Fine 2008c). The old ‘informal’, 
‘classical’ development economics had long given way to the ‘new’, 
with its emphasis on mathematical techniques, econometrics, the 
virtues of the market, and the corresponding need not to distort it 
through rent-seeking, corruption, and the like. But, in its reaction 
against neo-liberalism, mainstream economics had begun to 
emphasise the importance of market imperfections and the need to 
correct them through non-market mechanisms. This has fed through 
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into what I have termed the ‘newer’ development economics, with 
the PWC to the fore.
In one major respect, the CDF and the PWC exhibit a marked 
difference from earlier ideologies emanating from the World Bank. 
Although completely different from one another, the Keynesian/
welfarism/modernisation stance of the McNamara period and 
the neo-liberalism of the Washington Consensus had their own 
relatively simple messages on how to achieve development. In 
contrast, the PWC emphasises that the incidence of market and 
non-market imperfections is uneven and contingent in form, extent, 
and consequences so that not one model fits all, and everything is 
micro-based, not least in addressing the macro. Social capital is at 
core the negative, mirror image of such practices as rent-seeking, 
with the same analytical framework but diametrically opposed 
conclusions – that non-market influences can be beneficial (rather 
than detrimental) to the market. As such, it incorporates the 
non-economic in a way that is consistent with the (non-)market-
imperfections approach and is sensitive in principle to differences 
between one application and another. I hasten to add that this does 
not necessarily make a policy difference; rather, it simply offers 
richer scope in justifying policy. After all, there are limits to using 
neo-liberalism as the rationale for substantial intervention. Stein 
(2001, pp.18–19) reasonably concludes, then: ‘Unlike some people 
that argue that SCI [the World Bank’s Social Capital Initiative] is 
aimed at creating a post-Washington consensus, the initiative is 
focused at propping up the orthodox model while disarming some 
of its critics’ – although it might be even more reasonable to see this 
as the PWC itself rather than as an alternative to it.2
In short, social capital offered considerable leverage in the World 
Bank’s dealings with the external world. In addition, it allowed 
for certain internal institutional interests to be promoted. The 
World Bank is dominated by economists, numerically and intel-
lectually, and of the worst type from the perspective of the social 
scientists under the shadow of the Washington Consensus – who, in 
leaving the economy to the economists, would have to subordinate 
themselves to economics and to rational choice, both in approach 
and in being confined to a restricted range of applications. The CDF 
and PWC, though, offered some opportunity for non-economists 
to be taken seriously. Social capital was strategically chosen as a 
judicious concept for that purpose.
Given my own interest in social capital for other reasons, I was 
onto its importance for the World Bank from an early stage. I 
Fine 01 text   115 26/11/2009   11:46
116  theorIes of socIal capItal
dredged through the Bank’s dedicated website, http://worldbank.
org/poverty/scapital, and, initially, exaggerated its importance as 
a way of circumventing the idea of the developmental state as an 
alternative to the Washington Consensus (Fine 1999a), although 
that the PWC would (seek to) circumvent the developmental state 
proved correct. But my efforts did prompt a mole within the World 
Bank to contact me with three gems of wisdom in terms of the 
reaction I was likely to receive for my criticisms. First, I would be 
asked to back off, as the World Bank was changing for the good. 
Second, none of my criticisms would be addressed. And, third, 
I would be offered a job of sorts to internalise, incorporate and 
neutralise criticism.
Sad to say, even moles can get it wrong, and the last of these never 
materialised. Only on one occasion, the exception that proves the 
rule, was there any serious attempt to engage in discussion with 
me from the World Bank’s social capitalists. This was a seminar 
organised jointly by the London School of Economics and the 
Overseas Development Institute, specifically to provoke debate, 
and with Michael Woolcock as my opponent.3 To my astonishment, 
he insisted as a precondition for participation that I provide him 
with three questions to answer, and he would reciprocate. I offered 
the following:
1. Discuss critically the relationship between social capital and 
globalisation.
2. Assess critically what is the social capital of the World Bank and 
other IFIs.
3. Discuss critically what social capital understands as, and adds 
to the understanding of, development, with what economic 
analyses it is consistent, and how it understands ‘non-social’, 
especially economic, capital, and capitalism.
These were indicative of a wish to explore the relationship between 
social capital and globalisation, economic development, and 
the practices of the World Bank itself. I do not have a record of 
Woolcock’s questions but one was to ask what I would say to a 
South African nurse asking me how I would deal with HIV/AIDS,4 
and another was why I did not publish in respectable journals. The 
latter is ironic in view of the World Bank’s total exclusion of my 
work (in spite of its adopted role as a ‘Knowledge Bank’) from its 
social capital website (including its extensive annotated bibliography 
on social capital) and from its overall website altogether (other 
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than once for a legitimising exercise5). In the event, while I did 
answer his questions, he totally ignored mine, preferring to offer 
a tangential discourse on some obscure management framework 
before departing to overview the implementation of the World 
Bank’s social capital toolkit household survey for Albania. With 
social capital surveys having been widely adopted across developed 
and developing countries, whatever the intentions of the World 
Bank’s social capitalists in shifting internal dialogue and practice, 
the external impact has been considerable in this respect at least.
Otherwise, two other skirmishes mark my dealings with the 
World Bank social capitalists. One was also with Michael Woolcock, 
through email exchange, in which he chose to voice his own views 
through an anonymous third party, to the effect that ‘[w]hat makes 
social capital most useful is its neutrality; a neutrality that you 
cannot get in discussions about participation, discrimination, 
exclusion, etc., which I consider manifestations of social capital’. 
And, the anonymous commentator continues:
Ben Fine seems to be in a real minority here. While many people 
are still undecided about the value-added of social capital 
(which I can understand), Ben Fine seems to be the only one 
who thinks even considering social capital is actually destructive 
or distracting.
As will be seen, the presumed virtues of retaining a ‘neutral’ concept 
of social capital lay in its putative capacity to engage and shift 
economists at the Bank. The issue is how that neutrality was going 
to be coloured in at the Bank itself and with what effects.
This exchange with Woolcock took place around my commentary 
on the social capital contribution to the draft for comment for 
the World Development Report (WDR) for 2000/1 on poverty 
(ultimately World Bank 2001). I had pointed to my usual criticisms 
of social capital, suggesting in unduly compromising fashion that 
at most social capital should serve as an investigative category and 
that it otherwise offers no causal analytical purchase in and of itself. 
To drive this home, literally in terms of their draft, I observed that 
although the section discussing social capital preceded those on 
gender, discrimination, stratification, fragmentation, conflict and 
institutions, none of these then cared to draw upon social capital 
at all, scarcely even to mention it, and so they could do without 
it altogether. In the final version, this embarrassing oversight was 
resolved by the simple expedient of changing the order, so that 
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social capital was located after the others (as if these other issues 
were brought to fruition through social capital!).
Nonetheless, this WDR symbolised the high point of social capital 
at the World Bank. In addition, though, the leading position played 
by non-economists in its rise was at least in the beginnings of being 
eclipsed, as is evidenced by the collection of Grootaert and van 
Bastelaer (eds) (2002) that appeared soon afterwards. Initially, 
observe, possibly echoing Putnam’s expert appeal for the lean and 
mean, Grootaert and van Bastelaer advise against too great a level 
of fungibility in definition. For:
There could be a temptation to extend the concept of social capital 
too broadly, turning it into a catch-all category designed to capture 
any asset that does not fall under the conventional categories of 
natural, physical, and human capital. A concept that encompasses 
too much is at risk of explaining nothing. The challenge for 
research, therefore, is to give meaningful and pragmatic content 
to the rich notion of social capital in each context and to define 
and measure suitable indicators. (2002, p.5)
Apart from indicating the narrow basis on which the contextual 
is to be constructed – judicious selection of variables from one 
case study to another – a genuine problem is identified. If social 
capital encompasses everything, over and above the unquestioned 
traditional (economists’) categories of capital, it becomes an empty 
residual explanatory factor and is, thereby, rendered tautological 
– the ‘missing link’, to recall Grootaert’s (1997) subsequently 
regretted phrase.
Yet, despite good intentions to avoid circular reasoning, and 
corresponding definitions, Grootaert and van Bastelaer still tend 
to fall victim to such simple charms. Social capital is ‘rich’ because 
it can be anything beyond the traditional categories of capital, but 
not all of its wealth will always be present in all circumstances. So 
social capital still serves as a residual explanatory factor but, like 
God or the devil, moves in mysterious and diverse ways, for good 
or for evil, from one context to another. Definitionally, the lean and 
mean also proves elusive. In a table, detailing the use of social capital 
across the book’s chapters and entitled ‘Classification of chapters 
by scope, forms and channels of social capital’, Grootaert and van 
Bastelaer range over micro, meso and macro, and informational, 
collective action, structural and cognitive. That pretty well covers 
all social theory in broad terms! Throughout the volume, there 
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is also appeal to other categories of social capital – the bridging, 
bonding, linking, vertical, horizontal and dark side. This all reflects 
a futile attempt to impose some general classificatory order over a 
category that is free to roam wherever its users care to take it – as 
if religions could be classified according to their icons, canons, and 
standard practices, such as frequency of worship.
In this light, not surprisingly, tautology is never far removed 
from the contributions’ conclusions. Collier’s chapter (2002), which 
opens the collection, is an outstanding if deeply depressing example 
of the economist’s art of speculative or make-believe theorising. 
It begins with the insight that social capital as social interaction 
is variable according to composition and structure. A marriage is 
composed of the same two people whereas a singles bar is subject 
to shifting personnel. From here, it is a short step to including 
social capital as an input in a production function, one that varies 
as social interactions accommodate externalities, or not, through 
teaching, copying, trusting, pooling, and so on. Ultimately, we are 
led to the following ‘implication for a pro-poor policy’ (p.39): ‘The 
distributional consequences of different mechanisms suggest that 
public policy should focus on promoting mechanisms that are dis-
tributionally most progressive and attempt to redress the regressive 
aspects of the other mechanisms.’ I remain uncertain over whether 
this means we are in favour or not of marriage and/or singles 
bars.6 Less speculatively, other chapters in the volume find that the 
presence of social capital, however understood or measured, has an 
ambiguous effect depending upon the presence or absence of other 
factors (or context). This is so for Gugerty and Kremer (2002) on 
donors’ attempts to build social capital through their programmes in 
Kenya; for Krishna and Uphoff (2002) on watershed management in 
Rajasthan; for Pargal et al. (2002) on waste management in Dhaka; 
and for Bebbington and Carroll (2002) on federations of the rural 
poor in the Andes. What do these have in common, contextually, 
apart from the common foisting of social capital upon them?
For, in each case, the reason for the ambiguous effect of social 
capital is different, although, not surprisingly, there is some 
emphasis on the necessary presence of grass-root participation and 
its attachment to higher-level decision making and other factors. 
Essentially, this is equivalent to the conclusion that for social capital 
to be effective, some further factors X must be present. In a sense, 
this view is confirmed by the more upbeat case studies. For Isham 
and Kähkönen, for example, in their study of community-based 
water projects in central Java:
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Our results indicate that in villages with high levels of social 
capital – particularly in villages with active village groups and 
associations – household participation in design is likely to be 
high and monitoring mechanisms are more likely to be in place 
… Donors may want to avoid investing in community-based 
piped water systems in villages with low levels of social capital. 
(2002, p.185)
Now, what results of this sort mean is either tautology – participation 
is high where it is high if associational activity or the like is sufficiently 
close to water provision – or that some other form of association 
and its associated activity gives rise to spin-off effects to water. This 
latter option is precisely where social capital is at its most fungible 
– or should that be vulnerable? For, why and how should one set 
of social interactions be transferable to another? Such is the enigma 
that has been widely noted in various ways as surrounding social 
capital, especially in pointing to lack of attention to how social 
capital is created and how it has its effects, quite apart from its 
differentiation by context.
The same issue arises in slightly different ways in other papers 
in the collection. Knack’s (2002) exercise in growth and poverty 
accounting, which utilises a variety of social capital variables, is 
highly questionable on its own terms. In any case, as Temple has 
concluded:
What can a policy-maker in Mexico or Turkey actually do, 
confronted with the evidence from the World Values Survey 
that they govern a low-trust society? Standard recommenda-
tions, such as attempting to eliminate corruption and improve 
the legal system, are nothing new, and make good sense quite 
independently of any emphasis on social capital. (2001, p.92)
But, whatever the validity of the empirical conclusions and their 
policy implications, the point being emphasised here is that social 
capital depends for its explanatory purchase upon its generation 
as some sort of resource in one activity or context and its use in 
another.
This point is unwittingly confirmed by Collier’s contribution from 
within mainstream neoclassical economics. It is based entirely on 
the idea of social capital as arising, purposefully or otherwise, in the 
context of asymmetry of information between contracting parties, 
with more positive outcomes potentially being built out of cumulative 
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individual interactions, especially where this results in the market 
allocating resources more efficiently. The problem with this is that 
nothing new can ever arise, as has been recognised more generally in 
the neo-Austrian critique of neoclassical economics. So social capital 
in this perspective lacks a place for innovation and entrepreneurship, 
even within its chosen framework of methodological individualism. 
Collier’s account is remarkably defective in that it fails to explain 
fungibility between one activity and another, and the ability of 
individuals to go beyond the circular limits of their literally received 
knowledge or experience; it is not completely generalisable. Thus, 
for example, on the one hand, social capital arises out of copying 
and pooling of information on the basis of individual interactions 
(p.26); this can only replicate what already exists. On the other 
hand, a choir generates trust amongst its participants, ‘trust is the 
output, which is durable’, even if the choir is disbanded (p.24). 
Albeit on narrow terms, choir-generated trust becomes a resource 
that can be put to use in novel, non-choir, applications – but what, 
how and why? By the same token, game theory can only lead to 
outcomes that are preordained by the game itself. It cannot break 
out of them, let alone bring about ‘development’, however that 
might be specified as a process of unchartered change.7
This raises a further aspect of the general fungibility of social 
capital: that it can be negative as well as positive, as has now been 
occasionally, sometimes reluctantly, accepted. This is hardly surprising 
since, in its analytical framework, social capital is isomorphic to 
rent-seeking and corruption. Such is implicitly recognised in the 
conclusion of Gugerty and Kremer (2002, p.232):8 ‘Where programs 
try to impose collective decision-making on what is more naturally 
an individual household activity, such as agricultural production, 
they may promote rent seeking as much as social capital.’ To be 
provocative, it is not clear what is different between rent-seeking 
and social capital, except you downplay the one you do not favour. 
For social capitalists, the dark side of the force may or may not 
arise, depending upon context. This is formalised in the (World 
Bank) account of Woolcock and Narayan (2000).9 They consider 
that the state and social capital can complement or substitute 
for one another. They posit a two-dimensional framework, with 
(dys)functional states on one axis and bridging capital on the other, 
giving rise to four quadrants: social and economic well-being for 
+ +; coping for − +; conflict for − −; and exclusion and latent conflict 
for + −. This reduces the world to a two-dimensional map of states 
across time and place!
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However, the idea that social capital is positive or negative 
depending upon context is unacceptable in anything other than 
an idealised world in which win–win cooperative games present 
themselves as enduring outcomes. However, and however much, 
social capital incorporates social relations and processes, it is, 
thereby, ‘embedded’, to use the vernacular of the new economic 
sociology, in matters of exclusion and inclusion, power, conflict, 
exploitation, oppression, hierarchy and conflict. Not surprisingly, 
these are notable for their absence from the social capital literature 
as a whole; they are generally present only in the more tempered and 
neutral terms of vertical or bridging relations through hierarchies 
and/or with the state.
Such criticism is most apposite. For Grootaert and van Bastelaer 
reveal the logic of their position on social capital by reference to that 
standard-bearer of a physicalist (and individualistic) interpretation 
of capital, Robinson Crusoe (2000, p.5):10 ‘Although every other 
form of capital has a potential productive impact in a typical 
Robinson Crusoe economy, social capital doesn’t (at least until 
Friday emerges from the sea).’ Yet such disregard for the meaning of 
the social and of capital runs much deeper, as a result of the universal 
application of social capital across so many contexts. The result 
is to homogenise the understanding of variables, like trust, across 
different societies and instances, as if each of the multidimensional 
aspects of social capital (from friends and family to confidence 
in government and moral values) always had the same meaning 
and significance, even leaving aside the omission of other critical 
elements such as power, class and conflict.
The result often takes the form of one of two extremes. At one 
extreme, precisely because it can be anything and is in vogue, 
social capital can be used to legitimise and promote an analysis of 
something else, by association with itself. This is so even though 
the analysis makes no use of social capital at all, except in a title, 
an abstract, a keyword – the term can be entirely absent from 
the substantive text itself. The volume provides an exemplary 
illustration in the contribution of Bates and Yackovlev (2002) on 
ethnicity and violence in Africa. Their opening paragraph suggests, 
‘ethnic groups promote the forces of modernization: phrased more 
fashionably, they constitute a form of social capital’ (p.310). They 
close their chapter without ever mentioning the term again, although 
when they veer towards stating the obvious the influence of social 
capital is marked (p.331): ‘The most desirable institutions would 
be those that weaken the prospects of winner-take-all outcomes and 
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assuage minorities’ fear of permanent political exclusion, thereby 
countering the logic that leads political violence to replace political 
protests in ethnically diverse settings.’
At the other extreme, contributors fall over themselves to mention 
social capital at every possibly opportunity, not least because it 
is anything that everybody does together, and it can be minutely 
categorised as bonding, bridging, linking, horizontal, vertical, 
dark, and so on. Coletta and Cullen’s contribution, again a study 
of ethnic conflict, provides an example. Writing about Cambodia, 
they suggest:
Violent conflict often shapes social capital in favor of bonding 
relationships and a survival orientation in the emergency period, 
postconflict market penetration may easily reverse this pattern 
and lead to more outward-focussed, bridging social capital in the 
medium-to longer-term transition. (2002, p.292)
Turning to Rwanda, and neatly combining economic and social 
analysis in a way that once again borders on tautology, they 
write (p.299): ‘This perverse manipulation of social capital made 
possible the mass recruitment of Hutu … Tutsi elimination would 
benefit Hutu who participated in killings by decreasing number of 
competitors for land, homes, cattle, and other possessions.’ Lest 
this be insufficiently clear, Putnam and Goss (2002, pp.11–12) cut 
through the gobbledygook to get to the point: ‘In other words, 
bonding without bridging equals Bosnia.’ As will be seen elsewhere 
in this book, more bridging and less bonding is a recipe for curing 
all ills. It is where social capital, in the hands of economists and the 
like at the World Bank, leads us.
It almost goes against my better judgement to have covered 
the volume edited by Grootaert and van Bastelaer in this book 
in some detail, in part because much of the text offered here was 
already available as a result of an earlier review article (Fine 2003c). 
But, at this later stage, Grootaert and van Bastelaer’s volume now 
appears in many respects as both the high and the end point of 
social capital at the World Bank, and it needs to be understood as 
such. So the rationale for addressing the volume again lies first in 
indicating where social capital had got to at the World Bank by 
the turn of the millennium. It was offered as standard fare with 
uncritical application across multifarious topics. Second, though, 
the contributions did reflect a particular orientation across the 
vast social capital literature, one with a strong contribution from 
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mainstream economists, with little or no residual influence from 
the more radical or cultural content that might be derived from 
Bourdieu and his followers.
Third, though, the volume is of some importance when we place 
it in the context both of what was about to occur at the World Bank 
with regard to social capital and more generally. For, as detailed 
in earlier chapters, the broader literature was at least in part in 
the process of BBI all those omitted factors that were previously 
traditional within social theory, if not mainstream economics. This 
was not beyond the capacity of the economists, but it could only be 
done on an extremely limited and unsatisfactory basis. Now, suppose 
you were a social theorist at the World Bank, seeking to civilise the 
economists to take the social seriously and in an acceptable way 
through the medium of social capital. The volume of Grootaert 
and van Bastelaer will definitely now appear to be the best you can 
hope to achieve, with the possibility that this achievement will be 
sacrificed if it is pushed too far or if social capital itself becomes too 
closely associated with more radical or more unfamiliar modes of 
thought than could be countenanced by World Bank economists.
6.3  … and fall
In short, the situation seems to have arisen in which social capital 
could go no further at the World Bank other than as a mundane 
application in which the Bank’s social capitalists were complicit 
with its own economists. The latter had made use of the concept 
in their own way in response to the prompting of non-economists. 
There was even the danger that the latter would lose ownership of 
the concept at the Bank, the more it influenced, or was appropriated 
by, the economists. The evolution of social capital outside the Bank, 
as the BBI process strengthened, was also not particularly conducive 
to continuing engagement by its economists. So the situation arose 
in which neither World Bank economists nor non-economists had 
much to gain by continuing commitment to social capital. It was 
more or less peremptorily dropped by both sides of the economist/
non-economist divide, but with one exception. The non-economists, 
possibly with a twinge of conscience, felt obliged to explain why 
they had promoted social capital in the first place and to justify 
having done so.
One bizarre consequence of this was that the lack of engagement 
with criticism of the concept of social capital by the World 
Bank’s social capitalists was dramatically reversed in 2002, with 
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publications accruing in 2004, but in the most sudden, peculiar 
and token of ways. This followed from the overt notice that was 
given to the effect that social capital was about to be abandoned 
by the very social capitalists who had promoted it within the Bank 
– although residual affection has persisted to some extent across 
its erstwhile proponents, especially Bebbington (2004, 2007 and 
2008).11 As already observed, until the article by Bebbington et al. 
(BGOW) appeared (2004),12 the World Bank capitalists had simply 
failed to respond to criticism at all. By contrast, publications in 
2004 offered a watershed in which scarcely a page could not go by 
without my being referenced: 13 times in 7 pages in Bebbington 
(2004) and, in Bebbington et al. (2004), I am cited ten times in an 
article that contains a hundred other references. Yet, as already 
indicated, the social capital website, and the Bank’s overall website 
more generally, have effectively persisted in failing to acknowledge 
any of my work at all.
Did this mean that, at last, a proper debate would ensue? 
– unfortunately not. Bebbington (2004) himself in his first two 
pages explains the poor results of a debate that had not in fact 
taken place in terms of its tone, anger, acrimony, fiddling whilst 
Rome burns, general antipathy to the World Bank, preaching to 
the converted, undue passion and indignation, and lack of modesty, 
reflexivity, self-criticism and creativity. Later he offers lofty advice 
on problem framing, interdisciplinarity and middle-range theory. 
But, much more important than all of this non-engagement with 
the substance of social capital is that its critics have simply been 
breathtakingly undermined by the total acceptance by the World 
Bank social capitalists of more or less all of the criticisms of them. 
This assessment is confirmed by Knorringa and van Staveren when 
they suggest that Bebbington and the World Bank collaborators
by and large seem to agree with the critiques of methodological 
individualism, instrumentalism, and lack of attention to power 
and social structures … [and] attribute these shortcomings to 
the ideological framework to which they are bound, that of the 
Washington Consensus driven by the World Bank, favouring 
markets over states, individuals over groups, and ignoring issues 
of power. (2007, p.2)
So there’s nothing to debate, since the following criticisms, in 
summary form, now seem to be have been both recognised and 
accepted at a level of 99 per cent or more.
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Social capital:
• is totally chaotic in definition, method and theory;
• is indiscriminately deployed across applications and can be 
more or less anything, in principle if not in practice;
• is parasitic on, and crudely simplifying of, other social 
theory;
• misunderstands both social and capital;
• is complicit with mainstream economics, ‘economics 
imperialism’ and rational choice theory;
• neglects the economic, power, conflict, the state, gender, race, 
class, ethnicity, global, context, etc.;
• is self-help raised from individual to community level;
• has discarded Bourdieu but is bringing him back in piecemeal, 
alongside other omitted factors;
• induces hack academia (‘hackademia’) in publication, research 
and funding;
• fails to address criticism other than incorporating it as another 
factor;
• is Third Wayism as weak response to neo-liberalism;
• has been heavily promoted by the World Bank as a rhetorical 
device associated with the shift from the Washington to the 
post-Washington Consensus;
• is a peculiar end-of-millennium product of the retreat from 
the dual extremes of postmodernism and neo-liberalism.
In short, I have spent the last ten years or so offering these 
criticisms in print and by word of mouth, even exaggerating in 
order to solicit response and get a debate. Now, we know why there 
was none other than, usually in private, an apology for being guilty 
(though to a lesser degree than charged) and a plea to be excused 
on grounds of pursuit of other worthy ulterior motives. This claim 
to virtue, however, overlooks the broader picture of legitimising 
an inadequate concept by participating with it. As a critic of social 
capital, I have been accused of many things and motives, not least by 
Bebbington (2004), from anger to Marxism; but a casual reading of 
my book (Fine 2001a) indicates that my primary concern is with the 
degradation of scholarship that has been attached to social capital 
in general, at the World Bank in particular. Failure to debate with 
critics and then agreeing with them is but a sideshow in all of this, 
and Bebbington points to a worthy motive of his own for promoting 
social capital, and on a grand scale. This is nothing less than that 
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social capital should serve as ‘a language mobilized for struggles 
within the Bank’. Indeed, ‘the social capital discussion … was a 
real battlefield of knowledge inside the Bank’ (p.346, emphases 
added). With this, and on the wider terrain of ‘social and cultural 
dimensions of development … it may be nearing the end of its 
useful life’ (p.348). So debate on social capital can now at most be 
an obituary and the slate wiped clean as we build bridging social 
capital around future intellectual endeavours (p.349).
Yet, the purported short life of social capital as practised by its 
World Bank proponents cannot be so readily exonerated, quite 
apart from the monster that it has in part spawned in the real 
battlefield of knowledge outside the Bank. Bebbington (2004) offers 
little other than assertion on these inner struggles, but the BGOW 
article (Bebbington et al. 2004) offers a fuller account, equally 
remarkable for accepting criticisms of social capital and again, 
to emphasise, referencing me fulsomely, where previously there 
had been total lack of engagement. Still, at the time of its writing, 
BGOW’s article was unique in some respects for revealing inner 
workings and dissent within the World Bank, and I recommend 
everyone to read it for this reason – and also, if to put it harshly, 
as an exercise in virtuous self-delusion. For a start, BGOW run the 
paradox of beginning with a general appeal to critical discourse 
theory, but concluding in particular in favour of establishment, 
World Bank, postures as an example of it in practice! Critical 
discourse means uncritical discourse.
One way in which they do this is by drawing upon case studies 
purporting to show the positive role played by the World Bank and 
social capital. This is echoed in Bebbington (2004) and Bebbington 
et al. (2006). Leaving aside the issue of how this represents a victory 
in the internal battle for knowledge, these studies are notable for lack 
of independent evaluation, and for one of the cases examined, one 
of BGOW is not only the authority cited for a favourable outcome 
but was also the project manager! Is it possible that, far from social 
capital promoting the projects, the latter are being used to promote 
the discourse of social capital in a token exercise or three, and as 
part of a broader rhetorical strategy of legitimising the Bank? There 
is already a tradition of social capital being imposed ex post on 
research already undertaken, starting with Putnam himself (1993).13 
Why not construct projects anew to demonstrate its powers? Yet, 
notably absent from BGOW’s account is any acknowledgement of 
examples of the negative impact of social capital in Bank projects 
(for examples, see Fine 2001a on coal-mining in India and the 
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ludicrous application of social capital to Russia’s health and welfare 
crisis; see also Chapter 9 below for the limited purchase of social 
capital on policy, irrespective of its impact where applied).
In short, a more rounded, independent assessment of case studies 
is needed to make an overall judgement, something Bebbington 
only looks for in the future. But the wider (critical) social capital 
literature is already questioning not only whether there is much by 
way of policy conclusions that can be drawn from social capital 
(other than that if it’s there, it may help, depending on context 
and what has been left out of consideration) and whether it serves 
more as an instrument of central authority parading as decentralised 
participation. Hewison, for example, observes the rhetorical shift 
to the PWC, but sees little or no effect in practice upon social 
policy in Thailand, specifically with regard to social safety nets, 
following the Asian crisis. There was a continuing neglect, if not 
denial, of the class basis of policies, a feature of the Bank’s literature 
on Thailand more generally. However, on the basis of interviews 
with Bank employees:
The World Bank’s analysis of the social impact of the crisis 
in Thailand placed considerable emphasis on social capital. 
Initially, much of this discussion had little empirical or theoretical 
underpinning. In fact, Bank consultants and officers used ‘social 
capital’ in contradictory ways, with little understanding of the 
theory embodied in the concept. (2002, p.7)
Ultimately, though, social capital was used to suggest that the impact 
of the crisis would be moderated by the high levels of social capital 
amongst the poor.
Even more important than impact on social policy is the bigger 
omitted picture of a huge and continuing shift within the Bank from 
public- to private-sector support in infrastructure and other lending. 
Even if social capital is on balance favourable to a given project or 
two, this effect is dominated by overall portfolio effects that will 
subordinate the social to the private (and profitable), despite, or 
even as a result of, the current Bank rethink on privatisation for 
example (Bayliss and Fine 2007). Thus, whilst social capital is a 
highly significant marker in the passage from the Washington to 
the post-Washington Consensus, policy has been little transformed 
by the process, even where social capital is explicitly incorporated. 
Fox and Gershman (2000, p.408) note the neglect of gender and 
ethnicity across a selection of World Bank development projects 
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around social capital. Further, ‘most of the case studies found that 
project managers either ignored or were hostile to existing forms 
of pro-poor social capital’ (p.413).14 And the case studies in the 
Grootaert and van Bastelaer volume can scarcely conceal the link 
between social capital and privatisation. For Pargal et al.:15
The most important policy implication of our work is that the 
introduction of public–private partnerships or self-help schemes is 
more likely to be successful in neighbourhoods in which the level 
of social capital is high. Social capital proxies or determinants can 
thus be used as predictors of success when targeting neighbour-
hoods for different social or public good-oriented interventions. 
(2002, p.205)
So social capital is about community self-help to support the World 
Bank to privatise.16 Social capitalists have addressed neither this 
nor the potential of continuing privatisation to destroy the social 
capital that they seek to build up in the odd project here and there 
(Champlin 1999). Nor have they paid any attention to the patterns 
of lending and conditionalities that have accompanied loans in the 
shift to PRSPs. Rhetoric to the contrary, these have tightened by 
comparison with the practices of the Washington Consensus (see 
van Waeyenberge 2007 for an outstanding and detailed account of 
tightening aid allocation in practice). Whilst, rightly or wrongly, 
Bebbington (2004, p.348) is dismissive of the virtues of grand 
narratives, and regrets that social capital has become one, there is 
a yawning gap between an isolated case study demonstrating the 
virtues of social capital and the generalities of grand narrative. And 
it is a gap that, as far as the World Bank is concerned, is heavily 
filled out by (private and privatised) business as usual, irrespective 
of, or even masked by, the rhetoric of social capital.
6.4  strateGIc WeaKnesses are tactIcal strenGths?
These are my own assertions on the relationship between the 
scholarship, rhetoric and policy practice of the World Bank. There 
is no need to justify them here as they were already laid out fully and 
clearly in my earlier book and other publications on social capital and 
the World Bank. But the point is that they are not even considered in 
the Panglossian view of the forward march of social capital within 
the Bank. Instead, absolute reliance is placed upon the idea that 
discourse has an effect within the Bank; but some things cannot be 
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changed so easily, or at all, and so intellectual compromises must 
be made. Unbeknownst to outsiders, compromises are accepted 
strategically in deference to the economists, only to be won back 
surreptitiously through the Trojan horse of social capital. As already 
indicated, the now admitted list of conceptual concessions involved 
is astonishing, from economic alternatives through structures of 
class, ethnicity, gender, power, political economy, sensitivity to time 
and place and so on.17 This is in order to be able to engage with 
Bank economists who, by BGOW’s own account, would appear to 
have accepted the stalking horse with little or no cost, not least with 
Olson prevailing over Fox,18 the quantitative over the qualitative,19 
and Collier over social capital.20
As an internal strategy, there seems to have been no way for social 
capitalists within the Bank to recognise failure, nor opportunism 
on the part of opponents (and themselves), let alone for them to 
push their strategy to the point of, or beyond, being disciplined 
themselves by the Bank. Was there a chance of World Bank social 
capitalists protesting, even resigning en masse, in solidarity with 
Stiglitz, Kanbur and others who were essentially disciplined by the 
Bank for not conforming to its perspectives? It seems not. There 
were those who did challenge the Bank from within at the highest 
level and on the grounds of economics and policy. Did their fate 
possibly serve as a warning on ambition to social capitalists, 
and a protective cover for them, rather than being seized as the 
opportunity for alliances to be forged? Instead of fiddling at the 
margins in order that the social and themselves be taken seriously 
by the Bank’s economists, would it not have been better if they 
themselves had taken the economy and the chief economist, Joe 
Stiglitz, seriously? Their promotion of social capital hardly warrants 
the notion of the Bank as a ‘battlefield of knowledge’, and social 
capital victories might better be interpreted as at most Pyrrhic, in 
minor skirmishes, especially taking a longer view of the Bank’s 
economics from before the Washington Consensus. This is the light 
in which to set Bebbington’s (2004, p.347) parody of opponents as 
not offering alternatives but simply making calls to bring in Marxian 
political economy and class.21 I would have remained critical, but 
I would have been more respectful if the social capitalists had at 
least promoted the economics that was, rhetorically, hegemonic at 
the time of their strategising, and remains so, and which provided 
them with the space to prosper – the post-Washington Consensus.
For one thing I did get wrong, at least initially (Fine 1999a), 
was to exaggerate the likely impact of social capital within the 
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Bank. I saw it as the World Bank’s way of outflanking notions of 
the developmental state as an alternative to the CDF/PWC in the 
enforced legitimising retreat from the Washington Consensus. That, 
in the event, it was not necessary for social capital to play a major 
role in this respect reflects the unexpected extent of compromise 
(abject surrender?) made by the social capitalists on the economy! 
Thus, I was more optimistic than BGOW on what could be achieved 
by inner conflict. Social capital did not even serve in place of the 
despised developmental state approach, so low has its profile been 
within the economics of the Bank. It is the height of irony that 
Bebbington (2007) should be seeing social capital as providing the 
micro-foundations for the developmental state (when its use was 
potentially to circumvent it).22 In a later publication (2008, p.278), 
he concludes that ‘the issues to which the concept draws attention 
seem central for any understanding of the micro-politics through 
which a more developmental state is produced’. This may or may 
not be so (and it becomes more of a tautology the wider the concept 
of social capital is cast) but what is overlooked are the issues from 
which social capital draws away attention!
BGOW, however, by perverse way of compensation, are more 
upbeat on what has been achieved and claim that this is the 
consequence of their strategy of promoting social capital within 
the Bank, which privileges them as inner participants both to assess 
success and to dismiss critics unaware of their wider and inner 
purpose. But here, on their potentially strongest ground, they are 
at their weakest. First, social critics are homogenised and misrepre-
sented, not least as relying upon deterministic analysis by inclination 
or for want of access to inner Bank discourse. I, for example, am 
perceived to ‘reify’ social capital. But even a casual reading of my 
earlier book not only reveals a refusal to be deterministic, but also 
offers a more than full anticipation of the points made by BGOW, 
despite their inner privilege. These are:
1. The rhetoric, scholarship and policy of the Bank are carefully 
distinguished. They are not mutually determining or consistent 
with one another, although they do each have an effect on one 
another and more broadly. They do shift, individually and in 
relation to one another and in response to external factors and 
inner struggles, and the relations between them are different not 
only over time but over topic. This is all illustrated by reference 
not only to social capital but also, by way of contrast, to trade, 
privatisation and education.
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2. Non-economists within the Bank have traditionally not been 
taken seriously despite their efforts to the contrary. This is closely 
documented through reference to the work of Cernea.
3. The strategy of being taken seriously focused on social capital 
and had some success in light of the shift to the Comprehensive 
Development Framework and the post-Washington 
Consensus.
4. This all entailed a compromise with economists within the Bank, 
reinforcing the degradation of scholarship associated with the 
broader rise of social capital in the 1990s.
Second, if BGOW enjoyed superior knowledge of the practices of 
World Bank economists and how to overcome them, they offer little 
account of this and of why social capital should succeed. Surely, 
if they had put as much effort into strategy as into social capital 
itself, they would have addressed the six points that Broad (2006 
and 2007) has now revealed in her own study of the practices 
of Bank economists, tying them to Bank requirements. These are 
concerned with hiring (orthodox, Anglo-Saxon trained economists 
with golden pay levels to discourage dissent); promotion, which 
provides incentives for ‘paradigm maintenance’, especially in the 
enforced input from research to operations;23 tougher reviewing of 
publications that offer dissent; internal marginalisation of those 
individuals who do dissent; manipulation of data to the point of 
falsehood; and external projection of those who do conform to 
paradigm maintenance. Our social capitalists offer no evidence on 
how they were planning to overcome these practices or whether 
they succeeded, nor even that they were aware of them.
What is unusual in their account, especially in Bebbington et 
al. (2004), is the information and honesty they provide about 
the internal workings of the World Bank with regard to social 
capital. This began with Putnam’s invitation to be involved, as a 
way of kick-starting the social capital enterprise, and continued 
with the attempts to engage the economists (success), but not to be 
dominated by them (failure). Not surprisingly, this is not entirely 
the take of the paper’s authors. Rather, they see themselves as the 
unrecognised, strategically compromising and so reviled, heroes of 
a hidden internal battle to civilise the World Bank’s economists, 
and so bring the progressively social to the intellectual and policy 
practices of the World Bank.
In this respect, for them, criticism of social capital has missed the 
point of its inner significance in shifting the Bank’s thinking, and 
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hence its policy. Of course, this leaves aside both the other influences 
on the thinking and practice of the World Bank and the broader 
impact of the promotion of social capital in development thinking 
and practice elsewhere. Essentially, at least in retrospective self-
justification, these authors are asking us to devolve our intellectual 
responsibilities to them in order that they can promote their own 
positions within the World Bank around a concept that they 
themselves admit to be flawed. The parallels with the ‘never mind 
the arguments, just do it’ stance on privatisation are striking. And 
the situation is ironic! For whatever the impact of social capital on 
the design and implementation of particular World Bank projects, 
the strategy of the organisation in practice has been to shift as 
much of its finance as possible from the public to the private sector. 
This is so despite a World Bank rethink on privatisation adjudging 
it to have been previously too premature a gamble (Bayliss and 
Fine 2007).
Polemics aside, the account of Bebbington et al. (2004) is a 
striking illustration of how strategic thinking within the World 
Bank is forced, individually and institutionally, to conform to the 
Bank’s shifting needs and practices, and how limited is the scope 
to buck its requirements. Such is the case on a grander scale for the 
resignations of Stiglitz, Kanbur, and others. But where professional 
recruitment and careerism prove insufficient to serve the World 
Bank’s scholarship, rhetoric and policy, the delusion of internal 
influence and reform incorporates those who offer a little more by 
way of free thinking and altruistic motivation. This is not to say 
that the scholarship, rhetoric and policy of the World Bank are 
predetermined in and of themselves and in relation to one another. 
But they are embedded, to coin a phrase, in an institution and 
its practices that are heavily constrained and can be perverse in 
attaching intentions to outcomes. The reduction of the impact of 
social capital to the activities of a few scholars within the World 
Bank is at best partial and at worst misleading.
It is, then, with a cry that is more plaintive than ironic that, a 
decade after social capital was brought to the Bank in pursuit of 
civilising its economists, one of its leading proponents should feel 
compelled to complain ‘that development is about a lot more than 
economics, and that, accordingly, economics should not have (as 
it currently does at the Bank) a near-monopoly on determining the 
content and validity of development research’ (Rao and Woolcock 
2007). This is in response to the Deaton report, ‘An Evaluation 
of World Bank Research, 1998–2005’. They also complain that 
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given that about one in 20 of designated research staff are non-
economists, ‘perhaps one of the twenty [research] evaluators [used 
by the report] could have been a sociologist or anthropologist?’ At 
the least, this would appear to be a confession of abject failure on 
the part of the social capitalists in getting themselves taken seriously. 
At the most, it displays an institutional disregard for them and, 
having served their purpose, they are being dumped rather than 
themselves dumping social capital.
6.5  deconstructInG the BuZZ24
As is apparent, in defending their use of social capital whilst accepting 
its deficiencies, the social capitalists at the World Bank have appealed 
to the discursive impact of the concept to justify its use. This suggests 
that the concept needs to be critically deconstructed more fully and 
more carefully. In discussing consumer culture, I have argued that 
it can be characterised by six Cs (Fine 2002a and 2005a), although 
this can now be extended by a further two. Whilst I hesitate to 
extrapolate from consumer culture to social capital as a buzzword, 
doing so does offer some insight. The first C is Constructed. Social 
capital has been constructed through a combination of academic 
and, to a much lesser extent, developmental practices that have 
mutually reinforced one another but to the exclusion of others, 
especially where critical (myself) or inconvenient (Bourdieu, power, 
class, state, and so on). Of course, World Bank social capitalists 
consciously accepted, and even promoted, such construction in 
deference to the need to incorporate World Bank economists, who 
would otherwise have refused to engage. The issue, though, is 
whether this was too high a price to pay in terms of what then came 
to be constructed, and how it came to be used, both within the Bank 
itself and, which is arguably more important, outside as well.
Second, social capital is Contextual, like all concepts, in the more 
general sense of itself being a specific product of the material and 
intellectual circumstances that mark the turn of the millennium. This 
aspect of social capital is brought out by Putnam’s foisting it, as an 
afterthought, upon his study of regional disparities in Italy from 
the twelfth century onwards. He then exports it to the twentieth-
century United States as the way of understanding the decline of 
bowling clubs and the rise of television, prior to finding an entrée 
into the World Bank, where, as argued, it eased the transition from 
the Washington to the Post-Washington Consensus, explicitly and 
as a direct reflection in the case of scholarship and rhetoric. But 
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in terms of policy, its impact has been negligible, other than in the 
negative sense of diverting attention from what was or was not 
changing. And the relationship between social capital and the reality 
that it purports to represent is also contextually limited, in view 
of the factors that it has overlooked or even omitted. The context 
at the Bank allowed this to happen, and for social capital to be 
accepted and promoted as a legitimate and legitimised concept. 
As the contemporary phlogiston of social theory, social capital 
deployed and created a context as a means of legitimating itself 
and legitimising a much broader approach to development and the 
social more generally.
Third, social capital is Chaotic, not least in its multifarious uses and 
meanings. Far from this resulting in its dismissal from the intellectual 
arena, this appears to have promoted its use. It has been subject to 
hundreds of measures, or elements that make up a measure, so much 
so that it has been felt necessary to re-aggregate into intermediate 
categories such as linking, bonding and bridging. These all mutually 
contradict one another across traditional social variables (such 
as class, gender, ethnicity) quite apart from the conundrum of its 
perverse, dark or negative side (the mafia and the like).
Fourth, social capital is Construed; that is, it is not simply passively 
received as a well-defined and given concept, but is reinterpreted 
and worked upon by those who engage with it. One aspect of that 
reworking, for example, especially at the World Bank, has been to 
disassociate social capital both from Bourdieu (too radical) and 
from Coleman (too reactionary). How social capital was worked 
by economists at the World Bank was arguably more or less indis-
tinguishable from what it would have been in the absence of the 
worthy motives emanating from those that introduced them to it 
from the broader perspective of social theory.
Fifth, social capital is the product of Contradictory pressures, as it 
seeks to accommodate both material and intellectual developments. 
How can the World Bank legitimise itself while pretty much 
continuing business as usual? How can the economy be ignored 
when we are deploying social capital? And how can we set aside 
power and conflict when we are addressing social capital? How 
can economists address the social, through the medium of social 
capital, whilst ignoring so much of what social science has to offer? 
Ultimately, these tensions seem to have been resolved chronologi-
cally by the rapid rise and fall of social capital as it was picked up 
and then dropped by economists (rather than being the strategically 
adopted instrument of the non-economists).
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Sixth, then, social capital is Contested or subject to conflict over 
its meaning. Among social capitalists themselves, this is resolved 
through chaotic compromise. Otherwise, contestation takes the 
form of exposing and rejecting social capital for its sore conceptual 
inadequacies and corresponding consequences for practice. Social 
capital has in part risen to prominence because it has been allowed 
to do so by those who have not engaged critically with it. One index 
of this is that my polemic in Antipode, according to its editors, has 
been one of its most accessed pieces (Fine 2002b). I suspect this 
reflects the racy title, the prominence of social capital, and the silent 
but unengaged opposition to it. By contrast, while globalisation has 
been shown to be equally flawed as a conceptual panacea, it has 
been universally addressed by its critics and won away, not only 
from neo-liberalism, but also from the intellectual Third Wayism 
characteristic of social capital.
Seventh, social capital is Collective, in that the meanings to which 
it is attached, and the uses to which it is put, are not simply the 
consequences of the accumulated acts of individual scholars and 
pundits. They derive from the broader scholarship, practices and 
other endeavours with which they are situated. As is apparent, 
individual scholars, even the critical, cannot buck the deadweight 
and momentum that attaches to social capital. Indeed, the notion 
has exhibited an extraordinary degree of repressive tolerance, 
whereby criticism – especially in the form of BBI – is absorbed on 
a piecemeal basis, as if strengthening the concept through rendering 
it in part chaotic. In other words, social capital creates a community 
(a ninth C?) of its own.
Last, as a result and by no means least, social capital is Closed. 
On the one hand, closure prevails in the world of ideas, allowing or 
encouraging the presence of some in favour of others. On the other 
hand, and by the same token, social capital incorporates certain 
practitioners and participants whilst precluding others. Remarkably, 
such seems to have been the explicit intent of the World Bank’s 
social capitalists – to narrow down the conceptual world in order 
to incorporate mainstream (Bank) economists, to the exclusion of, 
and with disdain for, those unaware of their correspondingly higher 
purpose and its implications for the world’s poor.
6.6  GBs, heGel and aBrahaM lIncoln
In lieu of conclusion, let me first paraphrase George Bernard Shaw 
by suggesting that social capitalism is not bad because social 
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capitalists are bad but because they are good. By their own account, 
BGOW had honourable motives, but these were perverted by the 
circumstances in which they found themselves. These are talented 
scholars, confessing to having misled their colleagues and the rest 
of the world for strategic reasons. Is this an apposite model for 
the putative ‘Knowledge Bank’, let alone for those aspiring devel-
opmentalists who can be prised away from the careerism offered 
by the Bank? And the opportunities that arise for reform within 
the Bank owe a great deal to the pressures that are generated from 
outside, by the very scholars and activists whom BGOW would 
dismiss as having overlooked the significance of the strategy that 
they had adopted!
Second, to paraphrase Hegel, in this age of reason it is possible 
to find a rationale for anything. By their partial appeal to the bigger 
picture, a chain of reasoning leads from the promotion of social 
capitalist(ists) in the Bank to poverty alleviation, empowerment, 
and the like, in a project or two, with the prospect of further gains 
across all of those no-go areas within the Bank. But on these, there 
remains limited flexibility in practice, not least where the economy 
and the economic are concerned, despite these being the intellectu-
ally weakest (and most important) points of the Bank’s posturing. 
Further, BGOW and other social capitalists show limited knowledge 
of the economics of their Bank colleagues/opponents and of the 
political economy they claim they would foist upon them as an 
alternative, for which social capital is the putative thin end of the 
wedge.25
Third, to paraphrase Abraham Lincoln, you can fool some of 
the people all of the time … but not Bank economists any of the 
time, for they are too foolish to be fooled. They do not understand 
and are hostile to the issues that the social capitalists are seeking 
to incorporate. Yet, far from learning this lesson, BGOW close by 
offering the frightening prospect of fooling the fools once more 
by discarding social capital and moving to the more satisfactory 
notions of ‘empowerment and community driven development. This 
is already happening’ (Bebbington et al. 2004, p.57). As (Bank) 
economists are now wont to advise us, this raises huge problems of 
‘credibility’ in light of past experience: they have already been fooled 
once by their own social capitalists.26 It also begs the question of 
what sort of empowerment and community development our heroic 
social capitalists will be allowed to foist upon Bank projects.
BGOW seem to have fooled themselves into believing that their 
own heavily compromised struggles within the Bank unfold to the 
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benefit of the deserving poor on the outside, without regard to 
broader intellectual and ideological impact. Such compromises, 
not battles, are necessarily carried over into external relations and 
effects.27 At the practical level, soliciting funding from Scandinavians 
for social capital necessarily buys them into the Bank’s take upon 
it. But these countries’ own development agencies have been far 
more progressive than the Bank. The result is to promote the Bank’s 
own omissions in contexts where alternatives might have prospered 
(and been turned against the Bank’s economists).28 And this is only 
a small part of the picture of the entire social capital enterprise, 
whether attached to development or otherwise.
Thus, the institutional logic of promoting social capital within the 
Bank necessarily conformed with its promotion outside, reflecting 
and consolidating the rise of social capital in contexts where there 
was no wish nor need to omit everything, from economic alternatives 
through to gender, power and political economy. This is implicitly 
accepted by BGOW, in that the criticisms of social capital are only 
now being acknowledged as being essentially correct, ten years after 
they had adopted the term. Now that’s why I perceive them as social 
capitalists and, unfortunately, uncritical and legitimising in many 
respects and, as such, a part of the Bank’s own ‘social capital’, neither 
offering nor achieving anything by way of a challenge to the Bank in 
its economics, whether as rhetoric (advocacy), scholarship or policy. 
Indeed, I could forgive the Bank’s social capitalists everything – their 
failure to have debated, their deception over their true views, their 
pompous declarations of virtue in relation to grounded methods, 
interdisciplinarity, strategic engagement with opponents, reform 
within constraints, and so on – if only they had once genuinely 
challenged the Bank’s economics and economists. The failure to do 
so is what is most visible from outside and, by their own account, 
from within. If, within the World Bank, social capital represented 
a ‘political economy of language in that institution, for those who 
work inside the Bank’ and ‘in large measure this was a language 
mobilized for struggles with the Bank’ (Bebbington 2004, p.346), 
it has first and foremost been a language without vocabulary (or 
practice) for political economy, for struggle or for mobilisation.
Is all the foregoing criticism merely ivory tower intellectual 
idealism standing in the way of a more progressive World Bank and 
social capital movement, one that marries social analysis and policy 
to a reformed economic counterpart? Such is the implicit stance of 
many, and not just of those motivated by intellectual opportunism, 
as is characteristic of much social capital literature. For those who 
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continue to use social capital have also made insightful criticisms of 
it and the World Bank from within their own areas of expertise. Such 
contributions are by now sufficiently common not to be perceived 
as idiosyncratic. They take the form of observing the definitional 
chaos, inconsistencies and weaknesses, the measurement problems 
in principle and in practice, and the conceptual inadequacies and 
omissions in the use of social capital as an approach to a particular 
topic or field. They then proceed not to reject social capital but to 
suggest that it be reconstructed on the basis of correcting these 
deficiencies, something that only serves to reinforce both its stature 
and its corresponding flaws.
This will not wash for, irrespective of the more progressive and 
intellectually rigorous contributions that might be made, social 
capital has been captured in content and momentum by a ‘social 
capital’ of its own making. It has its own bridging, bonding, leaders 
and networks, trust and distrust, values and a legitimising dark side, 
and so on, that guarantee that it will endure until it serves out its role 
as a passing fad or is broken from outside. To reject social capital 
actively now, in development studies and more generally, will serve 
to hasten the processes of both shedding social capital and replacing 
it with more grounded and rounded alternatives.





In her outstanding empirical account of the rise of social capital 
from the perspective of the sociology of knowledge, Forsman (2005) 
finds that business and organisation studies, alongside psychology, 
come along in the third-wave of literature. This conforms to my own 
casual assessment. I remember very well sitting on the back porch 
of a suburban Melbourne house at the end of 1999, having for the 
first time come across a piece on social capital and management. It 
had been turned up by the outstanding library electronic facilities at 
the University of Melbourne, Buddy I think the system was called, 
which sought and obtained pieces in one go from its electronic 
databases. The piece, to which I will return in Section 7.3, was a 
draft by Adler and Kwon, and located on the World Bank social 
capital website, something of an establishment seal of approval. As 
a third-wave discipline, social capital now appears to be blossoming 
exponentially in management studies, as strongly as in any other 
field, exhibiting all the faults of its predecessors and adding some 
extra ones of its own.
Before getting to grips with these, I need to say something about 
the more general nature of management studies as a discipline 
(Section 7.2). For someone whose own discipline of economics lies 
outside its immediate domain, this is to court the danger of being 
both presumptuous and offensive. That’s a risk I need to take, and 
I am more than ready to be corrected.2
Section 7.3 offers a selective overview of the vast range of 
applications that have been made of social capital across (critical) 
management studies. Once again, it is shown how this has the 
effect of degrading social theory and undermining the more critical 
content that might otherwise flourish within the discipline, especially 
in relation to capital–labour relations, a theme also taken up in 
Section 7.4. The concluding remarks repeat the theme of needing 
140
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to beat social capital rather than joining it; there, and throughout, 
McDonald’s-type metaphors are to be found.
7.2  ’tWIXt heterodoXY and parasItIsM?
The stylised view of management studies for those from without 
is that it is intellectually lowbrow and normatively compromised 
by the very nature of its subject matter and the motivation of 
its practitioners. I do not doubt that, in some respects, these 
are important factors and they may even lie at the core of the 
discipline – possibly disciplines, since much the same is said of 
business, market and consumer studies, with which management 
has close and overlapping relations. It is a close-run thing whether 
the presumed parasitism of these fields leaves it suffering an even 
lower status than (human) geography.
But I am happy to report that these are dismissive assessments 
that I do not share, for a number of reasons concerning what I take 
to be some of the virtues of management studies, although others 
take them as vices. First, it tends to be more than usually empirically 
grounded, for obvious reasons in light of its subject matter. This 
is some protection, if not a guarantee, against ascent/descent into 
abstraction and over-generalising to the point of oblivion. Second, 
it is multidisciplinary and, as a consequence, is not bound by 
the variables, theories and methods of a single discipline and its 
traditions and professional practices. Third, whilst I suspect that 
theoretical dependency, if not parasitism, on other disciplines is 
strong, this does not mean an absence of theoretical challenge, 
either to those within management studies or to those seeking to 
incorporate its contributions from outside.
I can illustrate this most personally in two ways. On the one 
hand, whenever I have engaged in empirical work, this has almost 
inevitably involved visits to the libraries of business schools to solicit 
the necessary information. On the other hand, more specifically, I 
look back over my work on consumption and, having developed 
my own analytical framework that departs from those to be found 
within particular disciplines, judge in retrospect that I could not 
have reached my approach without engaging critically with business, 
consumer and marketing studies (Fine and Leopold 1993; Fine 
2002a). Often with a simple naivety, these studies offer lessons about 
what to incorporate, if not always how to incorporate it, that would 
leave more grown-up theory floundering in its abstractions.
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The final reason for rejecting the stylised and dismissive view 
of management studies is because of the presence of critique 
within the field, both of concepts and practices. At least in 
principle, critical management studies is neither intellectually nor 
ethically compromised, although this does not mean it is entirely 
independent of the mainstream core of the discipline, which might be 
characterised in these terms. Again, if I might offer a presumptuous 
and superficial assessment, management schools have prospered 
recently in the United Kingdom, not least through rapid growth 
in student numbers. Together with the application of pseudo-
market forces within universities, this has offered them a position 
of strength in command over resources. Subject to satisfying certain 
vocational requirements, this has meant that what is taught within 
the all-encompassing notion of management is otherwise extremely 
flexible. At the same time, the McDonaldisation of social science 
across other disciplines in the wake of marketisation and research 
assessment exercises (RAE) has discouraged heterodoxy within 
those disciplines, especially amongst those inspired by the radical 
expansion of social science in the 1960s – many of whom are now in 
positions of some seniority, with generations of succeeding students 
seeking homes as prospective academics.3 Together with reorganisa-
tion into schools and faculties, with management and the like often 
taking the nominal and intellectual lead, this has created a situation 
in which critical management studies has not only been able to thrive 
but has also occasionally and rapidly attained a degree of (tolerance 
of) heterodoxy and controversy that puts other disciplines, and 
especially my own of economics, to shame.
Somewhat more speculative is the idea that European management, 
with its greater freedom in the academic field, has yet to become 
as hard-nosed as its US counterpart. But, we have been advised, 
McDonaldisation of management is on the way, as is implicit in 
the suggestion of Starkey and Tempest (2004, p.78) that the more 
effective European methods of management are being undermined 
by Americanisation. This is destructive of social capital within 
management itself, the result being, ‘unrestrained pursuit of self-
interest, market fundamentalism, minimal state, low taxation’. 
Could this presage McDonaldisation of management studies?
Yet, the situation in the United States is not homogeneous and 
allows for some degree of heterodoxy. Management studies is so 
diverse and longstanding and there are so many different ways of 
funding it that there is plenty of room for critical management 
studies, as indeed there is for a department or two of radical political 
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economy across the university system as a whole. On the situation 
in management studies elsewhere in the world I am not prepared to 
comment, for lack of knowledge and investigation. But the position, 
role and influence of critical management studies should not be 
dismissed out of hand.
7.3  It aIn’t crItIcal …
Let me now return to the classic article of Adler and Kwon (2002), 
which in the United States is perceived to be part of critical 
management studies, and which first struck my attention in 1999. 
It stands alongside Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) as the leading 
article in management studies on social capital. Forsman (2005, 
pp.10–11) mentions that in 2003 it was the sixth-most-cited item 
amongst all those on social capital published between 1979 and 
1999.4 Adler and Kwon (2002) comes in as seventh-most-cited item 
of those published after 2000, one place below my own book; but 
the total number of citations for these two plus all others above 
them in rank are more than matched by those for Putnam (2000), 
which stands in first place.
In my book of 2001, I was critical of Adler and Kwon’s article 
simply for being a contribution to social capital, but recognised that 
it had taken a position that was at the forefront of the literature, 
especially in terms of BBI. In this vein, they offer their own 
definition: ‘Social capital is the goodwill available to individuals 
or groups. Its source lies in the structure and content of the actor’s 
social relations. Its effects flow from the information, influence, 
and solidarity it makes available to the actor’ (p.23). On the basis 
of this definition, I conclude: ‘In short, although there is a notable 
absence of power and conflict, the result is to throw everything into 
a gently bubbling analytical cauldron and expect social capital to 
result as accommodating synthesis’ (p.111). In a later, unpublished 
and less kindly comment on the article after it was published in 
2002, I suggest to myself that it represents, something commonly 
found in the literature, a case of ‘the vanity of putting social 
capital straight’.
What is significant in the treatment of social capital within 
management studies is that the concept first appears (in Adler 
and Kwon’s and Nahapiet and Ghoshal’s articles) in what would 
generally be recognised as the critical branch of the discipline. This 
is not surprising for a number of reasons. First, the critically inclined 
within management studies are liable to be open to new ideas and 
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so to be in the vanguard of incorporating them, even if they are 
subsequently turned to more mainstream purposes. Second, and a 
related but different point, the critical scholars are liable to be open 
to a more wide-ranging set of variables with a more progressive 
and relational content, for which social capital fits the bill in many 
respects. And, last, these early uses were themselves mindful of 
the critical potential in the use of social capital, not least in being 
sensitive to the approach offered by Bourdieu. Social capital offered 
the potential for critical leverage.
Indeed, it may be that the relatively early appearance of social 
capital with a radical content, through the auspices of critical 
management studies, may have impeded, if not discouraged, an 
earlier and fuller adoption by the orthodoxy in the discipline. But this 
could not last, and the goal of defining social capital meaningfully 
and progressively proved an impossible task. The attempt to tie 
social capital to social relations that can be used as resources has 
allowed others to use the approach of Adler and Kwon not only 
surreptitiously to bring back in power, but also to exercise it on 
behalf of the powerful.
Let me cite a study emanating from the Canadian Institute of 
Chartered Accountants, entitled Stakeholder Relationships, Social 
Capital and Business Value Creation: Research Report (Svendsen et 
al. 2003). It begins approvingly with Adler and Kwon’s definition 
of social capital. But where does it end? It delivers two case studies 
essentially revealing how corporate stakeholders can prevail in their 
goal of value creation either through the incorporation of supportive 
social capital or through the exclusion of oppositional social capital. 
This is in the context of large-scale resource extraction corporations 
desperate to overcome local resistance, especially on environmental 
grounds. Let me quote the naive honesty involved in this. Under 
the heading ‘Links from Relationships to Social Capital to Business 
Value’, we find:
MainstayCorp [a pseudonym] increased its social capital with 
community stakeholders by forging strong relationships. These 
relationships were characterized by active communication ties, 
mutual trust and mutual understanding. The corporation then 
used its social capital, in the form of (i) influence over stakeholders 
(ii) information to and from stakeholders and (iii) norm adherence 
by stakeholders to avoid delays.
The government stakeholders were particularly influenced by 
the state of relationships that MainstayCorp had with community 
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stakeholders. The governments were disinclined to speedily 
approve an unpopular project. Mainstay removed this potential 
source of delay by interacting with community stakeholders to 
maintain their continuous support. (p.51, emphasis added)
And of the second case study, we are told:
GrowthCorp is a natural resource extraction corporation that has 
been rapidly expanding its operations in a northern rural area of 
Canada. Its stakeholders include environmental non-governmental 
organizations (ENGOs), First Nations and government regulators. 
The latest expansion received regulatory approval faster than 
anticipated. The corporation wanted to learn whether and how 
stakeholder relations contributed to, or detracted from, the speed 
of approval. (p.52)
Of course, these examples of social capital being used as a means 
to (specifically corporate) stakeholder value may be exceptional. 
Nonetheless, the parallels with the use of social capital by 
government as a policy tool to facilitate decisions against popular 
resistance are striking. For the deployment of social capital as a 
management technique is transparent: in this case to obtain approval 
of potentially unpopular and environmentally questionable projects 
– and ahead of rivals, as is made clear elsewhere in the report. More 
generally, social capital is pervasive as an element in management, 
across all of its functions, although its use is usually in the context 
of the functional attainment of some general goal of positive-sum 
outcome for all concerned, with only limited reference to the explicit 
pursuit of self-interest in the form of stakeholder value. It is not 
surprising to find in Hüppi and Seemann (2001) that social capital 
is offered as a management tool: the contribution is co-written by 
the CEO of Zurich Financial Services, one of the world’s leading 
social capital consultants.
As such, the use of social capital seems to have little or no 
purchase in promoting critical management studies, either in and 
of itself as critical, or against orthodoxy, or in its wider application 
across the social sciences. Universality and neutrality of definition 
do allow for a critical content, but orthodoxy and conservativism, 
if not degradation of scholarship, almost inevitably prevail. For 
the critical to prevail, it is arguable that it must occupy the high 
intellectual ground by virtue of both its critical and its strategic 
content. These requirements are noticeably more important in the 
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inevitable slippage between theory, analysis, policy and outcomes 
in the struggle against the deadweight of economic, political and 
ideological power.
Interestingly, though, business management has been more or less 
unique in addressing the relationship between globalisation and social 
capital, not least the need to negotiate – may I suggest bridge? – the 
relationship between the global multinational corporation and its 
local affiliate. Thus, for Frost and Zhou (2005), innovation depends 
upon social capital as the social relations within organisations. The 
more there is co-practice, absorptive capacity and social capital in 
the affiliates of MNCs, the more innovation there will be. In a case 
study of Fiji, which has affinities with the longstanding debate over 
enclaves and export production zones, Taylor (2002) discusses the 
issue of whether or not MNC affiliates build local social capital 
and, hence, local productive capacity. On a lighter note, Au and 
Fukuda (2002) assess the role of expatriates as a form of social 
capital, finding that they are both happier and more successful the 
more they bridge boundaries in the local community.
The negative side of social capital tends to be overlooked at 
the global level, just as it is at the domestic level. For, when big 
business restructures, this involves affiliate closures, loss of jobs 
and community health, and decline of the very civil society that 
social capitalists suggest should be used to compensate for such 
losses. Portes (1998), Heying (1997 and 2001) and Levi (1996) have 
all pointed to such ‘delocalisation’, the process by which affiliate 
restructuring undermines the viability of the communities that lose 
employment and, with it, their social capital. Goetz and Rupasingha 
(2006) offer a neat study of Wal-Mart in this respect, finding both 
that the retailer tends to be located where social capital is low 
and that social capital lessens in its presence. This is the reverse 
syndrome of delocalisation, as the provision of hypermarkets and 
the like destroy local trading communities. But, as Walker (2002) 
finds, there is always the social capital of business executives in 
providing the means for compensating for corporate restructuring 
through philanthropy!
As a second illustration of the application of social capital to 
management studies, I wish to dwell on formal network theory, 
which might be summed up neatly and idiosyncratically by the idea 
of the social capital of structural holes associated with Ronald Burt 
(2002). For Borgatti and Foster,
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[p]robably the biggest growth area in organizational network 
research is social capital, a concept that has symbiotically 
returned the favour and helped to fuel interest in social networks 
… [But] to a large extent, social capital is ‘just’ a powerful 
renaming and collecting together of a large swath of network 
research. (2003, p.993)
I would add that the favour has been returned, but without interest, 
rather with deduction. For I see this as hackademia pure and simple. 
First, the whole enterprise existed happily prior to anyone ever 
having heard of social capital. Second, it has been opportunisti-
cally attached to social capital. Third, the network theory deployed 
is purely formalistic in orientation, as indicated by its inelegant 
diagrammatic spider webs, and at most seeks to compensate for 
lack of substantive content and theory by BBI social variables on 
a piecemeal and arbitrary basis and degrading such variables and 
theory in the process. There is even a step back from the weak 
and strong ties of Granovetter, for example, let alone from the 
more considered network theory that incorporates social relations, 
structures and meaning of what is communicated.5
Ultimately, as an example of the purely formal use of networks, 
Burt (2005, p.4) defines social capital by reference to ‘a person’s 
location in a structure of relationships … the contextual complement 
to human capital in explaining advantage’. But context merely seems 
to mean how and how many people are connected to one another. 
His approach is overtly functional, following Coleman and Putnam, 
in terms of ‘advantage’ to be gained, with individualism extended to 
people and groups, one of his own wrinkles being structural holes 
(thin but invaluable potential for communication). The problem 
is how to move beyond this metaphor without recognising the 
constraints that it imposes. The answer provided by Burt is to 
attempt to BBI what has been left out by a facile technicism, and thus 
to incorporate network brokerage, improved vision, and network 
mechanisms and returns around closure (decreased variation in 
connections). Thereby, social capital can bridge structural holes with 
vision, creativity, learning, embedding, trust, reputation, contagion, 
leadership, control, whether passive or active, and so on.6 Similarly, 
Burt (2002) seeks the solution to the social capital syndrome in the 
structure and longevity of personal interactions, but in a purely 
formal manner. Despite studying the investment banking division 
of a large financial corporation over four years, he provides no 
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discussion of what it is that is done there! Rather his concern is 
purely with bridging relations and how they are built or decay.
Contrast this with Willman et al. (2006), who suggest that there is 
excessive financial trading or noisy trading by traders themselves (as 
opposed to their taking advantage of the irrational noisy trading of 
others) in order to be able to make contacts for information, if not 
for insider dealing. In other words, both institutions and their agents 
(traders) generate as well as smooth risk, raising questions of how 
this is to be managed both by internal and external mechanisms and 
incentives; this is particularly apposite given the current financial 
crisis (see also Godechot 2008).
Further, indulging my own training as a mathematician, I cannot 
resist making the point that, with just a hundred or so individuals, 
the number of potential networks exceeds the number of molecules 
in the universe. As we ought to explain why networks do or do not 
exist, something generally overlooked in the empirical literature, 
which tends to examine only those that do, it becomes essential to 
take common social properties as the basis for networks in order to 
reduce dramatically the number that need to be explained.
Burt has his followers, of whom Lin is probably the most active 
and prominent. They have edited a book on social capital, together 
with Karen Cook (a rational choice theorist who was a contributor 
to the social exchange debate). In his own book, Lin (2001, p.10) 
asserts that, ‘human capital can be seen as consistent with the 
theoretical scope of Marxian analysis’, but that ‘it challenges the 
classical (Marxian) theory in the definition of capital, it challenges 
the classical theory regarding who can or cannot acquire capital’, 
‘with extensive cross-grade mobility possible, rather than a rigid 
two-class system’. Indeed, ‘laborers can become capitalists, as 
they enjoy the surplus value of their labor … The confrontation 
and struggle between classes becomes a cooperative enterprise 
– “What’s good for the company is good for the worker and vice 
versa.”’ (p.13). This is a truly astonishing misrepresentation and 
degradation of the intellectual tradition associated with Marxist 
political economy.7
For my third illustration, consider innovation, technical change 
and productivity increase. This has been a very popular topic for 
management studies and social capital, tending to focus upon 
the internal mechanisms by which such things as innovation are 
internalised, generated, and adopted or obstructed, although 
the literature has also addressed external relations – university 
connections, for example – as a source of social capital for 
Fine 01 text   148 26/11/2009   11:46
ManaGeMent studIes Goes to Mcdonald’s  149
innovation. Shane and Stuart (2002) find that pre-existing contacts 
are important for the success of university start-up businesses. 
Morgan (2002, p.66) suggests that ‘universities can play a key role in 
the building of social capital … as catalysts for civic engagement and 
collective action and networking’. But this is failing in Wales due to 
the presence of an elite model of university research that promotes it 
at the expense of application through outreach and diffusion. On the 
other hand, the leading cliche concerning social capital and technical 
change, Silicon Valley, is also open to alternative interpretation, 
as suggested by Feldman (2001), who recognises that cooperation 
there and elsewhere (his own case study is of the US Capital Region, 
Washington, DC) has much to do with government support and 
contracts and hence, unwittingly against the grain, suggests that 
‘one proxy for social capital may be governmental activity’ (p.867). 
Similarly, Honig et al. (2006) understand firm social capital in Israel 
in terms of business connections to the military.
Casting the net wide in interpreting what falls under productivity 
increase, specialised journals such as the Journal of Venture Capital 
and the Journal of Intellectual Capital have been hackademic 
beneficiaries of the rise of social capital, with the latter adding to the 
plethora of (social) capitals with the addition of social intellectual 
capital (SIC). Particularly prominent in the management literature 
has been the rare consideration of ethics and its relationship to 
social capital (see, for example, Saxton and Benson 2005 for the 
non-profit sector; but, most obviously and more generally, social 
capital has found a home in the Journal of Business Ethics). The 
treatment of ethics primarily has a counterpart in other social capital 
literature in that concerned with religion, where the contributions 
have been scathing about the functional and limited interpretation 
of human motivation that is attached to social capital (religion being 
an association like any other that has fluidity to other activities 
and outcomes but is not assessed in its own right). This reflects 
an impoverished understanding of the individual within the social 
capital literature, a deficiency that tends to be overlooked by 
virtue of the vernacular of the social within social capital itself 
as well as its appeal to (social) trust, reciprocity, and so on (see 
also Chapter 8). Otherwise there is a profusion of management 
journals that have been beneficiaries of social capital, and whose 
titles give a fair indication of likely application. These include 
Venture Capital, Journal of Small Business Management, Family 
Business Review, Small Business Economics, Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice, Corporate Reputation Review, International 
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Journal of Entrepreneurial Behaviour and Research, Journal of 
Knowledge Management, Journal of Small Business and Enterprise 
Development, Career Development International, The Learning 
Organization, Journal of Management Development, European 
Management Review, Industrial Marketing Management, Journal 
of Strategic Information Systems, Journal of High Technology 
Management Research, Technological Forecasting and Social 
Change, and so on.
 However, because of its close consideration of empirical issues, 
usually by case study of firms, and some acknowledgement that 
innovation requires attention to the nature of knowledge, this 
literature has from time to time offered some insight into BBI as far 
as social capital is concerned. This is to emphasise the importance 
of context in determining outcomes. Thus, Edelman et al. (2004) 
point out that each of bonding and bridging may be positive or 
negative in the context of the management of innovation. They 
advise the use of social capital with caution in light of ‘the potential 
for unanticipated negative consequences … [as] it can also grossly 
hinder the value-creation process by limiting trust, excluding new 
ideas and providing sub-optimal solutions to problems’ (p. S68). In 
other words, it can be its own opposite. Bresnen et al. (2005) reckon 
that social capital inertia might attach itself to project-based learning 
in construction firms. Reagans and Zuckerman (2001) investigate 
whether the heterogeneity or homogeneity in the composition of 
224 corporate R&D teams is a source of the success (or failure) of 
the teams. Ahuja (2000), in a study of innovation in the chemical 
industry, concludes that different types of network (dense/direct, 
indirect, structural holes) perform differently and with different 
effects in different circumstances. And Phillipson et al. (2006) offer 
the notion that as soon as the state seeks to intervene to sustain and 
formalise business networks, it may undermine their motivational 
basis, as the networks are attached to ideologies and symbolic 
actions around local identity and independence.
Further, by reference to Schumpeter’s notion of creative destruction, 
for example, it is recognised that economic and social interaction 
that is conducive to change for one technology may be a barrier 
in the case of another, thereby implicitly questioning when and 
whether the same social capital is positive in what might be rapidly 
shifting circumstances. Westlund and Bolton (2003) show that local 
social capital can impede Schumpeterian creative destruction. Fuller 
(2005) argues that the research process can create social capital, but 
that it is destroyed by its being spread by teaching. And, in a purely 
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model-building exercise for industrial spillovers, Soubeyran and 
Weber (2002) recognise that your social capital is also somebody 
else’s, so that you have to weight your own gain against theirs, what 
they call ‘co-opetition’. Thus, ‘firms take into account the reciprocal 
nature of local spillovers: while reducing their own costs, the firms 
also reduce the costs of their rivals’ (p.65).8
But, more generally, this literature, more by way of neglect than 
of degradation, lags a step behind what has been achieved in the 
study of technical change, especially from a critical perspective. 
For a start, there is little or no reference to the national system of 
innovations literature that is significant for its attention both to the 
wider socio-economic and institutional context and the evolutionary 
rhythm of accumulation. Thus, for Rycroft, we have the implicit 
displacement of the national, even global, system of innovation 
approach by social capital:
Viewing globalization through the lens of the emergence and 
evolution of social capital points out that even in the most 
powerful technological innovation process, success depends 
as much on social factors (e.g. the key roles of trust, shared 
values, and community) as on economic, scientific, or engineering 
variables. (2003, p.299)
As I have argued elsewhere (Fine 1993), this approach is weak on 
questions of evolving class structure, power and conflict, and the 
specificity of the particular systems of accumulation attached to 
particular economies or sectors of the economy.9 Not surprisingly, 
such omissions are reproduced in the social capital approach, as is 
the absence of more recent literature concerned with the nature and 
meaning of productivity change that can be derived from science and 
technology studies (STS), sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK), 
and even actor-network theory (ANT), though I have considerable 
reservations about the last (Fine 2003d and 2004c).
My fourth example is social capital in terms of the gains of 
cooperative relations between, usually small, firms or individual 
entrepreneurs. This has attracted attention outside management 
studies, not least with repeated reference, from Coleman onwards, 
to New York Jewish diamond traders – albeit without noting, as I 
am tired of pointing out, the wider context of the (internationally 
cartelised) diamond industry that makes their mutual trust over 
precious gems possible in the first place, nor the gender, ethnic 
and racial exclusion involved, nor the gains from tax evasion and 
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avoidance. Another avenue for hackademia in this area has been 
the revival through rereading as social capital of flexible speciali-
sation (‘flec-spec’), industrial districts, externality spillovers, and 
so on. What each of these approaches shares in common is the 
positive-sum view of cooperation, and a tendency to idealise it 
across small-scale enterprises that often only survive on the margins 
through excessive forms of exploitation. This has become much 
more transparent in the literature on small-scale traders and finance, 
with Grameen banking being reinterpreted as social capital, and the 
condition of female success in these activities being shown to depend 
upon acceptance of the norms of gender oppression attached to the 
advantages from community interaction (see Chapter 4).
I have saved what is possibly my most salient example to the 
last. It concerns labour markets and work organisation. There 
is a significant literature on this outside management studies, 
concerned with access to, and advancement through, promotion. 
Not surprisingly, this has been taken up within management studies. 
This has to be put in context. It is over 35 years since I was a Ph.D. 
student at the London School of Economics, so I read the university’s 
alumni magazine with increasing attention to the obituaries. In a 
recent issue, there was one, in a sense, for its Department of Industrial 
Relations, now renamed Employment Relations and Organisational 
Behaviour and located within the Department of Management. 
This is startlingly symbolic of the transformation of industrial into 
human relations management, and of a shifting emphasis from class, 
power and conflict into employment, organisation and cooperation. 
Social capital, from bonding within each of capital and labour to 
bridging between them, is an ideal conduit for this transformation, 
as is transparent from the literature that deploys it, in both its 
analytical approach and its managerial motivation. For Novicevic 
and Harvey (2001), social capital is now an important element of 
human resource development in a global world offering cooperation 
as opposed to a hierarchy of command.10
I suspect it is not necessary for me to highlight the significance of 
this illustration for those familiar with the origins and continuing 
dynamic and content of critical management studies. For the United 
Kingdom at least, one of the discipline’s major inspirations came 
from the Marxist labour process literature of the 1970s. Grenier 
and Wright (2006, p.38) correctly highlight the absence of that 
tradition in the rise of social capital, and point out that ‘[t]he 
workplace has tended to be excluded from theories of social capital 
almost by definition’.11 Unfortunately they continue by immediately 
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offering Coleman’s New York diamond merchants as a notable 
exception. In the rest of their contribution, there is no reference to 
work (and none to trade unions) other than in the context of the 
stress that arises out of (the threat of) unemployment, a potential 
cause of weakened social capital, as feelings of trust are eroded 
(with rising inequality in Britain also being a contributing factor, 
possibly partially compensated for by burgeoning Internet use). 
But it is in that tradition of studying the labour process, extended 
and developed across all aspects of managerial control and conflict 
within the firm and across capitalism, that the future of critical 
management studies needs at least in part to rest. Social capital 
cannot serve as an instrument in this respect.
7.4  … and It aIn’t MarXIst
And nor can it do so through Marxist political economy. Mercifully, 
there are few who try to incorporate social capital into a critical 
rejection of capitalism itself as an alternative to its critical 
management. There are, of course, good reasons for this, as have 
been laid out earlier in this book. Nonetheless, the use of social 
capital as an instrument against capitalism, rather than within 
it, is to be found across the literature. Not surprisingly, this use 
of social capital can be traced across a sequence of the ways in 
which capitalism destroys the beneficial social capital of the past 
and impedes and distorts its formation in the present. The critical 
rejection of capitalism can be effective in advancing working-class 
interests in pursuit of future reform and revolution.
As detailed in Chapters 3 and 5, social capital has been located in 
the past in historical studies of pre-capitalist societies and those in 
transition. Generally, these studies are dictated by an understanding 
of social capital that departs from its current use, focusing on the 
aggregate or systemic economic properties that are heralded by 
capitalism. This also has its counterpart in the understanding of 
contemporary capitalism, with Bina and Davis (2000) and Bina 
and Yaghmaian (1991), for example, deploying the notion of social 
capital as the spread of capitalist relations, especially through the 
internationalisation of circuits of capital.12
On the other hand, not least in terms of the corresponding reor-
ganisation of the relationship between the economic and the social 
that is brought by capitalism, there is the presumption that social 
capital comes under assault from capital in general and commer-
cialisation and monetisation in particular, hardly a novel insight 
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given Polanyi’s ‘double movement’. There can be the loss of social 
capital as the traditional knowledge of health remedies, under 
assault from pharmaceutical companies (Norchi 2000), and Trask 
(2000) similarly argues that the Hawaiian people’s knowledge of 
their own colonised history is at risk from the need to present a 
welcoming face to tourists.
But the most wide-ranging contribution in this vein is offered 
by Ciscel and Heath, for whom social capital is destroyed by a 
combination of capitalism and patriarchy, not least through the 
process of commodification in shifting the boundaries against self-
provision through the household. The relations attached to social 
capital, and the means and motives to achieve them, are taken away 
by the market. Thus,
[a]lthough corporate capitalism has provided a measure of 
opportunities to families and women, the concomitant usurpation 
of the family’s social role has been to the detriment of the family, 
society, and the market itself. The market has usurped those 
discrete aspects of social capital that are most profitable to itself, 
and left the remainder of social capital – the creation of the web 
of relationships – to the family, primarily women, to provide. 
Thus, the ersatz freedom flowing from the unfettered expansion 
of the markets in reality represents another form of oppression, 
confining women and their families to lives of market supporting 
activities. (2001, pp.407–8)
The market not only provides what was previously provided by 
the family, but also reduces motives around such provision to self-
interest (pp.410–11). So capitalism not only depends upon the 
family’s social capital for social reproduction but also undermines 
its creation and potential: ‘the paradox within a paradox is now 
complete. The market not only free rides on the family’s provision of 
social capital, the capitalist drive for profit makes that social capital 
increasingly impossible for the family to provide’ (p.412).
What is at dispute here is not the significance of the rise of 
capitalism for family relations and social reproduction more 
generally (Fine 1992a). Rather, the incorporation of social capital 
as the way to address this has the effect of unduly homogenising 
what are a diverse set of differentially determined outcomes. Thus, 
Bateman (2003) usefully argues that as commercialised forms of 
microfinance appropriate profitable opportunities, there is both a 
loss of social capital in the way such services have been provided 
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previously and the spread of Grameen banking initiatives to support 
such finance in places where the commercial sector will not go13 
(see earlier chapters for some discussion of the continuing inequities 
associated with this). But such an outcome is not replicated across 
other areas of provision in economic and social reproduction, 
especially given the role of the (welfare) state (see Chapter 9).
Significantly, then, Das (2006, pp.72–3) explicitly rejects my 
advice that the concept of social capital be jettisoned altogether and, 
instead, seeks to endow it with a ‘class-based, political economy’ 
content.14 Now, given the BBI syndrome, it is hardly surprising 
that Das is able to incorporate class, power, the state, conflict and 
political economy in his own reworking of social capital. And 
he accepts that this is unusual and runs against social capital’s 
predominant attachment to enlightened neo-liberalism or reformism 
and its neglect of the class and political economy aspects of capital as 
social. For him, in contrast, ‘[w]orking-class social capital is about 
mutual relations of trust and cooperation within working-class 
communities … It is also about relations of trust and cooperation 
between workers and reformist officials’ (p.82). This is simply the 
bonding (within groups), bridging (between groups) and linking 
(across hierarchy or with the state) social capital to be found within 
the orthodoxy. But for Das, this is tied to the observations that social 
capital is limited in what it can achieve (because of class and the 
political economy of capitalism – something that is also accepted by 
much of the orthodoxy on its own terms); and that it can be used 
to promote workers’ immediate (within mode of production) as 
opposed to fundamental (across mode of production) interests.
In addition, social capital ‘will also be place-specific, because the 
balance between class constraints and class opportunities – and 
indeed, the balance of power between classes – will vary geographi-
cally’ (p.83). So what we need to do is to analyse the balance of 
power within and between classes, constraints and opportunities, 
the relationship between reform and revolution, the role of the state, 
and so on, according to specific place. I suspect that we knew this 
already, and the appendage of social capital is at best superfluous 
and at worst unduly homogenising across specificity in lieu of 
appropriate attention to detail (although Das does offer detailed 
case studies).
But, as already argued on a number of occasions, the dispute 
is not simply about whether social capital is capable of offering 
an acceptable analysis on the basis of an individual contribution. 
Rather, whilst a Marxist (or other) version of social capital might 
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deliver appropriate insights, these would certainly be lost amongst 
the orthodox juggernaut of contributions that dominate the 
literature. The proliferation of social capitalists in part reflects the 
process of bringing back in omitted considerations, not least in light 
of the concept’s potentially variegated content (anything social) and 
universal application. Das might be interpreted as having fallen into 
this trap, with class, political economy, conflict, power, the state, 
and so on being appended, although these, however unsatisfactorily, 
were already there in Bourdieu’s first use of the term, before they 
were systematically jettisoned. Whatever the intentions of individual 
authors in this regard, the overall effect across the literature is to 
legitimise the notion of social capital as truly universal and well 
founded. Look, it can deal with things like class, and even Marxists 
are able to accept it!
7.5  concludInG reMarKs
How, then, are we to maintain a healthy analytical diet in response 
to the McDonaldisation of management studies, with critical 
management studies a potential victim as well? Two syndromes need 
to be avoided. One is the ‘naughty but nice’ syndrome, the jingle used 
to promote cream cakes to an increasingly health-conscious market. 
There are individual indulgences to be gained from deploying social 
capital, even from within critical management studies, such are the 
rewards for hackademia in a field that is inevitably heterodox, in 
face of a vocationally organised and conservative orthodoxy. But at 
the end of the day, naughty is naughty, and such indulgence cannot 
promote the cause of critical management studies more generally.
The other syndrome derives from the heavy/‘lite’ duality. As 
long as I have a Diet Coke, it’s OK to have a hamburger. This is 
the position adopted by those who argue that they accept all the 
criticisms of social capital as it is, heavy, but believe they can lighten 
it up by their own particular use, especially BBI. There is, of course, 
at the individual level, the risk of the self-delusion of slipping back 
into being naughty but nice under the rationale of being heavy if 
tempered by being lite as well. The evidence from my own work 
on the nation’s diet is that the impact of the availability of ranges 
of healthy-eating products in hypermarkets has been to increase 
the consumption of both heavy and lite foods, and, especially, to 
worsen the diets of those already having the worst diets, as lite 
consumption is virtue rewarded by heavy indulgence (Fine et al. 
1996; Fine 1998b). Even if this can be avoided in an individual 
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case or two, amongst those with the greatest self-control and 
determination, the impact is still to sustain the forward momentum 
of heavy consumption. As I have already suggested, social capital 
is intellectual repressive tolerance par excellence.
The thing about repressive tolerance is that it can be accepted 
or it can be fought but it cannot be avoided. The extreme and 
overt limitations of social capital have, however, tended to elicit 
two responses. One is to jump on the bandwagon, to become part 
of the social capital of social capital as it were, to be included 
alongside those who positively embrace it – to do so, but pretend 
to do otherwise; and to do so, but genuinely (and misguidedly 
in my view) seek to reform it from within. The other option is 
to seek to avoid it altogether in the hope that it will go away. 
Unfortunately, the latter is only too common, as evidenced by the 
silent majority who read my poem (Chapter 2), but who do not 
engage in opposition. As will have been apparent, I have sought 
to adopt a third way of my own, one of obdurate, even obsessive, 
criticism. As far as the prospects of critical management studies are 
concerned, I hope to have persuaded you that social capital should 
neither be adopted nor avoided, but critically engaged and rejected, 
from the unique intellectual and institutional position that the field 
occupies. If this does not happen, critical management studies will 
tend to become part of management studies, to the extent that its 
critique is acceptable; otherwise it will be marginalised.




The range of applications of social capital is so diverse, extensive 
and voluminous that it defies systematic organisation. This is 
reflected in this chapter more than any other, possibly apart from the 
next. Three apparently disconnected themes are explored. Section 
8.2 introduces Putnamenology, highlighting the extent to which 
the leading proponent of social capital has, in a sense, become 
an object of study in his own right and, as a result, has built his 
startling reputation and prominence despite, or even upon, having 
been open to devastating, extensive, almost universal criticism. To 
some extent, such critical treatment of social capital can be found 
amongst orthodox economists, if on economics’ preferred terrain 
of technical and statistical modes of enquiry. Even on the narrow 
and flawed foundations of that discipline, as shown in Section 8.3, 
it is enabled to embrace social capital only, paradoxically, by both 
highlighting and disregarding its legion deficiencies. One of these 
is the way in which it conceives the individual. Whilst the social 
capitalist is nowhere near as reduced as the homo economicus of the 
dismal science, it is striking how shallow and incoherent is homo 
socio-capitalus, as is revealed by interrogating the meaning of trust 
within the literature in Section 8.4. Our concluding remarks ask 
once more whether social capital can be reformed or whether it 
would be better for it to be abandoned
8.2  putnaMenoloGY
As reported previously, in trying to get a handle on the explosion of 
the social capital literature across a multiplicity of topics, I sought 
to allocate different contributions within and across a number of 
themes. I soon began to realise that much of the literature offered 
explicit critical reference to Robert Putnam. In addition, there was 
also much qualified acceptance of his work that might reasonably 
be categorised as at least implicitly critical. Such criticism has taken 
a number of forms, especially in empirical work. First, for example, 
158
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are differences in methods of measurement and in the trends of social 
capital, either for the United States or for other countries. Second is 
the failure to replicate his results in other countries, or even in the 
United States (and Italy). Not only might social capital not have 
declined in the United States, but also any decline may not have 
had the consequences that he suggests. Third, as is often explicitly 
recognised, there is the problem of omitted variables that condition 
both the presence and effects of social capital. Putting these sorts 
of contribution together, the ‘critical of Putnam’ category becomes 
one of the largest. Quite apart from being the most cited of authors 
across the social sciences, he is also one of the most criticised. For 
McLean (2007/8, p.683), ‘[c]riticism of Robert Putnam’s theory 
of social capital has become something of a cottage industry in 
political science’.
As observed in my earlier book (Fine 2001a, Chapter 6), these 
two characteristics of prominence and criticism often go together 
and induced me, for obscure reasons laid out there, to dub Putnam 
a ‘benchkin’: an academic who attracts attention in spite of the 
poverty of analysis and lack of validity of empirical work  – attention 
whose result, far from the academic’s rejection, is the promotion 
of a programme of work that qualifies and advances what has 
been shown to be a false starting point. As should be apparent, the 
weight, position and impact of such ‘critical’ work is a consequence 
of the nature of social capital itself, in terms of its burgeoning 
definitional chaos and its capacity to absorb more or less anything 
through ‘bringing back in’ (Chapter 4). Thus, the success of social 
capital is a striking illustration of the benchkin phenomenon, with 
Putnam at its core.
Such scurrilous mocking is hard to avoid and is even thrust upon us 
by what might be termed the Putnam phenomenon, or Putnamenon 
to which it might now be shortened, given the failure of the benchkin 
terminology to catch on.1 For Putnam has himself bordered on the 
ridiculous in his claims, grand historical or otherwise. Whilst social 
capital was laid down in twelfth-century Italy, with the comparative 
disadvantage of the south continuing into the twentieth century, 
it could be restored in the United States in the immediate wake of 
9/11 (Putnam 2002).2 As cited in the Financial Times of 14 April 
2001, Putnam claims: ‘There is less social capital than there used to 
be. From that you can predict higher crime, lower levels of health, 
lower educational performance.’ His website has claimed, without 
evidence, that the impact of going out and joining an association is 
as good for your health as giving up smoking. Upon appointment to 
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the University of Manchester to lead a team, jointly with Harvard 
University, to study civil society, he was asked in a radio interview, 
after breakfast with the prime minister, Tony Blair, what he would 
do about the veil problem in British schools. The stunning response 
was that more bridging, rather than bonding, social capital needs 
to be built. In the renewal of his work on social capital and ethnic 
diversity (2007), Putnam sees one as being at the expense of the 
other, outflanks potential future criticism (as well as criticism from 
the past) by constructing and answering his own criticism, and 
somehow manages to avoid any discussion of racism, other than 
to claim that it has been eliminated from the US armed forces. 
Hero (2007) offers a detailed rebuttal of Putnam’s earlier work, 
counterposing a racial diversity hypothesis to a social capital one 
for the United States. In contrast with Putnam’s historical account 
of decline in social capital and its impact upon outcomes, Hero finds 
that racial diversity is a far more powerful explanatory factor than 
social capital. In popular parlance, social capital is a ‘white man’s 
story’; in more academic terms, he points to ‘the tendency of civic 
republican accounts of American politics generally to understate the 
legacy of the racial or ascriptive hierarchy tradition’ (p.9).
In part, in more popular discourse, Putnam’s appeal to the 
bowling club, in practice and as metaphor, is doubly unfortunate 
given both Timothy McVeigh’s use of a bowling club to organise 
the Oklahoma bombing conspiracy and the rather different image 
of bowling presented in the film The Great Lebowski, in which 
neither the idea of capital nor of the social readily spring to mind in 
contemplating the dude, played by Jeff Bridges, or any of the other 
dysfunctionals involved. Putnam continues to offer opportunistic 
hackademicisms in ways that are liable to make even his fellow 
social capitalists cringe. I recall one interview in which he was told 
that more men were going to the pub in Britain, so he welcomed 
this as evidence of growing social capital in the United Kingdom; 
but when told this was to watch football on the TV, he immediately 
retracted. But the ‘surprising’ headline ‘fact’ to be found on the 
Bowling Alone website (www.bowlingalone.com), itself inspired 
by Putnam’s now already classic contributions (1995 and 2000), 
is that ‘[j]oining one group cuts in half your odds of dying next 
year’. This is a benefit that I too offer to those who gain social 
capital by absorbing my criticisms (and why not visit www.iippe.
org/wiki/Social_Capital_Working_Group?). Incidentally, the study 
with which the World Bank launched its commitment to social 
capital suggested that joining a burial society in Tanzania was six 
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times more effective than female education in reducing poverty, both 
for those that joined and for the villages as a whole in which burial 
societies prospered. Putting these two results together, it seems that 
joining a burial society means there is less need to do so!
But death is a serious business, especially when it comes to violent 
crime. Consider the contribution on social capital and firearm 
ownership in the United States by Hemenway et al. (2001), of which 
Putnam is a co-author.3 This regresses individuals’ firearm ownership 
against the number of times in the previous year they went bowling, 
played cards, entertained at home, sent greeting cards, and attended 
dinner parties. It accepts that issues such as race, urbanisation and 
poverty were omitted from the study and that correlation and 
causation have not been distinguished.4 The National Riflemen’s 
Association does not warrant a mention (although going to church is 
found, if insignificantly, to raise possession, suggesting that firearm 
ownership and religion may have some values in common).5 These 
conclusions also have to be set against the civilian possession of 
270 million firearms in the United States, compared to 7 million 
in Italy, and a death total by firearms 40 times higher relative to 
population than that in the United Kingdom – for all of which, 
explanation in terms of dinner parties and the like might seem to 
be slightly misplaced.
For these and other reasons, given the McDonaldisation of social 
theory by social capital, it is irresistibly attractive to place Putnam 
in the role of the Ronald McDonald of social theory, a metaphor 
that warrants considerable deconstruction, given the complexity of 
both the Ronald image and the use to which it is put. Inevitably, 
though, there are more serious, and academic, takes on Putnam’s 
deficiencies. First and foremost, he is perceived as being reactionary 
or conservative in his approach, not least through reference to 
generally unacknowledged antecedents.6 Whilst there is both 
reliance upon, and distancing from, Coleman’s rational choice (and 
corresponding neo-liberalism), Putnam is appropriately seen by Grix 
as deploying outmoded notions for societies that have moved on:
Traditional social capital indicators, developed in the early 1990s, 
fail to take account of the technological revolution, the major 
shift in working patterns and modes of production, the effects 
this has had on citizens’ mobility and families and the channels 
through which citizens articulate their interests and engage in 
civic affairs. (2001, pp.200–1)
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Similarly, Urry (2002, p.264) questions whether Putnam’s social 
capital has acknowledged the physical mobility and interaction 
characteristic of the current age of the Internet and international 
travel – not least in citing Putnam’s appeal for neighbourliness:
Let us act to ensure that by 2010 Americans will spend less time 
traveling and more time connecting with our neighbors than we 
do today, that we will live in more integrated and pedestrian-
friendly areas, and that the design of our communities and the 
availability of public space will encourage more casual socializing 
with friends and neighbors. (2000, pp.407–8)
Urry observes the irony that ‘Putnam also ignores what his own 
practice as an academic shows, the widespread growth of longer-
range mobility especially by air, as conferences, holidays, family 
connections, diasporic relations and work are increasingly interna-
tionalized’. And, whilst ethnic diversity has always figured within 
Putnam’s horizon once he had shifted social capital to the United 
States, its presence is not deeply analytically rooted. MacKian 
appropriately sees the Putnam model as
increasingly divorced from the realities of postmodern society, 
comprised as it is by a variety of cultural identities, affiliations and 
behaviours, populated by a wider constituency than the white, 
middle-class, churchgoing nuclear families so often found in the 
popular social capital literature. (2002, p.205)
This all corresponds to the predisposition on Putnam’s part 
to inhabit and restore the supposedly lost world of associational 
civil society. This reflects a structured analytical starting point in 
which civil society is separated from the economy and the state, 
before, possibly, they are allowed to interact once more. As Skocpol 
(2008, p.117) cautiously puts it: ‘At first glance, and in some of the 
original scholarly incarnations, social capital research seemed to be 
a reversion to social–cultural determinism, pushing state actions 
and political organization back into the province of dependent or 
intervening variables.’ Ironically, though, this passage is taken from 
Skocpol’s 2007 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture; Putnam (2007) had won 
the prize in 2006. The two complement each other, one bringing 
back in civil society, the other bringing back in the state, and neither 
the economy!
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Couto points to the extent to which such structural separation 
leads to a stripped down version of the separated elements, 
comparing this position with that of the conservative sociologist 
Edward Nisbet. For, imposing a social capital interpretation on 
him, Couto writes that ‘Nisbet relates the failure of intermediate 
associations to provide the psychological and symbolic functions of 
social capital – that is, its moral element – directly to their diminished 
capacity to perform the material and economic functions of social 
capital’ (1999, p.53).7 By contrast,
Robert Putnam’s work supported the conservative revision of the 
political role of mediating structures. It ignored and diminished the 
economic function of mediating structures and the material side 
of social capital. Social capital, in Putnam’s work, consists almost 
exclusively of moral resources. Defining social capital as moral 
resources expresses a limited criticism of market economics.
This is part and parcel of a dual absence in Putnam’s work, 
that of the agency and mechanisms by which social capital accrues 
benefits even within civil society itself, and of the constraints and 
interactions that these involve with state and economy. As Anheier 
and Kendall put it:
[H]ow do we explain the intermediary step of actual trust 
generation? This mechanism appears as the crucial link in the 
implied causal chain … what is it about voluntary associations 
that facilitates trust? … the ‘intervening factor’ in trust generation 
is, however, largely left unspecified by current sociological 
thinking. Putnam and others … tend to remain silent on how 
and under what conditions voluntary associations generate and 
preserve trust for their members and more widely for society as 
a whole. (2002, p.345)
That social capital is a resource that is mobilised merely by virtue 
of its existence is a consequence of a terminology in which we 
all become capitalists merely by belonging to (civil) society. This 
necessarily glosses over the different circumstances in which we 
engage in political activity and the moralities which we attach 
to it. Consequently, for Smith and Kulynych, the social capital 
terminology celebrates the individualism, competition and pursuit 
of wealth that is characteristic of capitalism, but only by seeking, 
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inconsistently, to promote the universal civic virtues that are its 
antithesis. For,
[a]s suggested by Putnam’s use of the term social capitalists as 
well as by his claim that working-class solidarity is a form of 
social capital, the term social capital imposes a universalizing 
logic on political activity that minimizes the historical context that 
gives much of this activity its meaning and impedes normative 
theorizing. (2002a, p.151)
Not surprisingly, they also take offence at Putnam’s (2000, p.351) 
citing the fraternité of the French Revolution as a form of social 
capital!
Similarly, DeFilippis recognises that Putnam too readily writes out 
power, relation to economic capital, and conflict within civil society, 
in order to be able to focus on win–win opportunities. Thus:
In Putnam’s understanding of the term, social capital becomes 
divorced from capital (in the literal, economic sense), stripped 
of power relations, and imbued with the assumption that social 
networks are win–win relationships and that individual gains, 
interests and profits are synonymous with group gains, interests, 
and profits. (2001, p.800)
Further, there are questions of the distribution and use of social 
capital, for why would an elite give up their advantages in these 
respects any more than they would their economic capital?
Why would those who benefit from the current structures that 
produce and distribute social capital willingly turn over their 
privileged access to it? We would not expect rich people to 
willingly turn over their mutual portfolio funds or, less hypo-
thetically, embrace poor and nonwhite students in their schools 
without a confrontation. Why should we expect that this form 
of capital would somehow be different from others? People who 
realize capital through their networks of social capital do so 
precisely because others are excluded. (p.801)
As a result,
[i]nner-city neighbourhoods have social networks and trust 
between members of those networks, and they possess many 
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nongovernment, community-based organizations. What they lack 
is power and the capital that partially constitutes that power [over 
the flows of economic capital]. They are not likely to realize either 
without confrontation or within a Putnam-inspired framework 
of community development. (p.801)
And there is a welcome reference to the lack of attention to the 
(declining) social capital of the wealthy, in contrast to the focus on 
those who might be deemed to be able to help themselves through 
more community spirit:
Why are the American elites, who have gone through 35 years 
of civic disengagement, doing so well financially? Affluent and 
professional Americans have enjoyed a virtually unprecedented 
period of prolonged prosperity, and the current gap in wealth 
between rich and poor is greater than it has been since before 
the Great Depression. Putnam’s theory just does not make sense 
in, let alone explain, this reality. (p.801)
In short, even where there is social capital in US inner cities,
these networks and support are unable to generate capital … 
the ability of most of these community-based organizations to 
generate long-term economic growth for their communities has 
been rather limited … it is also clear from this experience that 
simply creating community-based organizations in inner-city 
neighbourhoods does not, by itself, generate economic prosperity 
or even economic security for the residents. (p.797)
Thus, as Navarro suggests, Putnam displays a ‘remarkable 
absence of power and politics’ (2002, p.427), with social capital 
being deployed to replace the language of race, class and gender. 
Siisiäinen (2000) highlights how Putnam also neglects conflicts 
of interest of various types, deploying a romantic and universal 
notion of trust that can be ‘posited as disinterested … a euphemism 
concealing the hidden, but underlying specific interests of the 
powerful’. Significantly, then, in examining political democratisa-
tion in Taiwan, Marsh (2005, p.613) finds that increasing civic 
participation is associated with illiberal values and hierarchical 
organisations, indicating the extent to which ‘the theory [of social 
capital] takes the politics out of political behaviour and attitudes’, 
as well, it should be added, as offering a positive morality to be 
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attached to associationalism (despite its potential for exclusion and 
the dark side).
As has been fully revealed in Chapter 3, the social capital 
literature in general, and Putnam in particular, have studiously 
ignored earlier and explicit uses of social capital (as a macro-social 
economic aggregate) that do not conform to its current imperatives. 
In addition, as seen above, some concerted criticism has been 
directed at Putnam for the influences, whether these are conscious 
or not, that he does not acknowledge. And there are also those that 
question his use of both putative and explicit influences. Across 
each of these elements in the formation of the thought of Putnam, a 
common theme is the reduction and degradation, to suit his purpose, 
of what has gone before. This is revealed, for example, by Hospers 
and van Lochem (2002), who are critical of Putnam for departing 
from a rounded interpretation of the contributions of Jane Jacobs, 
a heralded pioneer of social capital, and for failing to see her as 
emphasising diversity, creativity, entrepreneurship and innovation 
within cities. But decisive in this respect is the treatment of the classic 
contribution of de Tocqueville, which in many ways Putnam takes 
as his starting point for the decline of social capital.
For Fried, then, Putnam totally misreads de Tocqueville, through 
insufficient attention to inequality and by neglecting the wider 
structural context and dynamics around economic, social and 
political life as an influence on political participation; and Putnam’s 
survey methods neglect individuals as interviewees, failing to tease 
out how they perceive and interact with institutions, as opposed to 
simply deriving bland quantitative measures of participation in civil 
society. In any case, associational life occupies only 6 of the 700 
pages of the de Tocqueville volume Democracy in America. Thus,
[d]espite Tocqueville’s status as (according to Putnam) a patron 
saint of social capitalists, Tocqueville’s ideas and approach 
have a more partial than robust presence in Bowling Alone … 
a more fully recovered Tocqueville casts attention to the issue 
of equality as a main element influencing American democracy, 
encourages scholarship that is contextual, institutional, and 
historical in nature, and invites methodological approaches 
oriented towards structural analysis and interpretative exegesis. 
(Fried 2002, p.40)
Similarly, Ehrenberg accepts social capital as an analytical concept, 
but considers that it is hard to create in practice, suggesting 
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that ‘Bowling Alone would be considerably stronger if it took 
Tocqueville seriously. The fact that it doesn’t shouldn’t be surprising. 
Unfortunately, a moralized, depoliticized, and self-righteous com-
munitarianism is a perfect ideological reflection of contemporary 
disengagement, materialism, individualism, cynicism, and inequality’ 
(2002, p.71).8 Or, as Crenson and Ginsberg observe, it is not the 
decline of civil society that is involved, contra Putnam, as Americans 
do not bowl alone. Rather, ‘[t]hey continue to bowl together, but 
they take part in politics alone and with far less frequency and 
enthusiasm than their forbears’ (2006, p.210). On the other hand, 
for Schultz, Putnam’s ‘appropriation’ of de Tocqueville proceeds by 
emphasising ‘group membership as a means of enhancing individual 
social capital, psychological attributes, and participation’, as 
opposed to de Tocqueville’s own pluralist focus on ‘critical structural 
forces essential to maintaining a stable democratic system’ (2002, 
p.73); and, once again, attention is drawn to the significance of 
equity for de Tocqueville. Putnam ignores structural forces and, 
in seeking to ‘build social consciousness from the individual up 
reveals an incomplete vision of democracy and human nature, as 
well as an incomplete understanding of human intersubjectivity’ 
(p.76; see also p.83). Further, Putnam is seen as combining the 
inner-directed individual governed by inner values and motives 
with the other-directed individual who seeks guidance from others 
(p.92–3, following Riesman et al.1953). For Riesman and his co-
authors, the period under scrutiny by de Tocqueville was, indeed, 
dominated by an inner drive with values derived from the family. 
But from the 1950s, outer direction came to the fore in a pernicious 
form, with individuals subject to malign influence, not least from 
McCarthyism. In contrast, Putnam harks back to the 1950s as a 
civic golden age, despite its McCarthyism, consumerism and racial 
segregation (see below).
Not surprisingly, even without reference to de Tocqueville, the 
absence of equity and equality in Putnam’s work is a common 
criticism. Savage et al. (2005) emphasise the need to disaggregate 
social capital in terms of who gets what and how because, for 
example, ‘[p]eople in disadvantaged positions are more likely to 
obtain situational social capital from informal neighbourhood 
relations, whilst those in advantaged positions are more likely to have 
social capital from social networks and civic engagement’ (p.120). 
They draw the conclusion that there is a need to situate social capital 
in the context of both stratification and inequality (p.121).
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Much the same position is taken by Kisby (2007), who rehearses 
criticisms of social capital in terms of what it excludes. He argues 
both that citizenship education was introduced in the United 
Kingdom by New Labour to promote social capital and also that 
it will fail because of its ‘reluctance to challenge the entrenched 
inequalities that undermine the promotion of social inclusion and 
thus prevent the development of social capital’ (p.84). Across these 
two contributions, there is a mix of presumption that inequality 
might be more important than social capital, that it certainly 
conditions it, and that social capital will not contribute unless this 
is all recognised.
In a slightly stronger vein, and with the added motive of suggesting 
the use of social capital to put inequality on the back burner, 
O’Connell emphasises that equality plays a more important role 
than social capital in explaining effective participation in political 
institutions across the European Union, but that the latter has 
become more popular, because ‘the difficult task of challenging 
powerful vested interests to redistribute wealth can be avoided in 
building cohesive societies’ (2003, p.247). And, he continues, and 
closes, as follows:
Rather, an active interest in their local football club will suffice 
to turn ‘ghetto mums’ into ‘soccer mums’. Vibrant birdwatching 
associations, busy rotary clubs, and regular philatelic conventions 
will start the wheels of progress rolling. This is not a caricature 
of the position [of Putnam]; in Bowling Alone, these are 
precisely the sorts of measures set forth for ‘renewing the stock 
of social capital’.
These are, of course, if we add a firearm or two, astonishingly 
apposite premonitions of Sarah Palin.
A rather different critical perspective on Putnam derives 
from Durlauf (2002a), who has long sought both secure micro-
foundations for social theory and more rigorous use of statistical 
methods in deriving empirical results.9 For him, Putnam ‘is in many 
ways very deeply disappointing, particularly when judged from 
the perspective of rigor or analytical depth’, a problem being ‘lack 
of clarity as to what constitutes social capital’ (p.260). Indeed, 
Putnam ‘suffers from a problem that pervades social science, the 
overstatement of the implications of particular empirical studies’, 
and ‘one finds a statistically significant coefficient of a particular 
sign far too often treated as justifying a claim that the associated 
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variable is a causal determinant of the process under study’ (p.266). 
The fallacies involved are precisely those that have been pointed 
out more informally in Chapter 2, with omitted variables, model 
specification, identification problems, and so on. In short, Putnam 
‘has not come close to the appropriate standard for drawing firm 
inferences …[and he has shown] little ability to discriminate between 
a social capital explanation versus some other’ (p.269); he has failed 
to offer ‘an explicit description of the joint determination of social 
capital and socioeconomic processes’ (p.270).10
It is hardly surprising, and is already apparent, that Putnam’s 
work should have been subject to extensive criticism, if not always 
in these hard terms, in its portrayal of the (nature of the) decline 
of US civil society and the causes for it.11 One major element in 
such reassessments, if not so explicitly put, is that Putnam looks 
forward from the past rather than the other way around. If we 
suppose that social movements come and go, in and of themselves, 
and reflect their times, this inevitably offers a bias towards the 
hypothesis of decline, since the measured social capital of the past 
will have given way to the unmeasured social capital of the present, 
unless attention is paid to new forms. In other words, supposing we 
undertook the exercise the other way round, the result would be 
to find that there has been an explosive growth in social capital, as 
low levels of activity in the currently new are found to have been 
minimal in the past. This is so whatever new form of social capital 
we take, whether it be the rise of consumerism (as activism), the 
‘grey panther’ movement (organisation of the elderly in the United 
States),12 environmental campaigning, or something else.13
In addition, of course, it is not just the projection of the loss of 
the past onto the inevitably different future that is at stake, but 
also that this is done from a necessarily conservative and limited 
perspective. An outstanding critique in these respects is offered by 
Arneil (2006). She emphasises how Putnam’s generally positive view 
of the women’s temperance movement as responsible and reciprocal 
overlooks its powerful role in racist oppression of non-Protestants 
in its drive for homogeneous assimilation and hegemony. Putnam’s 
associations were often exclusionary, in many instances on the 
basis of race and ethnicity, so that Arneil questions whether their 
decline should be deplored, especially given the changing situation 
of women (p.48). Where it does exist, the generational decline in 
social capital from the 1970s is better seen in terms of ‘economic 
turmoil and inequality … crises in political leadership … [around 
the] Vietnam War and Watergate … and dashed hopes of cultural 
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and racial politics’ (p.145).14 In this light, Steger (2002) admires, 
I take it sarcastically, Putnam’s (2000) panache in setting up the 
death of civic America as a whodunit, with answers in terms of the 
pressures of two-career families on time and money (10 per cent), 
commuting and urban sprawl (10 per cent), the privatising effects 
of electronic equipment (25 per cent), and the almost-as-important 
generational change between 1910 and 1940. Yet, Putnam’s 26-
page index has no entry for globalisation, and the 541-page book 
devotes just two pages to the global economy. Equally, there is 
no mention of deregulation, privatisation, marketisation, neo-
liberalism, and so on.
The thrust of these and many other writings is the need to bring 
back in the substance of politics explicitly, and on a wider and 
different frame than allowed for by Putnam.15 As Trigilia argues 
in the case of Italy:
Contrary to the hypothesis put forward by Putnam, social capital 
is less absent in the south than one could expect by defining it 
in terms of a civic culture inherited from a distant past … it is 
not the lack of these networks which seem to have hindered 
development in the south, but the lack of a modernized politics. 
While in the centre and north a modernized politics favoured a 
productive use in the market of social networks, based on kinship 
and community ties, in the south it fostered political capitalism: 
the use of social networks for a collusive appropriation of public 
resources. (2001, p.437)
And, on a grander and more general scale, Navarro (2002) offers 
a critique of Putnam’s understanding of the US progressive era as 
deriving from social capital rather than from social movements, 
and of the way in which he rejects solidarity within the labour 
movement as a purpose in itself, within and against capitalism. The 
recent decline of social capital within the US trade union movement 
is a reflection of repression and the shift in balance of class forces 
rather than a loss of cultural values amongst the young (as a result 
of watching television, for example). For Muntaner (2001), US 
exceptionalism (in the nature and decline of social capital) derives 
from the lack of a strong working-class movement, one capable 
of creating a welfare state. On a slightly different tack, McLean 
(2002b) simply suggests that the rise of mistrust in government 
(as a loss of social capital) may be stronger amongst those who 
are more active in civil society, especially in newer movements and 
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newer forms that are liable to be overlooked in counting decline in 
moving forward in time.
In short, as in the social capital literature more generally, there is 
a paradox, or at least a tension, in the extensive criticisms offered 
of Putnam, not least as these range over conceptualisation, theory, 
measurement and the empirical, both in cause and effect and in 
what happened. The paradox arises because the critics both accept 
social capital as an organising principle and, at the same time, reveal 
how the concept is too weak and chaotic to be sensitive enough to 
the complexity of the factors involved. And the same applies in the 
contextual content over the questions of whether social capital has 
gone up or down and whether this has been good or bad.
8.3  the dIsMal (socIal) scIence
As previously revealed, it is a significant but easily overlooked fact 
that the first major economist to use the term ‘social capital’ was 
Gary Becker (1996)  – not surprisingly, given his association with 
James Coleman at the University of Chicago (Fine 2001a). As a 
pioneer of economics imperialism of the old type (treat everything as 
far as possible as if reducible to individuals optimising given utility 
over given goods in an as-if-perfectly-working market), his use of 
social capital has been more or less totally discarded, for it is an 
embarrassment to the new type of economics imperialism, which 
is still founded on such ideas as that of optimising individuals, but 
in the context of imperfectly working markets and the non-market 
as the response to those imperfections. The reductionism may be 
less than for Becker, but the scope of application becomes much 
wider and more appealing whatever the subject matter (Fine and 
Milonakis 2009).
A neat application of Becker’s approach is provided by Borcherding 
and Filson (2002). The idea is to explain reciprocity (a form of 
social capital) on the basis of pursuit of self-interest, and they take 
the custom of buying a round of drinks as an example. They find, 
through a model explicitly based on Becker, that
[i]nformal reciprocity agreements are more likely to be used when 
transaction costs are high, the unit cost of the good is small, each 
consumer’s demand is not too responsive to price changes, the 
group is likely to continue to interact, the consumers are patient, 
the time between transactions is short, and the group is small and 
homogeneous. (p.239)
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That is, down the pub. For Borcherding and Filson, though, social 
capital through ‘socialization shapes the utility function to encourage 
consumers in the group to internalize price externalities’ (p.257). 
This reflects another aspect of Becker, the idea that apparently 
changing preferences are nothing of the sort, simply fixed ones 
modified in application in light of experience. But Borcherding and 
Filson see economists as reluctant to embrace social capital for, as a 
latent variable, it is difficult to measure. Yet, ‘there is every reason 
to believe that since social constraints and spontaneous informal 
coordinating are ubiquitous, economists will find the will and the 
wit to make sense of it’.
They have, however, also found the will and the wit to move 
beyond Becker. Nonetheless, one feature of his approach to social 
capital does, unsurprisingly, tend to survive amongst economists 
into more rounded approaches. This is the attempt, not always in 
pure form, to incorporate wider economic and, especially, social 
factors, but by retaining the uncritical use of prevailing concepts 
and techniques. Thus, Ray et al. (2001) are not alone in deploying 
social capital (A) as an input in a production function, generating 
increasing returns to scale within a new growth theory model:16
A is the stock of ‘social capital’ the economy has developed in 
the context of history and geography. It includes institutions 
like compulsory primary education, civil societies, free press, 
independent judiciary, effective law enforcement authority, 
and public policies relevant to: basic research; investments on 
transport and telecommunication networks, which generate 
network economies; health care; protection of environmental 
resources; promotion of competition as well as coordination 
among economic agents; and macroeconomic management 
of the economy. It also includes culture, such as thrift, work 
ethic, valuing knowledge or education beyond its market value, 
morality and ethical standards, and geographic factors such as 
climate and natural resources. It can be deliberately produced 
from a coordinated action of groups of individuals in a society 
for some collective good or is autonomously generated in the 
form of knowledge network economy. (pp.497–8)
Note the breadth and diversity of factors covered by a simple symbol 
A, to which I return below.
Piazza-Georgi also offers a striking illustration of social capital as 
business as usual as far as economics is concerned, first of all when 
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he defines any capital as ‘a productive resource that is the result of 
investment’ (2002, p.462).17 Otherwise, the more or less automatic 
procedure is simply to seek to reduce social capital to a form of 
physical capital, including everything from informal associations to 
(Douglass North’s) institutions. Thus, the search is on for assets
producing income without being consumed by the production 
process (but being subject to depreciation, thus needing 
maintenance and eventual replacement) … created and maintained 
by people at a theoretically measurable cost, thus fulfilling the 
condition that distinguishes capital from natural resources … 
[and] they ‘reside within’ human beings – in this case in the 
relationships between them rather than in the individual minds. 
In addition, institutions and social capital have important public 
good characteristics, which are shared by the ‘stock-of-knowledge’ 
form of human capital. (p.476)
Robison et al. adopt a different tack, acknowledging that the 
definition of ‘social’ has suffered from expansion of scope and, as 
such, ‘is at risk of becoming the ether that fills the universe’ (2002, 
p.1). They see the attempt at abolishing the use of social capital 
as being futile (getting the social capital cow back in the barn, as 
they put it), but they do at least seek to confine it to the pasture 
of ‘sympathy’, since this is the only way of making it capital-like. 
Sympathy itself is defined as a relationship that affects one only by 
affecting others, so that social capital produces benefits to others 
beyond those provided by exchange (p.6). By this means, social 
capital is capital-like, since it shares all of the properties of physical 
capital – transformation capacity, durability, flexibility, substitut-
ability, decay, reliability, ability to create one form of capital from 
another, opportunities for (dis)investment, and alienability (p.9). 
Indeed, Robison et al. find that social capital has a market value, 
since farmers sell land to their neighbours at lower prices than to 
strangers (see also Robison and Flora 2003), although this is a 
value to the buyer rather than the seller and might be explained by 
other factors.18
But appealing to sympathy as being equivalent to social capital, 
whilst this is an extraordinarily narrow definition, is indicative 
of how social capital functions for economists in its fullest form. 
First, traditional economic analysis fills out as much as is possible. 
Second, this is then extended to the non-economic. Third, anything 
else left out after this can be incorporated as complementing what 
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has already been provided. As seen in Chapter 5, institutions play 
a similar role, especially for those economists who are prepared 
to accept that there is a bit more out there than the optimising 
individual. Social capital becomes a relatively broad application 
of ‘freakonomics’, or the economic theory of everything (Fine 
and Milonakis 2009). As Temple (2001, p.82) puts it, ‘for some 
economists (not all) the intuition that “society matters” is strong 
enough to outweigh the current absence of much in the way of a 
theoretical understanding’.
But lack of theoretical understanding does not get in the way 
of theory (abstract mathematical models), and this can even be 
of a critical bent. For Farmer and Kali (2007), for example, the 
Putnamesque decline in social capital is a reflection of development 
in the positive sense of the greater efficiency of market provision in 
place of the non-market at higher levels of income – social capital 
declines as it is functionally displaced by the more efficient, and 
honest, market. The decline of social capital is modernisation. 
On the other hand, Mogues and Carter (2005) provide micro-
foundations which model ‘social capital as a real capital asset with 
direct use and collateral values’. These, however, tend to stick to 
wealth, and ‘[f]ar from being a distributionally neutral panacea for 
missing markets, social capital in this model may itself generate 
exclusion and deepen existing economic cleavages’ (p.193). And 
an exemplary illustration of the use of social capital in the hands 
of economists is provided by Bartolini et al. They jump on the 
economics of happiness bandwagon (see Johns and Ormerod 2008 
for a critique) and seek to explain the decline of happiness by adding 
social capital as an explanatory variable. For them:
By SC we mean the stock of both ‘non-market relations’ and 
‘beliefs concerning institutions’ that affect either utility or 
production functions. More precisely, in what follows we will 
distinguish between relational social capital (RSC), i.e. the non-
market relations component of SC, and non-relational social 
capital (non-RSC), i.e. the ‘beliefs concerning institutions’ 
component of SC. We further distinguish two parts of the RSC 
component: intrinsically and extrinsically motivated RSC. The 
concept of extrinsic motivations refers to the incentives coming 
from outside an individual. By contrast, intrinsic motives issue 
from within an individual. (Bartolini et al. 2008, pp.4–5)
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This is relatively sophisticated in allowing for the individual to be 
intrinsically motivated; but it is merely a prelude for a statistical 
exercise on large-scale data sets. They find that, ‘at the individual 
level, the intrinsically motivated part of relational social capital is 
positively correlated with reported happiness …[but] the extrinsically 
motivated part of relational social capital is negatively correlated’ 
(p.23), i.e. you are happier the less you are economically rational! 
But they do advise:
In principle, the problem of endogeneity could affect most of our 
regressors, including for instance absolute and relative income 
and, of course, social capital variables. However, in order to carry 
out a meaningful IV [instrumental variables] estimation we would 
require a large number of instruments that, in turn, would require 
a long list of additional assumptions about their relationships 
with both regressors and happiness. We are skeptical about the 
feasibility of such an IV estimation with our dataset. Thus, our 
analysis is limited to correlations and imputations and cannot 
support any claim about causality. (p.25)
Such honesty is as welcome as it is rare.
In my earlier book (Fine 2001a) I devoted the best part of 
Chapter 10 to the implications that could be derived technically 
from mainstream economic theory for the theory and measurement 
of social capital. This is because economics has long agonised over 
how to define aggregate capital across its different components in a 
way that is independent of its effects. The orthodoxy demonstrates 
that the associated problems are irresolvable – hardly surprising 
given that multidimensional categories cannot be reduced to a 
single concept or measure without anomaly or even inconsistency. 
In particular, I made use of the theory of social choice and the 
Cambridge critique of capital theory to demonstrate the hurdles 
that would have to be overcome19 before using a concept like social 
capital (ranging over social as well as physical assets, the latter alone 
proving troublesome enough).
This all involves devastating criticisms of the use of social capital 
by its current practitioners, who simply draw upon standard results 
from within orthodox (economics) reasoning. Conveniently though, 
within economics itself, these difficulties have been set aside as if they 
do not exist – a reflection of the rigour of economics taking second 
place to its substantive content whenever there is conflict between the 
two (Fine 2007g; Fine and Milonakis 2009). It is hardly surprising 
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that these criticisms of social capital within economics should suffer 
the same fate as across social science more generally. I know of not 
one reference to this aspect of my critique of social capital. In this 
light, can we place intellectual trust in social capital?
8.4  In socIal capItal We trust?
One of the advantages, at least in some respects, of mainstream 
economics is that it does at least have few pretensions of 
conceptual sophistication and complexity. And, precisely because 
of its deductive, axiomatic and statistical methods, what it has 
to say is reinforced in its clarity. As is apparent, for example, 
the reliance upon methodological individualism of a special type 
(utility maximisation) is a fundamental starting point, within 
and then beyond the market, ultimately being supplemented by a 
range of other more or less arbitrary motivations to suit particular 
applications. But what of the individual in the wider social capital 
literature, outside of economics?
Shorn of its origins in Coleman’s rational choice, the individual 
within the social capital literature tends to become a little, if not 
too much, more rounded. The pursuit of self-interest remains 
paramount. But, as with economics, this can be supplemented by 
other motivations and by social determinants at different levels, 
ranging from the family and neighbourhood through community 
to national culture of one sort or another. None of this tends to be 
closely examined. Instead, there is a presumption of relatively fixed 
mechanisms for relating the individual to the social, as well as for 
their co-evolution. And, not surprisingly, this is all underpinned 
by a positive spin. It is not just nostalgia for the lost world of 
social capital that has been romanticised, but also the role that 
individuals can currently play if they (or circumstances) would only 
bring out their sociability. As Tomer (2002) observes, social capital 
corresponds to the higher aspects of human life and functioning 
and, for Thomson (2005), it is a device for handling the alienation 
and anomie of the isolated individual, which can be traced back to 
Durkheim. For ‘social improvement through increased social capital 
does not require any fundamental economic or political transforma-
tions’. In short, this is all because ‘American social theories both 
assume individualism and fear its excesses’ (p.443).
The result, as already hinted, leaves individual motivation and 
its social origins underexplored. As Lebow (2005, p.287) notes, 
social capital shares this propensity with liberal institutionalism, 
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at best describing secondary processes as a manifestation of an 
underlying and unexplained propensity to cooperate (although 
institutions are required to preserve property against violent pursuit 
of self-interest). In short, ‘in their desire to offer parsimonious and 
“scientific” explanations for cooperation, both approaches denude 
the more complex framework from which they derive their deeper 
explanatory power’. There is a need to add reason and emotion 
and not just to rely upon the microeconomics of egoistic individuals 
primarily responding to external stimuli.
On reflection, these considerations raise serious questions about 
the nature of individual identity, how it is determined, how it is 
translated into action, and what subsequent consequences flow 
from this. As Servon (2003, p.15) observes, social capital, especially 
bridging social capital, is (or should be) inevitably bound up with 
identity and, ‘[i]n the anthropological literature, communities like 
this are said to be characterized by a plethora of cross-cutting ties 
– everyone is connected to everyone else in myriad ways’. There 
is also the issue of the origin of the needs served by social capital, 
for (citing Fraser 1989, p.163) these are formed with meaning, and 
are themselves interpreted by others, and filtered through socially 
legitimised discourse and practices. More generally, Body-Gendrot 
and Gittell (2003) argue that the much broader and richer notion of 
the individual encompassed by social citizenship – national identity, 
social status, participation and republicanism – is being substituted 
for by social capital. This is not unrelated to the hollowing out of 
social citizenship in practice by the rise of identity politics in the 
context of loss of welfare provision.
The vast majority of the social capital literature is cavalier on 
these issues. As Brickner (2000, p.105) puts it, ‘the capital in 
Putnam’s social capital is an underdetermined term with its moral 
stimulus cloaked in socioeconometrics … The problem with social 
capital is that it seductively presents itself as socioeconometrics 
while omitting its moral predilections’.20 Both an escape route from, 
and an illustration of, this veil of omission, is popularly provided 
through social capital’s use of game theory in general as a way of 
resolving these conundrums, with the prisoners’ dilemma to the 
fore (social capital is a solution, not least for Fukuyama (2001)).21 
Klabbers (2001, p.476) even suggests that our growing knowledge 
of game theory is itself a form of social capital for, ‘the participants 
become the co-owners of that knowledge. What a simulation and/
or game produce is to a large extent their social capital’. In other 
words, we learn about others and ourselves through game theory, 
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not least since, for Carpenter, experimental games can pin down 
behavioural patterns in response to incentives:
We have identified four experiments that are (relatively) easily 
adapted for use in the field, the trust game which measures trust 
and trustworthiness, the ultimatum game which measures the 
strength of norms and fairness and reciprocity, the dictator 
game which measures altruism and generosity and the voluntary 
contribution game which measures the propensity to cooperate. 
(2000, p.15)
Of course, ‘in the field’ signifies an enormous and unbridgeable 
gap between game theory and context (other than as defined by the 
game itself). There is no reason why behaviour should not vary as 
you move from game to game or, indeed, from game to real life, so 
fluid is behaviour by context.
But, as Murphy (2002, p.615) recognises, ‘it is imperative that we 
more closely examine and better elucidate the cognitive processes 
that enable individuals to trust outside narrow groups’. In other 
words, individuals reflect upon their circumstances and create 
understandings of them, and with which there are very complex 
relations to action and positive or negative outcomes. Thus, Roberts 
and Devine (2004) suggest that civic volunteering poses issues of 
formal participation and activism that may or may not be embraced 
by individuals who simply want to help out as opposed to being 
more widely and/or politically involved. Is activism motivated by 
commitment or antipathy to formal politics? – the answer surely 
depends both upon the substance of the politics itself and how this is 
internalised by the individual. And there are differences across socio-
economic strata: Williams (2003, p.75) discusses differences in how 
social capital might be mobilised ‘as sociability vehicles for higher 
income populations. Lower income households, perceiving these 
groups to be for people other than them, instead relying on one-to-
one reciprocal exchange … to access material support’. And, at a 
much grander level, Roberts (2004) refers to the isolated reciprocity 
of capital and labour under capitalism (suggesting resonances with 
possessive individualism). This imposes limitations on the extent 
to which there can be trust and reciprocity, given differences in 
the ethos of universal welfare systems: redistribution of wealth 
and democratic control of public services for labour as opposed 
to profits, flexible labour and private control of public services for 
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capital – although each, of course, attempts to persuade the other, 
with varying degrees of success, of its own ethos.22
These various observations about how the individual is poorly 
and weakly situated by the social capital literature come together 
in the treatment of trust. At one level, trust is simply seen as social 
capital. Individuals like to trust one another; they tend to do so 
within the family, but less so in the remoter layers of civil society. 
Trust is mutually reinforcing, and the more we experience and 
gain from it, the more of it we accrue and deploy. No wonder 
that Stolle (2003) no longer sees it as necessary to define social 
capital. It derives from everywhere – voluntary associations, the 
family, the state and political institutions – and, like the rain, it 
falls indiscriminately.
But, before unpicking this rosy picture of trust, it is worth 
questioning why it should have become more prominent in 
the social capital literature than other similar variables, most 
notably reciprocity and, especially within anthropology, the gift 
relationship.23 There is no reason in principle for this. Durston, for 
example, explicitly citing Mauss’s essay on the gift, asserts that
the concept of reciprocity is a central element of the social capital 
paradigm … For this reason, although reciprocity might at first 
sight seem to be a minor social phenomenon among many others, 
it is in fact the basis of social capital institutions in contexts like 
that of a peasant community. (1999, p.104)
However, as already argued in Chapter 5, by virtue of their origins 
in anthropology, gift and reciprocity sit uncomfortably within 
the social capital paradigm, once it has discarded Bourdieu and, 
with him, concerted attention to a coupling with both context and 
meaning.24 Trust, on the other hand, seems to have been much more 
amenable to the designs of social capital.
And, once again, we see within the literature how social capital 
degrades the concept of trust, but is not rejected as a consequence 
of this. First, Delhey and Newton (2003) unpick the notion of 
trust into two broad categories, as a property of individuals or 
of society. Individuals trust out of socialisation or out of pursuit 
of well-being. Society garners trust within individuals through 
voluntary organisations, networks, communities or social factors 
such as extent of conflict, extent of democracy, and so on. Different 
types of trust are associated with different outcomes in different 
countries, and ‘[t]he study of trust is bedevilled by the problem of 
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cause and effect’ (p.102). This necessarily casts doubt on the idea of 
a single measure of trust and a single relationship between trust (as 
social capital) and outcomes. Indeed, Delhey and Newton conclude 
that ‘individual social–psychological and demographic character-
istics are less likely to explain trust than objective and subjective 
measures of macro-social conditions and the strength of informal 
social networks’ (p.114). This complements the conclusions of an 
earlier study: ‘the theory claiming that there is a close connection 
between social and political trust, and a close connection between 
both of these and voluntary organizations on the one hand, and 
democracy, on the other, seems highly questionable’ (Newton 
2001–2, p.207).25
The thrust in these contributions is not to reject social capital 
so much as to qualify its influence. The same is true not only of 
different types of trust but also in how it is generated and deployed. 
But to ask for the mechanisms is to unravel the nature of trust 
and identify its different types: the deferential as opposed to the 
reflexive, the thick or dense versus the thin (Anheier and Kendall 
2002, p.348). Trust also differs by place, time and context (p.350), 
and in whether it is character-based (from background identity), 
process-based (from experiences of one another), or institutionally 
based (pp.350–1). To recognise the complexity of trust is essentially 
to set about reconstructing the breadth and complexity of social 
capital through its medium.
Such an exercise is bound to fail because, however far and wide, 
and deep, social capital is cast, it will prove unable to grasp the 
missing link that is essential to trust, as is brought out by Möllering 
(2006). He carefully lays out the nature of trust in terms of three 
standard approaches: one involving rationality or calculation of 
strategy in light of what is expected of others; a second focusing 
upon routine derived from attachment to institutions; and a third 
also inducing routine, but arising out of response to experience. 
Individually, or taken together, none of these is adequate to get to 
grips with trust. Indeed, each might be seen as a ground-clearing 
exercise in determining what is not trust. For Möllering, trust is 
something where calculation is not enough, where institutions need 
to gain or sustain credibility, not where they already have it, and 
where experienced routines retain elements of vulnerability and 
uncertainty (without which trust would not be necessary). Trust is 
not independent of rationality, calculation and routine, but requires 
something over and beyond each and all of them.
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This issue is, however, cleverly addressed, if not entirely resolved, 
in a remarkable earlier paper (Möllering 2001). Here he observes that 
most treatments of trust approach it from a functional perspective 
and, of these, relatively few examine its origins. Thus, across the 
literature, ‘[t]rust can be defined, first of all, as a state of favourable 
expectation regarding other people’s actions and intentions’ (p.404). 
It is derived from the experience of others. By contrast, drawing on 
a reading of Simmel on trust, it is perceived to include ‘a mysterious 
further element, a kind of faith, that is required to explain trust and 
to grasp its unique nature’. It is related to confidence, which can be 
given by money, but in its own dealings lies somewhere between 
complete ignorance and complete knowledge, the presence of either 
of which would eliminate the need for, or the possibility of, trust. 
Hence trust is highly nuanced and heterogeneous; it depends on 
a mixture of knowledge and ignorance and also, crucially, is not 
entirely inductive. Through Simmel, Möllering posits three elements 
that constitute trust – expectation, interpretation and ‘suspension’. 
The latter is associated with a leap of faith. By contrast, ‘current 
trust research is concerned predominantly with the land of inter-
pretation assuming (wrongly) that “good reasons” will inevitably 
produce trust (without a leap)’ (p.412).
Whilst suspension, then, departs from rational choice, nor is 
it blind hope. It involves ‘a duality of individual self-interest and 
social/moral embeddedness’, but one wedded to the interpreting 
individual: ‘The process of trust as such, however, ends with a state 
of expectations and begins with interpretation’ (p.415). This is to 
be distinguished from
probabilistic perspectives (from game theory to rational choice 
and so on) and positivist methods (quantitative methods and most 
types of survey or experiment) [which] are limited, because they 
predict a singular model of human interpretation. They cannot 
capture the arbitrariness of ‘good reasons’ which Simmel’s notion 
of trust entails ... The challenge is to grasp what from the point of 
view of the trustor constitutes ignorance, or the ‘unknowable’ ... 
[Thus] [t]rust is in danger of becoming an insignificant sociological 
concept, one that is easily subsumed under decision making and 
exchange theories, unless it is recognised that the problem of 
the ‘leap’ represents more than a quirky defect of an otherwise 
‘reasonable’ concept’ (pp.416–7).
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A number of points can be made about this reading of trust, and 
of Simmel. First, there is a wonderful and continuing parallel with 
trust as money. Simmel is (in)famous for having construed money 
as the great homogeniser (although, more accurately, he argued 
that the idea of money gives rise to the idea not the actuality that 
everything can be reduced to it). Like money, trust can be spent 
where you will. Second, the idea that trust depends upon a leap of 
faith, and resides within the individual (rather than deriving from 
external events), has parallels with Mauss’s treatment of the gift,26 
and reciprocity, a term that is heavily used as innocently and crudely 
as trust within the social capital literature. Third, whilst posing 
a deeper understanding of trust by virtue of an added subjective 
element, one that breaks out of the circle of the past to embrace 
new experience, the idea of suspension points to the problem rather 
than resolving it. What is this leap of faith, why does it arise in some 
people and not in others, and in some but not other circumstances, 
and why is it transferred, or not, between practices? No answer 
can be found within the individual alone, even if the question is 
located at this level and with suspension of (dis)belief to generate 
trust. For, fourth, already implicit in Möllering’s account is the 
dependence of suspension upon the individual’s ideology, how 
the world is interpreted. Fifth, Möllering’s account reveals what 
a simple view of humans has been constructed within the social 
capital approach, not least because of its predominantly functional 
foundations. They respond to the external world but they do not 
interpret it, and they recreate it in thought in highly contradictory 
ways. In reality, the meaning and exercise of trust, for example, is 
heavily bound up with the formation of identity, the understanding 
of self and its extrapolation, or not, onto others. At best, the social 
capital literature recognises associational activity and values that are 
sources of trust as involving identification with self (bonding), others 
(bridging) and those at other levels, possibly opponents (linking or 
vertical). But even joining a single association (from marriage to a 
trade union), or holding to a single value (from vegetarianism to 
freedom of speech), is highly complex, contradictory and shifting 
in meaning. Trust is not at all like money, with its homogeneity in 
transferability between objects in exchange.
Last, that trust depends upon ideology and how the system 
is understood by its participants means that analysis can only 
legitimately proceed from the sources of that ideology in the social 
system itself. This cannot be reduced to judiciously chosen measures 
of associational activity, questions about values, trust, or neigh-
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bourliness (usually for purposes of regression). Rather, any proper 
treatment of trust must locate individuals in their economic, political 
and social context – their class, gender and race, and so on.
8.5  concludInG reMarKs
In closing their contribution, Foley et al. (2001, p.273) ask ‘Is It 
Time to Divest Ourselves of Stock in the Social Capital Concept?’ 
and offer ‘a qualified “no”’, as long as ‘the context-dependent and 
social structural/relational approaches of Bourdieu and Coleman’ are 
adopted (p.274). Although not intended as such, this is a destructive 
amendment, certainly in practice and possibly in principle also. It 
depends upon a chalk-and-cheese combination of Bourdieu and 
Coleman, with the weaknesses of each, let alone the chaos in taking 
them together.
As this chapter has demonstrated, as soon as we look at Putnam, 
economics, the individual or trust, we find problems raised by social 
capital that, rather than being resolved, grow worse the more we 
pursue them. Unlike the stranger asking directions for a destination, 
who is told that it would be better to start the journey from 
somewhere else, we do have that option in theory. It is preferable, 
then, to divest ourselves of our stock in social capital.




This chapter has four purposes. First, Section 9.2 samples some of the 
new, and not so new, applications of social capital, to give a sense of 
the widening spread it has experienced, and continues to experience, 
as well as the critical tasks that face social theorists in undoing 
the damage it has caused. Topics covered include consumption, 
leisure, migration, the family, welfare, disaster, disability, gentrifica-
tion and religion. At most a taster is offered of each, in the hope, 
as suggested in the final section, that others with expertise in these 
areas will carefully deconstruct the way in which social capital has 
generally degraded both the subject matter and the literature that 
has previously been associated with it and will point to alternative 
ways of proceeding.
Second, Section 9.3 offers a discussion of some of the problems 
that have attended the measurement of social capital. These are 
recognised to be legion, but the nature of these problems is shown 
to derive from those of social capital itself rather than the more 
general problem of operationalising abstract concepts within 
social theory, which is often used to excuse the definitional and 
measurement issues surrounding social capital. Third, the failure, 
or inability, to measure social capital in any coherent way has also 
meant, as discussed in Section 9.4, that its deliberative presence 
within policy has been extremely limited, as opposed to its being 
used as a discursive rationale for policies that are, in a wide-ranging 
and substantial literature, found to be located somewhere between 
Third Wayism and neo-liberalism, at least to the extent that these 
are not identified with one another.
Last, the final section of the book reiterates the necessity of 
rejecting social capital, as it stands as an impediment in the way 
of understanding contemporary capitalism, including its preferred 
terrain of civil society. The most glaring symbol of social capital’s 
failings is that the global financial crisis has crept up upon it without 
so much as an inkling of acknowledgement. At least the same cannot 
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be said of globalisation. The most pressing problem facing civil 
society is whether it will allow itself to continue to be the slave of 
bankers and to pay for its own slavery, whilst individuals, no doubt, 
continue to reside in families, (mis-)trust politicians and one another, 
and engage in associational activity of one sort or another, with the 
partial promise of betterment within limits through cooperation. It 
was once said of socialism, and is now said of capitalism in joking, 
that it is all very well in theory but it just doesn’t work in practice. 
Sad to say, social capital is one step worse, and does not even work 
in theory.
9.2  flaVourInG But not faVourInG socIal capItal
As previously discussed in Chapter 5 in the context of (social) 
history, there are a number of topics in which social capital has 
made little headway, especially where more rounded social theory 
is liable to be present and/or required. This includes consumption.1 
This is despite the sociability that is involved, especially for food and 
eating (Hess 2007), from the family meal through dinner party to 
formalised banquet (and despite the highly publicised dictum that 
the family that eats together sticks together).2 Nonetheless, Bian 
(2001) puts forward the notion of guanxi capital, garnered from 
Chinese banqueting or social eating, and Pietrykowski (2004) poses 
the slow food movement as a form of social capital. This neglect, 
though, is unsurprising once recognising the postmodernist influence 
on the consumption literature albeit moving more recently to 
approaches based on material culture that continue to emphasise the 
social construction of the meaning of consumption (Fine 2002a and 
2005a). On a small scale, consumption has entered into the social 
capital literature through a set of contributions on its connection to 
leisure, especially gyms, but this has tended to focus on the role of 
leisure as source of network. There is though a small but lively, and 
generally reasonably circumspect, literature on leisure and social 
capital, in part inspired by the rise of leisure studies and in part 
by the rise of the gym as a site of sociability (see Blackshaw and 
Long 2005). The literature, mainly US, on social capital and sport 
in schools tends to be less critical (but see Arai and Pedlar 2003; 
Langbein and Bess 2002).
These are exceptional entries of social capital into the world of 
consumption and, presumably if implicitly, there would be more 
sympathy in the field for the judgement of Warde and Tampubolon 
(2002, p.155) that ‘social capital is a flawed concept and that 
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greater appreciation of the complexity and diversity of network 
ties is required to understand how personal connections influence 
consumption’. Otherwise, with the neglect of ethnography, the 
gift, Polanyi, and context as meaning, history, anthropology and 
consumption are marginalised by social capital, confined to casual 
reference and more likely attuned to Bourdieu, aptly dubbed the 
ghostly Banquo at the social capital banquet (Baron 2004; and 
see below).
Migration might be thought to be a fertile location for social capital, 
given its emphasis upon networks in both sending and receiving 
migrants. But it too benefits from considerable ethnographic and 
cultural input, which would discourage application of social capital 
as it has become; an early intervention stressing the limitations of 
the concept in studying migration was made by one of the leading 
scholars in the field, Portes (1998). Nonetheless, and unsurprisingly, 
there are excellent accounts of migration that jump the social capital 
bandwagon whilst offering sophisticated analyses of material and 
cultural factors that run against its common grain (see Babou 2002 
for an outstanding example; also Griffiths et al. 2005 for a critical 
use of social capital, BBBI in the context of refugees).
But the spread and depth of social capital is not only uneven by 
topic, the same is true of its geographical application. For some 
reason, possibly due to individual proselytisers, it has been especially 
prominent in Scandinavia and Australia.3 The appropriation and 
homogenisation by social capital of the cultural forms of sociability 
is unsurprising. It ranges from ujamaa in the context of coastal 
management in Tanzania (Torell 2002) to blat in eastern Europe 
(Korosteleva 2006); Boström (2002) likens the social capital 
underpinning lifelong learning in Sweden to Japanese kokuru. 
Whilst Zhao (2002) examines the role of social capital in finding 
re-employment in China, measured in part by the number of new 
year greetings cards sent and received, Knight and Yueh (2008) use 
own or parental membership of the Communist Party.
The nature of social capital as equivalent to an oxymoron induced 
me to suggest ‘It Ain’t Social and It Ain’t Capital’ (Fine 2001b); but 
subsequently I extended this to ‘It Ain’t Social, It Ain’t Capital, and 
It Ain’t Africa’ (Fine 2002c), examining the chaos that surrounds 
the application of the concept to the dark continent – a peg for 
research that could be used for other parts of the world. For social 
capital can only be applied in context by exposing its limitations. 
There is a significant literature on social capital and India, but for 
Morris (1998, p.8), it is ‘[l]ike heat in the chemistry experiment, 
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social capital speeds up the rate of reaction, making the system run 
faster and more smoothly’. And for Islam (2005), social capital 
provides the framework for BBI everything from Marx to Putnam 
to Indian rural organisation and social theory.4
Yet most of the literature finds it necessary to depart from 
traditional concepts of social capital, if not from social capital itself, 
in order to make it work for India.5 For Bhattacharyya (2002), it is 
a matter of making local democracy work, deploying ‘a redefined 
notion of social capital most suited to the specific situation … as 
democratic consciousness about citizens’ right as well as the state 
performance regarding the same’ (p.34). Putnam’s form of civil 
society is seen as unnecessary and, equally, as less likely to arise in 
non-western societies in light of their capacity to draw on ‘historical 
movements (national liberation, labour, peasants, socialism, ecology, 
students and so on)’. These may become formalised through the state 
and political parties and organisations as a condition of democratic 
electoral success. The result is that ‘[f]or the post-colonial societies, 
“democracy without associations” may be the rule rather than 
the exception’ (p.36). Indeed, ‘Without denying the importance 
of associations in making democracy work, this study has shown 
and argued that this act of associationalism may be performed by 
agencies not typically civil societies.’
Similarly, Dash (2004) takes his model from Kerala, with its need 
‘for mobilization and cooperation of government, political parties 
and civil society organizations’ (p.190): Kerala was declared the 
first totally literate state in India in April 1991 – before, it should be 
emphasised, social capital had ever been heard of. It is unfortunate 
that Heller’s outstanding study of Kerala (1995, 1996, 1999a and 
1999b) should have used social capital as a point of reference. His 
analysis, and his emphasis upon the role of class forces and state 
relations, runs entirely against social capital’s thrust, as is apparent 
from his reference to Kerala as a developmental state and to ‘Social 
Capital as a Product of Class Mobilization and State Intervention’, 
the title of the earliest of these three pieces.6 Das (2004 and 2005) 
also wishes to endow social capital with a class content in the 
context of rural India (see Chapter 7). Less explicitly in relation to 
class, Krishna (2001, 2002a, 2002b and 2007) has been concerned 
with the nature of the politics and the unique agencies that give rise 
to outcomes in India.
More generally, as it has evolved or, more exactly, expanded 
in scope of definition and application, social capital has become 
chaotic in content, and subject to the problems associated with 
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distinguishing cause and effect, and the conflation of determining, 
determined and conditioning variables. This has increasingly 
brought the salience of context to the fore, although this too has 
been deployed in weaker and stronger forms, raising the issue of 
whether one instance of social capital has any resonance with, let 
alone implications for, another. Indeed, one significant avenue along 
which the social capital literature has strolled, if not galloped, with 
at least implicit criticism of Putnam as a by-product, is the way in 
which the presence or taking account of some extra variable has 
the effect of nullifying or even reversing the supposed impact of 
social capital. I have dubbed this the plus/minus syndrome. It is 
recognised in principle in the social capital literature itself most 
explicitly through the idea of negative social capital, the distinction 
between bonding (within groups) and bridging (between groups), 
and the corresponding acknowledgement that social capital includes 
only by excluding, by whatever social characteristics, and that it is 
only romanticised as a positive-sum resource by setting aside power 
and conflict, across both those it includes and those it excludes. 
Considerations of class, race, gender, poverty, inequality, politics, 
morality, ethnicity and much more besides, inevitably allow all of 
this to be transparent. BBI these variables both adds to the social 
capital juggernaut in practice, on an individual case-by-case basis, 
and undermines it in principle if case studies are encompassed as 
a whole.
One area in which the tensions accommodated by social capital 
have been prominent is religion. On the one hand, there are those 
who wish to see social capital as a major source of beneficial 
outcomes, seeking to elevate the partnership of religion and social 
capital to a more prominent place (whether in emphasising and 
regretting mutual decline or in suggesting that the decline of social 
capital is not so dramatic if religion is properly taken into account). 
On the other hand, and increasingly so, emphasis has been placed 
on the complexities and diversities of religion itself and the ways 
in which it functions within society. (The religion and social capital 
literature has, however, had a decidedly Anglo-Saxon Christian 
bent.) The idea that religion is reducible to one element in the 
social capital lexicon becomes patently absurd. Thus, for Wuthnow 
(2002), religious involvement is not only civility, but also a source 
of status and presumed access to hierarchy, with social capital 
too amorphous ‘in reducing the complexity of the social world 
to a single concept’ (p.682). Further, Dodd and Gotsis (2007), 
to quote the abstract to their paper, examine ‘the interrelation-
Fine 01 text   188 26/11/2009   11:46
W(h)Ither socIal capItal?  189
ships between religion and enterprise. The authors find that these 
are highly context-specific, and will vary markedly over time and 
social setting, mediated by other sociocultural variables such as 
political structures and ideologies, and religious symbolism in the 
workplace’ (p.93).
Indeed, the good/bad (allowing for the dark side) and plus/minus 
syndromes are inevitable, with the corresponding nature and impact 
of social capital heavily contingent. I do not wish to demonise 
‘fundamentalism’, itself socially constructed; Lam (2002), however, 
amongst others, shows that religion, even the fundamentalist, has 
a positive association with civic activity.7 Schwadel (2005) points 
to the complexity of the role of the church, with the beliefs of 
conservatives often militating against wider social participation, 
other than on their own terms. ‘Simply put, what is preached 
from the pulpit and talked about in the pews influences church 
members’ activities, not just in the church but also outside the 
church’ (p.169).8 Unruh and Sider (2005), for example, appeal to 
the notion of religious social capital deriving from corporate social 
action, individual civic action, sharing of resources, and evangelism, 
as opposed to spiritual social capital based on beliefs, acknowledging 
that the drive for one may not be entirely compatible with the other. 
In other words, the reduction of religion to a resource is hopelessly 
simple-minded. On the other hand, religion has played a significant 
role in progressive liberation movements and the struggle against 
racism (and, obviously, in the fight against South African apartheid). 
All of these factors can only be taken into account by looking at the 
substance of belief and practice as well as at context – each of which 
tends to be obliterated by a homogenising social capital. Otherwise, 
how do we explain, as reported in C. Wood et al. (2007), that the 
trend to convert to Protestantism from Catholicism in Brazil reduces 
infant mortality by 10 per cent? How do we bridge, analytically 
let alone politically, even within the Christian tradition, let alone 
with other religions, across the divide created by the right to life? 
Social capital is too blunt and inappropriate an instrument for this 
and other matters.
And the same applies to discussion of social capital and welfare 
provision. Does social capital substitute for the latter’s absence? 
 – or vice versa? For Rothstein raises the question of whether the 
welfare state serves as a destroyer of social capital:
Have, as many have argued, the numerous and encompassing 
welfare programs made not only voluntary organizations but also 
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other forms of informal social relations and networks between 
individuals unnecessary and thereby fostered social isolation and 
anomie? Is there something like a ‘carving out’ effect so that more 
social programs mean less civil society and thereby less social 
capital? (2001, p.208) 
On the contrary, he argues that social capital and social welfare go 
together in Sweden, because the latter is more of an all-inclusive 
‘insurance’, without class-segregated, Bismarckian-type stigma and, 
he concludes, ‘people receiving support from the government cannot 
be portrayed as “the others” … and compared to means-tested 
programs, universal ones are far less likely to create suspicion that 
people are cheating the system’ (p.234).
This suggests that if we are to allow social capital, its relationship 
to welfare provision can only be unpicked by a sufficiently 
sophisticated study of the latter in its own right – something that 
is extraordinarily complex, and is contingent on both what is 
provided and how, to whom and where it is provided (see Fine 
2002a for a critique on this score of the welfare regime approach 
and Fine 2005b specifically in the context of social capital). Thus, 
Käärläinen and Lehtonen (2006) find different relations between 
various types of social capital and various types of welfare regime, 
and similarly for van Oorschot et al. (2005), who refer to the 
substitution and reinforcement hypotheses in the context of formal 
and informal ‘solidarity’.9
Similar issues of contagion, and hence complexity, contingency, 
and context, apply across other favoured areas of application for 
social capital. We need to unpick the family, for example, with 
Edwards (2004, p.16) making a start by opening up rather than, 
as has happened, ‘[closing] down on a range of issues concerning 
gender and generation’. She sees this, however, not as ‘a call for 
the jettisoning of social capital as a concept … [but as] a call for 
greater reflexivity in the use of social capital, intellectually and 
politically’.
The aim is welcome, but whether it would be realised in practice 
through social capital is a moot point. As Furstenberg suggests:
Before we can determine the relevance of social capital to the 
sociology of family and kinship, we must fill the gaps in our 
theoretical knowledge. For example, we still do not know how 
couples, parents, children, and groups generate, accumulate, 
manage, and deploy social capital. Neither do we know the 
Fine 01 text   190 26/11/2009   11:46
W(h)Ither socIal capItal?  191
consequences of social capital for the welfare of families and 
their individual members. To investigate these areas, we must 
replace the makeshift measures currently in use with measures 
that do not confuse social capital with the presumed consequences 
of access to same. With this attention to theoretical elaboration 
and careful measurement, we will discover whether the idea of 
social capital is fruitful or merely decorative. (2005, p.809)
There must be doubts about whether these worthy aims have been 
or can be achieved with social capital, with the literature (pushing 
to the extremes) more likely focusing on specific variables at finer 
levels of detail – social capital, for example, perceived as making for 
better fathering or step-fathering (Fagan et al. 2007 and Marsiglio 
and Hinojosa 2007, respectively). And familial social capital is 
itself a determinant of criminality. For Williams and Sickles (2002), 
deploying the presence of father and working mother as proxies for 
social capital, suggest that ‘[p]eer influences from youth have an 
enduring influence on criminality in adulthood … family structure 
is an important factor in criminal choice, with men in common 
law marriages more likely to engage in crime’ (p.505). Similarly, by 
perceiving crime as akin to a form of work, McCarthy and Hagan 
(2001) find that youth crime pays greater dividends in the presence 
of social capital (willingness to work cooperatively with others).10
Yet, crime is also a function of neighbourhood, itself a function 
of constructed space. Saegert et al., writing about New York, 
say that while their study demonstrates ‘the important role that 
within-building social capital plays in preventing crime in low-
income housing, there is still the broader question of preventing 
neighborhood crime’ (2002, pp.119–20). They go on, reasonably, 
to ask:
Is it the case, for example, that in buildings having higher levels 
of social capital, within-building crime is simply displaced to 
contiguous buildings having less social organization? Or do 
many well-organized buildings in a particular neighborhood 
lower neighborhood as well as within-building crime? These are 
clearly important questions, and, at the moment, we do not have 
the answers. However, the questions themselves raise important 
conceptual and policy issues.
Glaeser and Sacerdote (2000) suggest that large apartment blocks 
have more social capital through close association with immediate 
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neighbours, but this leads both to less civil participation because of 
internalised management and to crime being displaced to the street. 
And self-contained, high social capital apartment blocks may be 
associated with gentrification and opting out of neighbourhood 
schooling for private education elsewhere at the expense of the 
associational life that supports local state schooling (Butler and 
Robson 2001). In short, as Butler, concludes in a study of social 
capital in Barnsbury, ‘Gentrification has not so much displaced 
the working class as simply blanked out those who are not like 
themselves: they do not socialise with them, eat with them or send 
their children to school with them’ (2003, p.2484). Indeed, ‘only 
about half of the middle-class children are attending primary schools 
in the areas in which they live and none is in the borough’s secondary 
schools’. Not too much bridging social capital between the classes 
there then to promote educational achievement!11
Similarly, Carter (2008), in a study of Southwark in London, offers 
a heady and fascinating mix of gentrification, ghettoisation, crime, 
slum clearance, the dilemmas attached to provision of insufficient 
levels of public housing, intra- and inter-class and ethnic divisions, 
migration, and the politics and economics of urban renewal. He 
suggests in his abstract that ‘the narrow community that is capable 
of creating strong social capital will often be unwilling to share 
the benefits it creates’ (p.155). This might appear to offer an ideal 
example of bonding at the expense of bridging social capital. But the 
term ‘social capital’ does not appear again throughout his piece, and 
this is hardly surprising, for the explanatory factors listed preclude 
simple nostrums like appealing for more bridging social capital 
to overcome intense rivalries over access to resources, which are 
themselves played out against broader and national processes of 
economic, social and political change. Indeed, Carter appropriately 
concludes that, with housing programmes, for example, designed 
to support the worst-off, a negative outcome ‘was by no means 
inevitable; rather, it was an unintended, and cruelly ironic, 
consequence of 50 years of social intervention designed to build 
social solidarity’ (p.155).
Cyberspace offers equally insurmountable challenges to the 
social capital sledgehammer and has attracted a strong and rapidly 
growing set of contributions over the most recent period. There is 
an earlier presumption that Putnam had rounded up the Internet 
with television (because each uses an individualised screen perhaps), 
but his later work has become a little more sophisticated. As 
Williams puts it,
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scholars investigating the relationship between the Internet and 
social capital have been stymied by a series of obstacles, some 
due to theoretical frameworks handed down unchanged from 
television research … For example, the social interactions that 
occur through television are prima facie different from those that 
occur online. (2006, p.593)
Yet, Field reports,
Putnam devoted an entire chapter of Bowling Alone to this subject. 
Although he [now] accepts that the internet removes barriers to 
communication and thus facilitates new networks, he remains 
sceptical about its influence. In particular, he notes the emerging 
digital divide between those who are connected and those who 
lack the skills and equipment to enter cyberspace. Second, because 
online communication is casual and lacks the instant feedback of 
face-to-face encounters, it discourages reciprocity and facilitates 
cheating. (2003, p.101)
But the thrust of much of the literature is that these qualifications 
do not begin to get to grips with the complexities involved.
In the case of the digital divide, for example (or should that be 
digital divides?), Korupp and Szydlik (2005) find that, in Germany 
at least, this is related to reunification, ethnicity, gender, income, 
household composition, and class; and Borgida et al. (2002) suggest 
that the nature of and response to the digital divide depend upon 
whether the Internet is perceived as a private or a public good 
and, as such, is political in content. Numerous studies show that 
the Internet expands or reduces social capital with results that can 
be positive or negative, and are always contingent: for example, 
Sullivan et al. 2002 for (community) electronic networks; Aalto-
Matturi 2005 for trade unions and NGOs; Barzilai-Nahon and 
Barzilai 2005 for the complex relation to religious fundamental-
ism; and de Vreese 2007, p.207, for whom, ‘[c]ontrary to common 
wisdom … the young online consumer is also politically active’. 
Indeed, somewhat uncontroversially, ‘[i]t is not the time spent online 
… that matters but rather the activities that are undertaken’ (p.214). 
As Quan-Haase and Wellman (2004, p.126) put it, ‘[t]he fact that 
people are not interacting in visible public spaces does not mean that 
they are isolated’. And, for Huysman and Wulf (2006), it is a fallacy 
to separate the Internet from its environment, the individual from 
the group. The result is to acknowledge the salience of Bourdieu’s 
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approach to social capital and to bring in power and conflict, trust, 
cognition and embeddedness, and so on, with the Internet subject 
to the BBI syndrome (see also Fischer et al. 2004, Oxendine et 
al. 2007 for the importance of politics and context in how the 
Internet is introduced and used; Bærenholdt and Aarsæther 2002 
for the idea that locational proximity is not necessary for forming 
social capital; and Miyata and Kobayashi 2008 for the greater 
sociability associated with emailing by mobile phone as opposed 
to the Internet!)12
Not surprisingly, on the other, dark side of the digital divides, given 
its overtones of self-help and improvement through both costless 
cooperation and disregard for deeper determinants of disadvantage, 
social capital finds itself open to application for those in the more, 
or most recently, straitened circumstances. This began with the 
World Bank using social capital as the means to poverty alleviation, 
estimating that joining a burial society in a Tanzanian village might 
be six times more effective than female child education. Social 
capital has now become attached to disaster research, as observed 
by Carson (2004), including relief following the Asian Tsunami of 
2004. Those with more social capital do better (no doubt illustrated 
by the fate of the black population in New Orleans following the 
2005 flooding) – an observation which pays little attention to where 
disadvantage derives from in the first instance and whether it might 
not be better to address such underlying determinants. So social 
capital has been seen as an element in ‘coping’ strategies (Carter and 
Maluccio 2003; Jóhannesson et al. 2003, for example), and the same 
applies to those with disabilities (Pavey 2006; Bates and Davis 2004, 
for example). And environmental management is benefited by social 
capital. Pretty and Ward (2001, p.209) observe that in recent years 
over 400,000 groups with around 10 million members have emerged 
in ‘watershed, irrigation, microfinance, forest, and integrated pest 
management, and for farmers’ research’. These naturally make up 
social capital.13
9.3  Measure for Measure14
An extraordinary proliferation of empirical case studies has 
accompanied the social capital phenomenon, ranging from the 
highly specific and local to the general and national (although rarely 
the international). Consequently, it has been necessary to provide 
some empirical evidence for social capital in order to identify its 
presence or not (and, thereby, to gauge its consequences, and less 
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frequently, its causes). Not surprisingly, then, there has been a 
mini-industry setting about measuring social capital – individual 
researchers for their own case studies as well as concerted large-
scale national surveys. Such proliferation of measurement has 
attracted remarkably little critical attention. Researchers have just 
got on with it in individual case studies or even for (inter)national 
(government) agencies. In a rare exception, van Deth observes 
that the measurement of social capital in practice has been far less 
diverse than its conceptualisation, which, as has been seen, varies 
across almost every aspect of individual and social life. Van Deth 
himself points to the conceptual ranging over a number of divides, 
such as structural –cultural, individual self-perception as opposed 
to observer observation, individual–collective – and these too could 
be broken down into separate components. He concludes:
Surprisingly, the conceptual heterogeneity is much less reflected 
in operational and empirical heterogeneity than expected. The 
field is characterized by several orthodoxies, mainly related to 
the dominant position of polling methods and the use of straight-
forward survey questions. Available alternative approaches are 
limited to the use of official statistics as inverse indicators and to 
some experiments. (2003, p.79)
He appeals ‘for multi-method and multi-level strategies in order to 
strengthen the role of empirical evidence in the debates on social 
capital, civil society, and citizenship’. But, as has been emphasised 
throughout this volume, rescuing social capital by such devices is to 
acknowledge that it is not the homogenising, or unifying, concept 
that it purports to be from its initial starting point.
In addition, as Devine and Roberts (2003) observe, van Deth’s 
account is almost exclusively concerned with quantitative, as 
opposed to qualitative, measures of social capital. They reasonably 
point to the possibility that someone belonging to an association may 
participate but be alienated (although some degree of participation, 
if not its exact nature, can presumably be counted on in addition to 
membership itself). Once the qualitative is restored, measurement 
of social capital is, or has the potential of being, more or less as 
diverse as its conceptualisation, further compounding the problem 
of identifying what it is, does and how it is created. Yet, even on 
the quantitative side alone, van Deth accepts that ‘for many authors 
the actual meaning of the concept cannot be fixed a priori, since 
it arises in definite situations only’ (p.81). This seems to provide 
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a rationale for measuring social capital before, or as a means to, 
defining it.
As a result, van Deth is able to point to ‘a number of nasty 
questions that go far beyond the conventional quality assessments 
of measures in terms of validity and reliability’ (p.86), listing these 
as one pitfall after another: using proxies from existing data sets, 
and relying upon surveys designed for other purposes; substituting 
(self-)perception for observation (validity of self-reporting); 
using aggregated measures for collective concepts; using putative 
consequences of social capital to measure it; using the same index 
in different contexts; and using single instead of composite indices.15 
On this basis, it would be appealing as a critic of social capital to 
put forward a model of research (not followed by the literature) in 
which concepts are first defined, and then placed within theory that 
offers hypotheses to be tested against the evidence garnered from 
well-designed empirical work.
Whilst I do not want to go down this route, because neither 
individual nor collective research is or can conform to this model 
(not least because there are necessary tensions between concepts, 
theory and measurement, and corresponding relations between them 
that are interactive and continually reconstructed), it is significant 
how far social capital research diverges from established empirical 
procedures, and cannot converge upon them, so diverse and chaotic 
is social capital in definition. In short, it is not satisfactory simply 
to claim that the measurement and empirical problems that beset 
social capital are common across all social theory, since they are 
particularly severe for social capital. This is not just because of 
such problems in general, either in principle or in practice, but 
reflects the inadequacies of social capital itself as a concept and 
the way in which it has evolved. A promising area of research is to 
deconstruct how social capital has been conceptualised, measured 
and tested in light of the mutual interaction between these analytical 
procedures in a particular intellectual, ideological and policy context 
(see below).
One response, which I tend to favour in empirical work, is to 
use factor analysis to address the variables involved or, as van Deth 
puts it, to handle multi-dimensionality ‘by using sophisticated data 
reduction techniques’ (p.82). He is right to recognise that this is 
very rare in social capital research. What it would do is to take 
the various elements that purportedly make up social capital 
and test whether they do or do not mutually co-exist amongst 
themselves and across other factors that might not be construed as 
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social capital. But this is only to discover empirical regularities in 
particular circumstances and with particular causes, consequences, 
mechanisms and meanings that have to be examined, with little or 
no presumption of generalisation to other circumstances.
In other words, to put it in technical terms, it is possible to define 
the principal components in a factor analysis of a mix of variables 
as social capital. But that would mean that social capital would 
be different in each and every application, and the causes and 
consequences of such correlations would still require explanation. 
In more mundane terms, we are left with conclusions of the sort 
that: obesity is more prevalent amongst men with lower trust, but 
this is not the case for women; and smoking is more prevalent for 
both men and women with lower trust, but this is less significant 
if other factors are taken into account. These conclusions derive 
from ranges of survey questions (on levels of social capital) of the 
sort concerning safety in going out at night, loud parties in the 
neighbourhoods, drunks or tramps on the road, and so on.16 Such 
are the conclusions of a major household survey of social capital 
and health in the United Kingdom (Boreham et al. 2002). It’s a long 
way from ‘it’s not what you know but who you know that counts’. 
The journey would appear to have been wasted, possibly in and of 
itself in terms of teasing out the socio-economic and socio-cultural 
determinants of health, but certainly in taking social capital as 
guide and companion.17
9.4  socIal capItal as polIcY?
Despite its prominence across the social sciences, and its role as a 
panacea in curing all social and individual ills, there is remarkably 
little literature on social capital and policy. I mean this in the 
following very special and possibly narrow sense, because there 
is much literature saying that things, including policy, turned out 
well because social capital was present, and badly because it was 
not. But, where is the literature that says policy set out to create 
and/or to deploy social capital and demonstrably succeeded with 
the positive impact that was expected and intended? It is practically 
non-existent, and none springs to my mind as particularly prominent 
and convincing.
To some extent, this is to be expected, because social capital is 
at the outset supposedly located apart from the state and hence 
from policy. But getting things done through social capital is a little 
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indirect and possibly ineffective. As Raymond puts it in the context 
of the urgency of protection of an endangered species:
institutional mechanisms and political leadership can play an 
important role in encouraging collective action without relying on 
trust among cooperators. Besides their theoretical implications, 
the results suggest policymakers might spend more energy on 
creating incentives and assurance mechanisms to encourage 
collaboration, rather than the potentially fruitless task of building 
of social capital among rival stakeholders. (2006, p.37)
In addition, the presumption that social capital derives from civil 
society as opposed, or in opposition, to the state is wrong, with 
Brewer (2003), for example, finding, not surprisingly, that public 
servants have more civic attitudes than citizens in general. And, 
interestingly, Tittensor (2007) raises the issue of how social capital 
is created in light of its correlates such as health, employment and 
education. It might be better to provide these directly rather than 
through social capital. No one seems to be inclined to make such 
calculations.
Accordingly, it is not surprising that social capital should not have 
been authoritatively shown to be a positive instrument (and goal) 
of policy. It has, though, been extraordinarily prominent in policy 
discourse, from the highest down to the humblest levels, not least in 
offering both analytical and policy panaceas. As if to parade both 
its neo-liberal credentials and its aversion to them, social capital has 
been successively adopted by Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, not 
least through the social capital entrepreneurship of Robert Putnam, 
who is often reported to have enjoyed breakfast audiences with the 
(Anglo-Saxon) world leaders. As Arneil (2006) reports in detail, in 
the wake of 9/11, something that Putnam (2002) saw to have the 
potential to restore US social capital, the notion was explicitly and 
slavishly adopted by the Bush administration, which demanded, 
and heavily funded, voluntary public service for civic action (closely 
identified with national security), as well as making the sinister 
exhortation that one should keep an eye on one’s neighbours.
More generally, the policy literature on social capital has been 
explicitly and most heavily associated with discursive support for 
neo-liberalism in action. For Mohan and Mohan (2002), it is a flag of 
convenience used by centre-right governments as a means of setting 
aside material circumstances in addressing social problems. Cheshire 
and Lawrence (2005) see social capital, community, and democratic 
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participation as the complicit responses to the individualism of neo-
liberalism, deploying the example of regional policy in Australia, 
where social capital has been unusually prominent. But, appropriately 
in light of the timing and content of its rise to prominence, it is more 
usual for social capital to be critically seen either as a marriage 
with, or as formed by, Third Wayism. Craig and Porter (2005) and 
Robison (2003 and 2004) have explicitly interpreted it as a way 
of promoting some form of compromise between neo-liberalism 
and Third Wayism. For Amin, in its use of social capital ‘the Third 
Way has thrown its weight behind the prosperous, redefining its 
duty of care to the less prosperous as a duty of moral improvement 
and community empowerment’ (2005, pp.629–30). He generously 
suggests that, in a sense,
the unwitting result has been to squeeze the social into a narrow 
channel depositing social capital and the like as a tonic for those 
in need of regeneration, accompanied by an impoverished and 
utilitarian but largely ineffective understanding of the political 
and the democratic. (p.630, emphasis added)
Edwards (2004) notes that Third Way social capital approaches 
to the family have replicated stereotypes rather than challenging 
them.18 Merrett (2001), in a case study of non-metropolitan areas of 
Illinois, disputes the idea that the decline of welfare provision under 
neo-liberalism can be compensated for by the spontaneous rise of 
social capital to fill the gap, as neither organisation nor finance exists 
to support it. And for Lister (2003), social capital underpins the 
Third Way shift to social investment in the child as citizen–worker 
of the future as opposed to being a policy perspective guided by the 
more progressive and welfarist notion of the citizen–child.
Similarly, for White (2002) for example. He notes that social 
capital serves as a metaphor for social relations, but with an incom-
patibility between the approaches of Bourdieu and Putnam, and 
perceives the latter as furnishing the basis for Third Wayism. He 
advises heeding Foucault’s insight, ‘Power relations are rooted in 
the system of social networks’ (p.268). The intellectual pendulum 
has, however, swung so far against Foucault in the retreat from 
postmodernism that, despite the social engineering associated with 
social capital, his presence is almost totally absent in the literature, 
including the critical.19 It is to be suspected in addition that, from 
a Foucauldian perspective, social capital is too easy a target to 
warrant the trouble of taking critical aim at it.
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Nonetheless, the role played by social capital in defining away 
power and conflict, and both highlighting and marginalising the 
disadvantaged whilst rendering the privileged invisible, is a persistent 
theme. As Purdue (2001) acknowledges of social capital in the context 
of leadership in neighbourhood regeneration partnerships, there are 
problems of trust and collaboration, from planning to implementa-
tion, from one leader to another and across different parts of the 
community, and both inside and outside.20 Hence, ‘social capital 
was used in competition and conflict as well as in collaboration and 
community development’ (p.2222). More critically, for Baron, who 
sees social capital as a Macbeth of sorts,21
[t]he Banquo at this new policy feast was, of course, Bourdieu. 
There is little sense in [Gordon] Brown’s vision of the social 
and cultural mechanisms by which dominant classes maintain 
their dominance and how these power processes articulate with 
economic power. (2004, p.8)
This gives rise to a pathology of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ social capitalists 
and the dispossessed and problematic ‘social proletarian’, with both 
social science survey design for social capital and policy suffering 
an elision ‘from being defined in terms of the literature’s triad of 
networks, trust and norms into an ever expanding metaphor for 
“social problems”’ (p.11). Saegert (2006) emphasises how building 
cooperative community initiatives is liable to be at the expense of 
marginalised groups, who need to organise to challenge existing 
power structures rather than to cooperate with, or defer to, them.
There is, then, a sense in which social capital borders on the 
utopian in its vision of individuals, communities and politics. For 
Avis (2002, p.315), ‘social capital … has a number of weasel-like 
qualities’. He suggests that, in the face of the knowledge economy, 
Third Wayism is an amalgam of post-Fordism, collective intelligence 
and learning (all also weasels), and has a radical content and appeal 
in its democratic objectives. But it is limited, because it ‘seeks to 
create a moral community organised around a settlement based 
upon a collective intelligence, a settlement that would apparently 
reconcile the conflicting interests of a range of constituents – labour, 
capital, ecological movements and so on – enabling economic 
competitiveness’ (p.321), with social capital (and Third Wayism) 
conveniently forgetting to suit the systemic dependence of capitalism 
upon extraction of profitability.
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Walters (2002) pinpoints all of this and more in terms of social 
capital as ‘re-imagining politics’. Social capital is located both 
at individual and collective (cultural) levels but, ‘social capital 
assesses politics in terms of social norms of performance rather 
than ideological legitimacy’ (p.386), not least because ‘a key presup-
position of social capital theory is of the actor as a self-interested 
maximizing individual’. In the context of a state–society duality, 
social capital also holds out the promise of self-governance, as 
opposed to ‘an image of politics as a system defined by the poles 
of elites and the governed. With social capital this stark polarization 
gives way to an image of the polity as a much more horizontal space 
of multiple communities’ (p.388). He describes this in terms of a 
shift from a bio-politics – governing health, education and welfare 
in all its aspects – to an etho-politics, involving the population’s 
trust, civility, volunteering, communalism, and so on, which become 
manageable aspects of the system. ‘Social capital brings the ambition 
of positivity and calculability to ethopolitical discourses … it offers 
a quantitative rendering of the ethical field, all the better to enhance 
its governability. It purports to make trust and civility measurable’ 
(p.390). It conforms comfortably with divisions between normal 
and pathological, sane and insane, social and antisocial, employed 
and unemployable, excluded and included, and civic and uncivic 
(p.392). And, unlike previous political theory, ‘with social capital, 
this stagist, developmental trajectory is not evident. Across space 
and time, all societies are analysable in terms of social capital’ 
(p.395). And, as far as the World Bank and other international 
agencies are concerned, ‘it could be that social capital will offer 
them another way to express concern for social injustices, but in 
such a way that they are not required to address the thorny matter 
of economic exploitation’ (p.394; see Chapter 6).
With social capital a cure-all confined within civil society, it 
has captured discourses about communities, decentralisation, 
participation, and so on, in this rose-coloured and analytically 
blinkered etho-politics, albeit posing, in Blair’s words, as tough 
but fair. The critical literature, attached to close case studies, has 
demonstrated how the processes and outcomes do not match 
the rhetoric. Mooney and Fyfe’s study of development around 
a swimming pool in Glasgow is representative of a growing but 
heavily outnumbered literature on the dark side of the force around 
social capital. In it they argue that,
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[a]gainst a background of globalization, neo-liberalization and 
the demise of the Keynesian/Beveridgean welfare state, neighbour-
hoods are largely viewed … as arenas where developers, realtors, 
lending institutions, and a host of other private ventures extract 
profit and instigate a particular vision of the city … Arguments 
advanced from within the community about use-value of the pool 
in terms of its contribution to local social welfare were simply 
deemed illegitimate. (2006, p.148)
For Flint and Kearns (2006), in a study of housing policy in 
Scotland, especially the creation of registered social landlords, the 
emphasis on social capital has to be set against the arguably more 
important impact of material deprivation, and the corresponding 
role that might be played in mobilising consent and cooperation 
if this were addressed. Even so, heightened tensions can arise out 
of conflict between marginalised groups for access to improved 
facilities, suggesting that both bonding and bridging capital are 
insufficient and ambiguous in their effects unless account is taken 
of the broader internal and external conditions. Flint and Kearns 
observe the tension ‘between the emphasis on social cohesion and 
community empowerment at neighbourhood level and a neo-liberal 
economic focus on competitiveness and entrepreneurialism at city 
and national levels’ (p.52).
In a more favourable vein, Bridgen (2006) suggests that attention 
to social capital means that addressing health inequalities and 
primary health care may be put on the agenda, but acknowledges 
that this is placed in jeopardy by high workloads, auditing and 
performance targets, and the search for quick fixes at the expense of 
local public participation. In contrast, Gewirtz et al., in the context 
of English ‘education action zones’, conclude that
progressive sentiments are not enough … policy and practice 
needs not only to be responsive to the material constraints faced 
by those defined as socially excluded but also must be based 
on, and informed by, respect for the values and choices of these 
people. (2005, p.670)
Similarly, in the context of leisure services and the prospect 
of communitarianism that underpins social capital as policy, 
Blackshaw and Long perceive ‘an inconsistency in the protestations 
of promoting trust at the local level while successive governments 
have centralised power’ (2005, p.254). In contrast to responding to 
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how people live their lives, a mythical world of civic communitarians 
is created. For
the once emancipatory welfare services can too easily become a 
second-rate and repressive regime, subject to the ‘gaze’ of those 
employed by the state: the social services officer, the community 
sports development worker, the doctor, the social worker, the 
probation officer, and so forth that collectively ‘police’ the ‘flawed 
consumers’. (p.254)
Further, Shortall (2004), in a study of Northern Ireland, concludes 
that ‘the social capital debate gives renewed impetus to a romantic 
naive view of rural communities, where civic harmony and inclusion 
triumphs and there is little room for power struggles, exclusionary 
tactics by privileged groups, or ideological conflicts’ (p.110), with 
these being ‘transferred by the state to sub-national levels’ (p.120), 
and having limited power for addressing problems at the local as 
opposed to the central level of government. Shortall questions 
whether partnerships are empowering simply ‘because they are local 
and moving power away from centralised bodies’ (p.120). Jones 
and Gray (2001) see social capital as potentially underpinning the 
positive side of decentralised employment initiatives; but, in practice, 
this turned out to be little more than Third Way rhetoric wedded 
to local ‘workfarism’, with benefits conditional on employment 
activity. Lowndes and Wilson (2001) note that Putnam is light on 
the mechanisms through which social capital does its work and, 
in particular, neglects the role played by state institutions and 
politics because of his society-centredness. In the context of local 
government, they point out that participation in practice is not the 
same as benevolent social capital in principle, but can be managerial 
(what do ‘customers’ want?), instrumental (meeting statutory 
requirements), tokenistic (window-dressing) or cynical (to legitimise 
the unpopular). Even the local museum can no longer be taken for 
granted in the age of social capital; for ‘current government policy 
aimed at “building social capital” in both Britain and Australia 
expects museums to prove that they “make a difference” in terms of 
long-term social impact’, rather than being valued for their intrinsic 
worth as public goods (Scott 2006).
The Third Way and the Third Sector also come naturally together 
with social capital, Fyfe (2005) possibly unwittingly suggesting 
a two-Thirds society. The consequences are at their sharpest in 
transition economies. For Korosteleva (2006), in much of the new 
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Europe social capital plays the role of impeding the formation of 
genuine democratic rights, and it undermines protest for human 
rights and against abuse and oppression by offering ‘a method 
of keeping discontent under control by diverting the grievances 
and dissatisfaction to informal infrastructures that can deal with 
specific concerns more efficiently’ (p.186). And for Kovách and 
Kučerová (2006), a ‘project class’ has emerged to benefit from, 
and take advantage of, attempts to build social capital in Hungary 
and the Czech Republic.22 Of course, NGOs as well as favoured 
donor recipients benefit from the social capital they garner and 
promote. For Sundar (2001, p.2009), in the context of Indian 
forestry and the World Bank’s search for local-level bridging social 
capital, ‘in practice neither the Bank nor state governments have 
made attempts at wider consultations with forest dependent people’, 
preferring contact only with experts and bureaucrats. Much the 
same story is true for linking social capital, with selective exclusion 
of NGOs and people’s organisations except where these are small 
and uncritical. Further, current policies of devolution are now 
being opposed by those who have long campaigned for lower-level 
democratic participation, as this is being manipulated to legitimise 
the displacement of local inhabitants from forest land and the 
reallocation of this land to the forestry department (see Chapters 
5 and 6 for more on development and transition).
And last, but by no means least, as Harrison (2006) puts it in 
an article about the ‘new regionalism’, social capital takes time 
to cement and cannot be put in place by fiat and, whilst it can be 
used to gloss over complexity in policymaking, ‘an economic and 
democratic dividend can be achieved through the occupation of the 
institutional voids by weaker economic groupings and civic based 
third sector organisations’ (p.35). Indeed,
although concepts such as social capital are not always deployed 
accurately, its place is relatively secure as a useful mechanism for 
both academics and policy-makers … many of the relations and 
concepts that new regionalists promote do indeed have inherent 
flaws, but bearing these in mind and not shelving their existence 
can still enable pertinent theoretical insights to avail from the pens 
of scholars prepared to engage in such debates. (p.43)
Given both the depth and breadth of the flaws appropriated by 
social capital and its role in legitimising rather than making policy, 
this is more wishful thinking than anything else.
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9.5  the last Word – aGaIn
Throughout this book, the recurring theme has been how social 
capital has degraded social theory. In part, this is because it has 
failed to acknowledge, let alone to debate with, its critics. But, on 
occasion, the problems with social capital are recognised by its 
proponents and the concept is defended, although this is much rarer 
in print than in person. I want to focus on two responses that are 
particularly prominent. The first is that social capital is no different 
from other concepts used widely across the social sciences. Rothstein 
and Stolle put it as follows:
Whilst much of this criticism has been valid and necessary to 
improve the research, it is also obvious that social capital does 
not differ from many other central concepts in the social sciences 
when it comes to problems of definition, let alone measurement. 
(2003, p.2)
The ‘other concepts’ include ‘power’, ‘oppression’ and ‘violence’.
The implication is, of course, taken to be obvious, that just as 
we would balk at removing power, oppression and violence from 
the social science lexicon, so we should refrain from discarding 
social capital. But this is not a valid argument. Our commitment 
to these concepts is not because they are difficult to define and 
measure but because they capture a universal reality that we wish to 
incorporate. Nor would these concepts be deployed as an analytical 
starting point; but they would always be endowed with context and 
substance. The problem with social capital is not that it is hard to 
define and measure, but that why and how this is so is a reflection 
of the legion analytical deficiencies that it displays in practice, not 
least that it tends to preclude the presence of power, oppression 
and violence other than as an afterthought. The validity of concepts 
must surely be disputed on the basis of their substantive content, 
not the unfortunate, possibly inevitable, properties that they do or 
do not share in common.
Secondly, social capital has been defended on the grounds that 
it gets to grips with an aspect of social theory and reality that 
would otherwise be, or has been, overlooked. It addresses the role 
of civil society as opposed to the state and the market. I consider 
this to be sheer mythology in two separate senses. On the one 
hand, the literature on civil society is extremely extensive and has 
anticipated everything that social capital has had to say and much 
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more besides. On the other hand, social capital has parasitically 
replicated such contributions through reducing their content. In 
any case, if civil society is our object of study, social capital is not 
the way to go about it.
That is unless the social is to be understood, incorrectly, as 
founded upon the three separate elements of state, market and 
civil society. Then we can make a start with social capital and BBI 
economy and the state. One problem, as seen within the social capital 
literature itself, is that the boundaries between these three elements 
become blurred, with social capital reaching out to incorporate 
its determinants and consequences as part of itself. By the same 
token, social capital is fractured by the standard divisions of social 
theory across class, race, gender, and so on. As is only too apparent, 
without a proper specification of the social and of capital, and their 
mutual interaction within capitalism, social capital promises what 
it cannot deliver – cooperative gains without reference to properly 
specified power, oppression and violence.
These remarks are brought home forcibly by the severity of the 
financial crisis that continues to unfold at the time of writing. Is 
it too much of, and too unfair, a pastiche to suggest that the way 
out of the crisis is for there to be more bridging and linking capital 
between finance and the rest of us, and between governments and 
finance? And, otherwise, for the rest of us to help one another out 
as best we can? I am reminded of my favourite quote from Sir Josiah 
Stamp, formerly a director of the Bank of England, and reputedly 
the second-richest man in England in the 1930s:23
Banking was conceived in iniquity and was born in sin. The 
bankers own the earth. Take it away from them, but leave them 
the power to create money, and with the flick of the pen they will 
create enough deposits to buy it back again. However, take it away 
from them, and all the great fortunes like mine will disappear 
and they ought to disappear, for this would be a happier and 
better world to live in. But, if you wish to remain the slaves of 
bankers and pay the cost of your own slavery, let them continue 
to create money.
Is it accidental that the social capital literature should have engaged 
scarcely at all with either globalisation or finance, let alone the 
elites they serve?
What Stamp is pointing to are the illusions created by the failure 
to see the bigger picture, not least the powers that reside in the 
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establishment, even if in his case this was confined to banking. But 
like money, globalisation and McDonald’s in the age of financialisa-
tion, social capital is getting everywhere.24 Some, often producing 
outstanding analyses, have argued that social capital can be rescued 
from its deficiencies by BBI whatever has been left out. Others 
have been more opportunistic, accepting that social capital has a 
presence, and so they might as well join it rather than fight it. I beg 
to differ, and insist not only that social capital should be critically 
addressed, but that it should be discarded as a result. This is not 
simply a matter of occupying the intellectual high ground; if social 
theory is to flourish, it is a necessity.
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chapter 2
 1. I also used ‘male’ and ‘female’ in place of ‘gender’. The search engine used in 
this case, provided by BIDS (Bath Information and Data Services), recognised 
an asterisk (*) in search strings to specify truncated versions of similar words – 
‘segments’ and ‘segmentation’, and ‘consumer’ and ‘consumption’, for example 
– and an ampersand (&) to specify that both terms are to be present.
 2. For similar exercises, see Fine (1990) on the British coal industry, and Sato 
(2005) on the South Korean steel industry.
 3. As Akçomak interestingly reports, ‘20 years ago there were about 0.1 social 
capital articles per human capital article but now there are 1.2 social capital 
articles per human capital article’ (2009, p.2).
 4. See also Laird (2006) on social capital as ‘pull’, with a historical reductionist 
narrative reduced to this notion, ranging over magnates, the success, but also 
the exclusion, of women and Afro-Americans, stereotyping and how to use 
it, affirmative action as ‘synthetic social capital’, and self-help. In short, as 
Laird writes in closing, ‘Revealing the existence of social capital and how it 
works embeds individuals’ stories into their social and cultural context. These 
newly enriched narratives highlight the consequences of differential access to 
social capital and the benefits of synthesizing it on behalf of the meritocracy 
of our ideals … It may be that reaching the perfect balance of individual and 
social factors for success in business – making America truly the land of equal 
opportunity – is a dream. But it remains the American Dream’ (p.338). See 
McNamee and Miller (2004) for a different take on the meritocracy myth.
 5. Not surprisingly, the longest ‘chapter’ by far in this book is the last, the 
references!
 6. Further mini-surveys were undertaken as the book was being completed around 
the end of 2008.
 7. See Islam (2003), Durlauf et al. (2005) and Rodriguez (2006), for example. 
There is a stunning parallel with the literature on total factor productivity, 
in which its change over time tends to be explained by the incidence of, for 
example, market imperfections, contradicting the basis on which what is to be 
explained has been constructed. See above on South African coal.
 8. Actor-network theory (ANT), for example, has tended unscrupulously to 
abuse others for deploying an artificial division between the social and the 
natural, reading the literature through the very division that it itself rejects 
(Fine 2004c).
 9. Unfortunately, copyright obstacles prevented the use for the cover of this book 
of the image of Morgan Spurlock spewing out McDonald’s chips (French fries), 
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10. On Becker and Bourdieu, see Fine (1999b). For fuller account of economics 
imperialism, see Fine and Milonakis (2009) and visit www.soas.ac.uk/economics/
research/econimp/ for more references.
11. See also my earliest published piece on social capital (Fine 1999a).
12. See especially Fine et al. (2001) and Jomo and Fine (2006), but also Fine 
(2008c).
13. Here is another typical example from Schuller (2007, p.15), citing Halpern 
(2005), the leading adviser to Blair and New Labour on social capital: ‘Halpern 
uses the vitamin metaphor to argue that a healthy and effective community 
… needs a blend of different types of social capital, just as a body physically 
needs a mix of different kinds of vitamins. Excessive ingestion of any single 
vitamin will not only not produce good health; it can also have the opposite 
effect. Similarly, a single form of social capital … is not enough on its own, 
for meaningful measurement or for the development of effective policy.’ So, as 
long as McDonald’s is part of a healthy diet …
14. There are, of course, defenders of McDonald’s, including those who would 
wish to discredit Morgan Spurlock (see www.spurlockwatch.typepad.com/). But 
see also Tschoegl (2007), whose abstract boasts, ‘McDonald’s brings training 
in management, encourages entrepreneurship directly through franchises and 
indirectly through demonstration effects, creates backward linkages that develop 
local suppliers, fosters exports by their suppliers, and has positive external 
effects on productivity and standards of service, cleanliness, and quality in the 
host economies’, all of this in the context of development. It seems that social 
capital plus McDonald’s is the missing link to all success.
15. In googling on ‘social capital’ and ‘turtle’ to obtain this address, I turned 
up numbers of academic articles on social capital and turtles (frequently in 
metaphoric conjunction with hares). See Lei (2008), for example, on how to 
be successful in business in China.
16. But, by the same token, Pagett (2006) sees social capital as an inducement to 
neglect the language of home or origin and, presumably, the same can apply 
to accents.
17. Possibly to be pipped at the post by the study of the social norms on the Titanic 
which allowed for ‘women and children first’ (Frey et al. 2008). (This was 
discovered through the excellent social capital website run by Fabio Sabatini at 
www.socialcapitalgateway.org/; see the list of the new papers organised under 
the umbrella of social capital at http://lists.repec.org/mailman/listinfo/nep-soc 
for evidence of the concept’s widening scope of application and influence.)
18. The idea of middle-range theory derives at least from Merton (1957), but 
is hardly explicitly prominent these days. For its application in the case of 
segmented labour market theory, and the corresponding dangers of becoming 
middle-brow, or even low-brow, see Fine (1998a).
19. See Schuller (2007, p.14) for an implicit account of social capital as middle-
range:
1. One of the key merits of social capital is that it shifts the focus of analysis 
from the behaviour of individual agents to the pattern of relations between 
agents, social units and institutions.
2. It offers a link between micro-, meso- and macro-levels of analysis.
3. It encourages multi-disciplinarity and multi-professionalism, through its 
broad appeal and potential application.
4. It reinserts value issues into the heart of social science discourse.
5. It has significant heuristic capacity.
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20. Despite their emphasis on the chaos, they explicitly reject my recommendation 
to discard social capital, preferring to modify it by bringing back in sounder 
foundations (but see Chapter 4).
21. By contrast, see Hauser (2007, p.84) for whom ‘[s]ocial capital is not an 
appropriate term for empirical analyses because it consists of multiple 
independent dimensions. Scientific hypotheses should be formulated with 
respect to specific dimensions rather than to the too general notion of social 
capital’.
22. See below for a plethora of capitals, with relational capital and systemic capital 
as likely candidates. See also Lorenzen (2007, p.801) who, in the context of 
the relatively narrow goal of analysing localised learning, offers a ‘relatively 
narrow definition’ as ‘“social relations” … connections among two or more 
agents … persons (individuals), but these often represent the organisations 
(firms) in which they are employed’.
23. For Onyx (2005, p.3): ‘The point is not that some of these definitions or 
components are correct and others incorrect. Social capital, we are coming to 
understand, is a complex and multi-layered concept. Within the broad scope 
of social capital there are probably some elements that are core and others 
that are effects of the core. We are not yet in a position to clearly delineate the 
boundaries of the concept (any more than we can do so for concepts such as 
“beauty” or “governance” or “intelligence”.’ Together with Dale (2005a and 
b), Onyx sees a need for social capital to address or incorporate inequality, 
power, exploitation, political economy, wider structural, economic, political 
and national factors, and vested interests, expertise, alienation, distrust, 
disconnection, anomie, separation, empowerment, relationship, connection, 
reciprocity, communication, deliberative dialogues, reconciliation, engagement, 
trust, cooperation, collective norms, knowledge diffusion, shared futures, voice, 
commitment, stakeholders, diversity and leadership – all in pursuit of a dynamic 
balance between social capital and sustainable community.
24. See ‘The Foresight project on Mental Capital and Well-Being’ at http://
carycooperblog.com/2008/10/23/the-foresight-project-on-mental-capital-
and-well-being-delivers/. But note how Wieloch (2002) appeals to the idea 
of ‘oppositional capital’ in the context of pro-drug groups and their use of 
popular culture. And Sabatini (2005, p.13) notes that the Dictionary of Political 
Economy at the beginning of the twentieth century includes ‘the Law, the 
Church, Literature, Art, Education, an Author’s Mind’. So, presumably, each 
of these is a potential source of (social) capital.
25. Note that Freitag (2003) finds that, as a result of its cantons, Switzerland has 
high levels of social capital in the form of trust even though it is extremely 
impoverished in associational life. See also Akkerman et al. (2004) for the 
Netherlands. In the business world, hierarchical ties to social capital are 
networked very differently (Jack et al. 2004, for example, and in EU governance 
for water provision, Kaika 2003). See discussion of linking social capital in later 
chapters as a way of bringing back in the state, vertical relations and hierarchy, 
especially Chapter 9 on social capital and policy. 
26. See Moore (2001) for a more general critique of the incorporation of such 
notions as empowerment and participation into social theory in anaesthetised 
forms.
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27. Note that Ritzer (2003) himself has now moved on to the idea of ‘globalisation 
of nothing’ indicating both that the local remains salient and that the global is 
degrading.
chapter 3
 1. Bourdieu’s understanding and critique of mainstream economics seems to 
have remained anchored in its simplistic representation as pro-market, with 
no recognition of the market-imperfection varieties of economics and their 
increasing significance over the past 20 years.
 2. Interestingly, Merton (1957) proposes middle-range theory as a compromise 
between these two extremes, on both of which he is tart in commentary.
 3. Although this is fully documented in Fine (2001a, ch.5). For a partial exception, 
see Lazega and Pattison (2001) and Seppola (2004, p.31); the latter suggests 
that social exchange theory ‘has been used extensively by marketing scholars 
to explain business-to-business relational exchange’.
 4. Quoted in Amadae (2003, p.151).
 5. For fuller discussion, see Fine and Milonakis (2009).
 6. Discovered through citation in Amadae (2003, pp.151–2), emphasis added.
 7. James Buchanan, ‘Moral Community, Moral Order, or Moral Anarchy’, Abbot 
Memorial Lecture, no.17, Colorado College, Colorado Springs, 1981. The title 
gives away all you need to know, that social morality (of which social capital is 
a part), not the market, is the foundation of society, and that the United States 
is losing it. Note that this lecture was delivered a few months after President 
Reagan took office. 
 8. As evidence of his extraordinary conservatism, Coleman (1993, p.1) begins 
this contribution on the rational reconstruction of society with a vision of the 
past, as he accompanies his son in ‘a canoe trip down the Wisconsin River 
and a portion of the Mississippi … in a setting much like that experienced by 
Indians’, invoking family bonds in a world without commerce, urban life and, 
it should be added, native Americans.
 9. For the opposite view, in which social capital compensates for the market, see 
Marysse (1999, p.24) for, ‘in an era of triumphant and unrivalled capitalism’ 
in which ‘unfettered pursuit of self-interest is overlooking a whole domain 
where people’s well-being in markets, liberalisation and globalisation do not 
have a solution … Social capital brought cultural, social and historical factors 
back in the picture saving us from a disease that could be called the reduction 
of society to monoeconomics’.
10. See Fine and Milonakis (2009) and references therein.
11. The ‘newest’ economics imperialism takes the form of adding supplementary 
factors to the newer, whether based on the individual or not, giving rise to dirty 
models (Fine and Milonakis 2009).
12. See Stevens et al. (2006) for the lack of association between wealth of social 
capital and more localised coverage by the media in Minnesota, ‘one of the 
nation’s “social capital capitals”’ (p.61). More generally, explorations of 
television as an explanatory factor in the (decline of) social capital pay little 
attention to its commercial imperatives and corporate origins.
13. For the (contextualised) significance of class for any study of social capital, see 
Anderson and Miller (2003) and Pichler and Wallace (2009).
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14. Their answer is that social capital is, ‘the god-thing in a secular power-religion, 
the one true measure into which we can empty all that is complex and puzzling, 
the embodiment of all our bravest ambitions and secret desires for a society 
that reflects our very own values’ (p.206).
15. Significantly, Putnam and Goss (2002, p.5) claim, totally erroneously, that 
‘Hanifan’s account of social capital anticipated virtually all of the crucial 
elements of later interpretations of this concept, but his conceptual invention 
apparently attracted no notice from other social commentators’.
16. On Austin (and social capital), see also Gabrielson (2006), who notes, however, 
that ‘[l]ike many progressives, Austin’s theory weaves together arguments for 
democratic inclusion and justifications of racial and class discrimination’ 
(p.661).
17. Interestingly, Pinnock (2007) cites Dubé et al. and suggests that the weakness in 
current usage of social capital reflects its failure to have introduced the physical 
practices and facilities that underpin it.
18. See Idahosa and Shenton (2006, p.71), who cite Marx’s use of social for 
aggregate capital, observing that ‘Coleman’s crediting of Loury as the originator 
of the concept of social capital was, of course, wildly erroneous for the simple 
reason that it has long been a staple of classical political economy’. 
19. A fascinating example is provided unwittingly by Malinvaud (2003) in his 
discussion of Wicksell’s contribution to neoclassical capital theory. He finds 
that Wicksell was unable to reconcile the marginal product of (social) capital 
as a whole with the multiplicity of marginal products of individual capitals 
(in the absence of the real rate of interest as its price in inter-temporal general 
equilibrium). 
20. See also Smith and Kulynych (2002b).
21. Until Godechot (2008), who offers a fascinating account of the social capital of 
a financial team able to threaten departure from a major bank in order to be able 
to leverage higher compensation. Heads of dealing rooms are seen as internal 
subcontractors for their teams, following Marglin (What Do Bosses Do?), 
Schumpeter (creative destruction), and Marx (revolutionising the instruments 
of production, although, in this case, exchange), allowing for an account of 
the conflicts between individualism as a goal and the collectivism required 
to achieve it, given the individual and team knowledge attached to financial 
trading. Social capital meets insider trading! See also McNamee and Miller 
(2004, pp.84–7) who, in the context of the ‘meritocracy myth’, point to the 
glass ceiling and insider knowledge in the stock market as well as the negative 
effects of social (and cultural) capital in relation to nepotism, fitting in social 
climbing and snobbery, which, together with oil networks, led to the presidency 
of George Walker Bush!
22. Cited in Oishi (2001, p.23). 
chapter 4
 1. See also Rothstein (2000).
 2. See Stein (2001) for the idea of social capital as a black box that needs to be 
filled by being placed in the context of institutions.
 3. See Chapter 8 for more on social capital and game theory. 
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 4. Similarly, for Anderson and Jack (2002), who interviewed three entrepreneurs 
about the operation of their businesses, social capital is both ‘glue and lubricant’, 
a process of forming structures with their own etiquette.
 5. See Taylor and Leonard (2002) for a series of case studies in different countries 
examining social capital in the context of the embeddedness of local enterprise. 
They conclude that the power to exclude is important in defining success and 
failure.
 6. See also Allen (2006, p.98) who, in the context of community-based disaster 
preparedness, concludes that, ‘social capital cannot be created or shaped 
independently of structured inequalities and the political agendas of local and 
external actors’.
 7. By way of contrast, for an outstanding study of the changing nature, meaning 
and gendered personnel of a market (for illegal foreign exchange in Kinshasa), 
see De Herdt (2002).
 8. I hesitate to engage with these socially constructed regressions, but the absence 
of significant gender effects may be due to simple self-selection bias in a market 
context – necessarily disadvantaged women who do survive as traders may 
enjoy some compensating but unobserved ‘advantage’ – the most obvious (and 
most observed in the critical literature) being to gain it through conformity to 
oppressive gender roles. Thus Friedemann-Sánchez (2006) finds that Colombian 
female flower producers do better the more social capital they have, but this is 
seen as a way of avoiding male domination (Friedemann-Sánchez is oblivious 
to the irony that the latter may itself be a form of social capital).
 9. See also Lyons and Snoxell (2005), who observe that informal traders use 
different social capital by gender, and so warrant different policies, but without 
questioning whether this may consolidate undesirable gendered relations.
10. Jackson (2000, p.17) raises the question of whether men are engaging in ‘leisured 
decadence’ or ‘diversifying into non-agricultural work’ in so far as social capital 
promotes women’s taking over their roles in agricultural labour.
11. Note that for Fonchingong (2006, p.137), the success of social capital as 
communitarian networks in advancing women’s position in Cameroon 
grasslands ‘hinges on efforts at erasing cultural stereotypes that project women 
as domestic workers, improving literacy, increased access to productive resources 
especially land, direct support to women’s agricultural activity and improved 
rural infrastructure (roads, water supply, and electricity) that is compromising 
women’s participation and empowerment drive’. With these preconditions for 
the success of social capital, it is arguable whether it would then be needed!
12. See also Ghazali (2003) for social capital and micro-credit (kut) in Penang, 
including the downside, especially for women; Takhar (2006) for gender 
blindness of social capital, in the context of its tension with, and diverse 
effects in the presence of, ‘multiculturalism’; and Hope Cheong (2006) for 
the limitations of social capital’s impact upon impoverished ethnic minority 
families.
13. It has long been noted that social capital is seen by corporate capital as a 
preferred solution to its own downsizing and the impact this has on local 
economic and social decline.
14. See Chapter 7 for women in business.
15. See also Park (2007), who finds for South Korean academic biochemists that 
formal rules for advancement, far from leveling the playing field, need to be 
more fully satisfied by women.
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16. Note that Idahos and Shenton (2006) give an excellent account of how the 
position adopted by Loury (1977 and 1987) on US black disadvantage derives 
from an inherited history of slavery and racism rather than from any deficiencies 
in black culture. This has been ignored by the social capital literature. Coleman 
credits Loury for introducing him to the idea of social capital.
17. See Mullis et al. (2003), Crowder and South (2003) and Caughy and O’Campo 
(2006) for the limited impact of social capital as opposed to race in explaining 
educational performance.
18. See also Foley and Hoge (2007), who emphasise the shifting meaning of ethnicity 
itself and its relationship to Americanisation. Complexity covers the geography 
and culture of ethnicity as well as its economic and non-economic aspects, 
the enormous variation among worship communities, organisational culture, 
external relations, and the different circumstances and reception of immigrants. 
Significantly, their chapter on the sources of social capital manages to mention 
the term only six times!
19. Her earlier piece (McClenaghan 2000) argued that ‘[s]ocial capital is used in 
such a way as to place the main emphasis on social cohesion; an emphasis 
which gives the analysis a profoundly functionalist and socially conservative 
bent in that it discounts community organisation and mobilisation in defence of 
citizenship rights and the political articulation of rights-based demands which 
inevitably generate conflict, in favour of activities designed to enhance social 
cohesiveness and, by implication, social control. Such an approach only serves 
to conceal and obscure the expanding social divisions incorporated within 
social capital’s sister concept, “community”’ (p.580). See also Mowbray (2005, 
p.257) on social capital as a spray-on solution to Brigadoon communities that 
has ‘facilitated a move to depoliticize social problems’.
20. See Smith (2004) on reducing faith communities and religion to social 
capital.
21. See also Alex-Assensoh (2002) for emphasis on context in understanding civil 
community engagement.
22. They might equally have referred to a ‘deficit theory syndrome’. Mitlin (2001), 
in recognising that the rise of social capital has reflected a shift of expectation 
from NGOs to civil society more generally in order to make up for ‘deficits’, 
suggests that critical issues have been abandoned, such as representativeness, 
motives, and leader dominance in community organisation. See also Everingham 
(2003), who views social capital as both capturing a mood of reaction against 
economic rationalism and also as blaming the poor for being so through social 
capital deficit. There is a corresponding need to go beyond social capital to 
understand how community is constituted and contested, without exclusively 
relying upon concepts and measurements drawn from the supposedly universal 
values of western democracies. 
23. Commenting on Putnam, Sundar (2001, p.2009) asks ‘why a country whose 
citizens are as trusting as they are claimed to be, would need to build up the 
largest nuclear arsenal in the world’.
24. See Chapter 9 for brief further discussions of social capital and each of religion, 
the Internet and the welfare state.
25. Brooks and Lewis (2001) find that low trust in government can encourage 
volunteering.
26. See Maloney and Rossteutscher (2007) for a close study of social capital as 
associationalism across six European cities. The diversity of sources and forms 
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has the paradoxical effect of leading to the almost complete absence of social 
capital even where it is supposed to be explicitly addressed. It is not mentioned 
in Maloney and Rossteutscher’s conclusion, for example, and there is no entry 
for it in the index.
27. For a more sophisticated and less politically and ideologically compromised 
version of BBI (or not), centred on the United States, see Saegert et al. (2001). 
In the introduction (by Warren, Thompson and Saegert: Warren et al. 2001), 
they BBI context, racism, power, conflict, bonding and bridging, synergy with 
financial and public institutions, culture and gender. The foreword by Putnam 
concludes: ‘comfortable Americans must summon up a more capacious sense of 
“we”, an interpretation of “our” communities and “our” children that extends 
beyond the neat front lawns of suburbia’ (p.xvi).
28. Interestingly, his own historical study of health and social capital in Britain 
appends the latter as an afterthought whose absence explains all deficiencies 
and for which New Labour Third Wayism needs to take more note. 
29. See also Bridgen (2006), who appeals to Bourdieu’s approach to social capital 
and health as a way of incorporating social stratification into the study of social 
networks. And for Flint and Rowlands (2003), housing tenure incorporates 
different forms of social, cultural, symbolic and cultural capitals, with these 
deployed to label multiple deprivation and, hence, notions of antisocial 
behaviour.
chapter 5
 1. This chapter draws in part upon Fine (2008b).
 2. The study of Dennison and Ogilvie (2007), on serfdom in Bohemia and Russia, 
deploys the notions of horizontal (communal) and vertical social capital in 
a way that is replete with reference to a coercive apparatus for internal and 
external social control and brutal extraction of surplus. They regard ‘claims 
such as those so widely advanced by the World Bank that lavishing resources 
on the social capital of horizontal community institutions will automatically 
bring beneficial economic outcomes with considerable scepticism. Such 
resources may simply be appropriated by a local oligarchy with centuries of 
expertise in profiting from collaboration with exploitive vertical hierarchies’ 
(pp.542–3). Ironically, and presumably to her horror, Ogilvie (2003) is cited 
by Meadowcraft and Pennington (2007) as a rationale for neo-liberalism’s 
rescuing of social capital from social democracy. This is because nasty, state-
supported guilds in Germany are a contrast to the ‘more liberal economies of 
the Netherlands and England’ (p.3).
 3. There is also the issue of globalisation. Does it make sense to talk of the impact 
of social capital within Russia when ‘[r]eportedly, the Russian Mafia is operating 
in Poland, Italy, and Spain’? (Varese 2004, p.148).
 4. If only. Fukuyama (2004, p.37) is lured into the definitional honey pot, ‘One of 
the weaknesses of the concept of social capital … is that there is still no agreement 
as to what it is. I will use my own definition …’ Further, he does recognise the role 
of social capital for the World Bank: ‘the failure of the Washington consensus 
was one of omission; the problem did not lie with the policies themselves … 
The problem with the Washington consensus was not that it was misdirected, 
but rather that it was incomplete. One of the ways in which it was incomplete 
was its failure to take social capital into account’ (p.34).
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 5. There is no guarantee against the McDonaldisation of history by historians. 
See the astonishing approach to the industrial revolution offered by Sunderland 
(2007, p.208), for whom ‘[t]rust changes over time and it seems likely there 
exists a trust equilibrium, a level of social capital that facilitates growth and 
social stability … As the economy accelerates, trust will continue to rise, but 
will eventually overshoot the equilibrium level and give rise to structural 
impediments that damage growth.’ And, smoothing over context: ‘Turning 
to present-day trust levels. These appear to be low and falling, and the social 
capital problems of the Victorian age are therefore arguably as relevant today 
as then’ (p.209).
 6. See Fine (1998a and 1995b) for example. Note that flexible specialisation 
(‘flec-spec’) is a natural application for the idea that the small-scale can survive, 
compete and prosper by non-market cooperation. Alongside its treatment 
of small-scale traders and finance, often involving women (see Chapter 4), 
the literature has blossomed by discovering non-market sources of market 
success. However, the blood diamonds of the New York dealers provide the 
classic starting point (again, see Chapter 4). But the flec-spec literature has 
been sluggish in embracing social capital, despite the latter’s obvious uses in 
explaining cooperation between small producers. This is probably because 
flec-spec itself emerged prior to social capital, and it has been extraordinarily 
weak in addressing such cooperation in terms other than those of commercial 
operations (as an antidote to a stylised Fordism). For a relatively early exception, 
not apparently pursued, see Bazan and Schmitz (1997), where trust is preferred 
as the missing link. And, for other examples of social capital in this context, see 
Nel et al. (2001) and Milone and Ventura (2000) for the agricultural, Bellandi 
(2001) and Molina-Morales and Martínez-Fernández (2006) for industrial 
districts (the latter for ‘relational capital’ in Valencia), Wølneberg (2002) for 
Argentina’s tanning industry supply chain, Bertolini and Giovannetti (2006) 
for agri-food industries in Modena, Molina-Morales (2005) for Spanish tiles, 
OECD (2006b) for clusters in transitional eastern Europe, and Annen (2001) 
for Pakistani manufacture of surgical instruments! See also Larance (2001) for 
the Grameen Bank. Interestingly, the flec-spec approach has now given way to 
global value chains (with global commodity chains en route). It offers another 
example of BBI as it uncomfortably attempts to handle ill-fitting case studies 
to its ideal types. Social capital has only just begun to appear (see Vasileiou 
and Morris 2006; McPhee and Wheeler 2006).
 7. Nonetheless, in explicitly asking if social capital is capital, he offers only a weak 
response (pp.243–4).
chapter 6
 1. This chapter draws upon Fine (2003c, 2007d and 2008a). 
 2. Note that the shift from the Washington to the Post-Washington Consensus, 
with social capital as conduit, is at best limited and at worst obfuscating for 
Bergeron (2003) on women, for Wong (2003) on empowerment, and for 
Robison (2004) on combating neo-liberalism.
 3. Given Woolcock’s excellent article (1998), it seems that mole’s condition three 
is operative on occasion for others, with Woolcock soon to become a leading 
social capitalist employed at the Bank.
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 4. I cannot resist pointing to the answer that might have been given by a World 
Bank ‘lead economist’, Bonnel (2000, p.849), who in discussing social capital, 
argues that ‘[r]eversing the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemics and mitigating 
its impact’ requires three sets of measures: (1) sound macroeconomic policies; 
(2) structural policy reforms; and (3) modifying further the systems of incentives 
faced by individuals. But what about HIV/AIDS?
 5. See foreword to Fine (2004b).
 6. See also the Deaton assessment of Collier and Gunning, ‘Explaining African 
Economic Performance’ (1999); and, for more detail, Fine (2008e). In response 
to the question, ‘Are the conclusions consistent with the research findings?’, it 
offers the answer, ‘No. The paper jumps to conclusions about social capital, 
while there is nothing in previous research or even in this paper that suggests 
that social capital is a major factor.’ For a corrective on social capital as the 
key (to entrepreneurship) see Meagher (2006, p.579): ‘The weakness of African 
small-firm networks does not arise from excessive state intervention or from 
perverse cultural blueprints but from state neglect and the instability of the 
wider institutional context in which these networks are embedded … where the 
state fails to contribute appropriate institutional support, strains on informal 
enterprise networks provoke a fragmentation of informal organization which 
impedes growth and exacerbates differentiation, uncertainty, and opportunism. 
This negative production environment undermines the development of collective 
efficiencies in small-firm organization and limits the formation of subcontracting 
links with the formal sector … [and] weak formal institutions and the lack of 
incorporation into the formal economic framework encourage informal firms 
and occupational associations to turn to cliental forms of economic and political 
incorporation.’
 7. These issues are taken up again in the specific context of the individual and 
trust in Chapter 8.
 8. The ambiguities are neatly expressed by D’Hernoncourt and Méon (2008) in 
terms of their subtitle, ‘Does trust increase the size of the shadow economy?’ 
The informal as well as the corrupt economies (often the same!) depend upon 
social capital as much as the formal.
 9. Note that these two authors appeal for openness and participation amongst 
those engaged in studying social capital, but essentially make no reference to 
the critical literature themselves.
10. Like many others, Grootaert and van Bastelaer see human capital as a model for 
social capital to follow, with its initial difficulties being overcome through neglect 
rather than resolution (but with no sense of the overwhelming deficiencies of 
each) (p.345). For an outstanding critique of the creation of the myth of the 
Robinson Crusoe economy, see White (1982).
11. This might be explained to some extent by the lag in getting into publication. It 
is notable that Bebbington’s continuing contributions on social capital are much 
more hedged and lacking in confidence than formerly. Bebbington (2007) might 
be thought to be a little bit late for BBBI and BBI gender as correctives. See below 
for his views on social capital and the developmental state. As late as 2002, 
Woolcock insists on ‘the ever-accumulating weight of evidence documenting 
the significance of social capital ... it allow us to rule in several decades’ worth 
of careful research by sociologists and economists on communities, networks 
and associations that, while not deploying the social capital terminology as 
such, nonetheless most certainly can and should be read as foundational work 
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in this field’ (2002, p.23). In addition, Woolcock in 2004 is leading a charge to 
have social capital installed in the vanguard of study of the social determinants 
of health (see Fine 2008e for a full account and critique).
12. Note this is also complemented by Bebbington et al. (2006) which, despite 
being later, engages much less with critics. There is every reason to believe this is 
because of forced scholarly standards on the earlier refereed journal article. 
13. Bebbington himself seems to be able to do well enough without social capital 
(2000)! His paper ‘Social Capital/Social Development/SDV’ (2002b) reveals its 
appeal for him at its height, before the subsequent decline.
14. See also Hewison (2002) and Jayasuriya and Rosser (2001).
15. Thus, Isham and Kähkönen (2002) advocate a policy of ‘no water without 
(the right amount, and pro-privatisation type of) social capital’, to reiterate, 
(p.184): ‘The allocation of investment resources for water services may need 
to be adjusted to take account of the fact that water projects are less likely to 
be effective in villages in which the level of social capital is low. Donors may 
want to avoid investing in community-based piped water systems in villages 
with low levels of social capital.’ This establishes the link between social capital 
and social engineering, something that reaches absurd proportions with the 
suggestion that mental health clinics should be located in regions of low social 
capital (Lofors and Sundquist 2007).
16. Is it a coincidence that social capital came to the fore just as the World Bank 
proposed the reallocation of billions of dollars for infrastructural funding from 
International Development Assistance (IDA), which makes concessional loans 
to governments, to the International Financial Corporation (IFC), which lends 
exclusively to the private sector? See Bayliss and Hall (2001).
17. Also omitted by BGOW is globalisation, itself generally absent from social 
capital analysis, and significant for the extent to which, unlike social capital, 
it has been won away from orthodoxy and with an economic content (Fine 
2004a).
18. Methodological individualism over political economy.
19. The problem is not quantitative versus qualitative analysis, but how to combine 
the two satisfactorily – this in general being precluded by Bank economists on 
the basis of their own often appalling quantitative analysis (see Deaton et al. 
2006 for a friendly slaughter of Bank ‘advocacy’ on this score).
20. ‘I am an economist, I can analyse anything.’ See Ferguson (2000, p.995) for a 
humorous take on economics and language, an important but flawed input to 
the economic (Collier’s) analysis of civil war, for example.
21. One of the remarkable myths propagated by social capitalists is that they 
are innovative in understanding civil society and in bringing it back into 
consideration  – whereas in reality they are selectively parasitical on, and distort, 
what has long been there. The mirror image of this myth is that economists resist 
consideration of the social – whereas in reality they are currently embracing it 
on their own terms, for which social capital has proved an ideal conduit, handed 
to them on a plate by the missionary social capitalists from other disciplines.
22. See Dannreuther and Dolfsma (2003) on the relationship between social 
capital, globalisation and the shift from the Washington to the post-Washington 
Consensus, all at the expense of the developmental state.
23. One element in this is external journal publication, where this is paradigm-
conforming. Am I right in thinking, from casual observation, that this is 
growing, possibly motivated by a wish for fluidity of position between Bank 
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and academic employment, especially amongst non-economists, for whom the 
outside academic world is somewhat more critical than within the Bank?
24. This section draws on Fine (2007d). See Smith and Kulynych (2002a) for an 
assessment of social capital as a keyword, with a history of its use as such.
25. The critique of social capital from within mainstream economics is possibly 
the least acknowledged part of my work (Fine 2001a, ch.10).
26. Significantly, Lincoln’s quote is deployed by Thomas J. Sargent in an explanation 
of rational expectations, the neo-liberal economist’s version of not fooling any 
of the people any of the time (www.econlib.org/library/enc/RationalExpecta-
tions.html, accessed 20 March 2009).
27. And the World Bank’s social capital website is both a disgrace and a barrier to 
the pursuit of knowledge, given its chaotic inclusion of anything and anyone 
as illustrative of the (usually unwitting) use of social capital (Fine 2001a, 
p.125).
28. As Deacon (2007, p.170) puts it: ‘The problem, however, for those within the 
Bank who have struggled long and hard to reform its social policies in a more 
progressive direction, is that they are working in an institution that does not 
have global legitimacy. Far better that their efforts and their money had been 
directed to the UN social agencies whose work they have undermined.’
chapter 7
 1. This draws upon the keynote address to the 2007 Critical Management Studies 
biennial conference in Manchester (Fine 2007a).
 2. For discussion of the issues involved here, see the contributions in Organization, 
vol.9, no.3, 2002.
 3. See Lee (2007) for an outstanding account of the destruction of heterodoxy 
within economics as a result of the RAE. But his comparable conclusions for 
management studies is unduly pessimistic, not least in referencing interpreta-
tions primarily from the orthodoxy itself.
 4. In a footnote to my earlier book (Fine 2001a, p.221), I describe how Nahapiet 
and Ghoshal ‘throw everything from their field into social capital, including 
a good dose of Bourdieu, to explain how social capital supports intellectual 
capital within organizations’.
 5. For an account of the potential richness of network theory, see Tindall and 
Wellman (2001).
 6. See Taylor and Leonard (2002) for critical takes on the use of embeddedness 
in industrial development; they point especially to the absence of power, place, 
time and context.
 7. Further, in the context of labour markets and harmony, for Lin et al. (2001, p.ix), 
‘[t]he principal argument is that social capital should benefit both employers 
and employees’. For more of the same gobbledygook, see Lin and Erickson 
(2008) in their appropriately ambitious ‘International Research Program’.
 8. They find any number of equilibria by outcome for firms and their locational 
dispersal.
 9. See Dovey and White (2005) for exceptional recognition that learning, creativity 
and innovation depend upon negotiating social capital as power relations.
10. But see Moerbeek and Need (2003), who offer social capital as a means by 
which networked ‘foes’ at work can impede your progress.
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11. See Meulemann (2008b) for a rare attempt to address whether social capital 
leads to empowerment at the workplace (as opposed to political participation), 
although differences in country legislation are of importance. Yet, for Rothstein 
(2001, p.222), ‘[o]f all Swedish organizations, the union movement is the one 
with the most members and that is, next only to the sports movement, activating 
most people’. For Sánchez (2007), political motives are more important than 
social capital in explaining participation in trade unions. See also Gomez et 
al. (2002), who find that youth preference for unionisation in Canada is more 
influenced by peer pressure and other family attachment (social capital) and 
concerns over workplace issues than for their parents.
12. This may also be the intent of Hean et al. (2003), who offers an otherwise bizarre 
understanding of social capital as the circuit of money capital, M–C–M'. Equally 
peculiar is the articulation of Burt and Wallerstein in Sacks et al. (2001).
13. See also Quinones and Seibel (2000).
14. See also Das (2004 and 2005).
chapter 8
 1. And, just to prove that I am not the crudest in criticism and humour involving 
Putnam, it has been suggested in light of his neglect of gender that ‘[a] feminist 
critic might ask, for example, whether Mrs Putnam is doing the washing up 
and minding the children while Mr Putnam bowls alone?’ (Witz and Marshall 
2004, p.15).
 2. Kapucu too (2006) looks to social capital as a positive factor in responding to 
9/11.
 3. As is Ichiro Kawachi, one of the leading (mainstream) scholars of the social 
determinants of health, who has actively embraced social capital and who also 
moderated the World Bank’s social capital newsletter for a time.
 4. Would you play cards with, or invite to dinner, someone with a gun? Or as 
Messner et al. (2004, p.882) put it more scientifically, on the basis of their 
own study, in critique of Putnam on crime: ‘Systematic empirical evaluations 
of the links between the multiple dimensions of social capital and violence are 
limited by the lack of adequate measures … findings show that many forms of 
social capital highlighted in the literature as having beneficial consequences for 
communities are not related to homicide rates. Two dimensions of social capital, 
social trust and social activism, do exhibit significant associations with homicide 
rates, net of other influences. However, in the latter case, the relationship is 
positive, and in both cases, simultaneous equation models suggest that these 
dimensions of social capital are consequences as well as causes of homicide. 
The results underscore the importance of examining the different dimensions 
of social capital and assessing their reciprocal relationships with homicide and 
other social outcomes.’
 5. Firearm ownership aside, Kunitz (2004, p.70) implicitly observes the impact 
of social capital through ‘the destruction of President Clinton’s plan for health 
care reform by a coalition of voluntary associations including the National Rifle 
Association, the Christian Coalition, the National Federation of Independent 
Businesses and the Health Insurance Association of America’. Muntaner (2004, 
p.675) appropriately suggests that if social capital had been dubbed social 
anarchy in view of its potentially negative effects (or social socialism because 
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it is beneficial), it would have received short shrift even though, it should be 
added, reference could be made to negative social anarchy (or socialism).
 6. The affinity between his work and Banfield’s on Italy has long been pointed 
out (Fine 2001a, pp.83–4).
 7. On Putnam and Nisbet, see also Brickner (2000).
 8. See the essays collected in Edwards et al. (2001) for critical perspectives on both 
Putnam and broader neo-Tocquevillean perspectives and applications. These 
essays also place considerable emphasis on how economic restructuring is a 
major influence on the vitality of community life. See also Lichterman (2006) 
and Mouritsen (2003, p.650); the latter claims of Putnam that ‘in four ways, 
he misses the more “political” understanding of ... republican writers, including 
his hero, Tocqueville’.
 9. See also Durlauf et al. (2005).
10. Interestingly, Durlauf perceives the popularity of social capital as a consequence 
of the limitations of conventional economic analysis, essentially its inability to 
derive the social from the individual. His own remedy, superior statistical methods 
aside, is a combination of game theory and a more rounded individualism, so 
that cooperation is not derived from self-interest alone: ‘trustworthiness means 
something quite different’ (p.262). But see Fine and Milonakis (2009) for the 
limitations of this attempt to improve upon economics.
11. I will not run over the extensive critique of his extraordinary claims for Italy; 
but note that Mutti (2000) acutely observes that Putnam on southern Italy is 
part of a long tradition of locating the region in terms of particularism, the 
exceptional that impedes development, especially familism and clientelism, 
without attention to the universals that might have been expected to promote 
its development.
12. Sander with Putnam (2006) might be considered too little too late.
13. See Boggs (2002) for Putnam’s self-serving choice of associations and movements, 
etc., and how they have engaged in politics. He also points to the complete 
neglect of corporate change, and its increasing reach into every arena of life, 
and of international agencies such as the IMF and World Bank.
14. Snyder (2002) also points to a lack of substantive politics in Putnam – who 
fought for civil liberties and economic justice, and who labelled such efforts 
communist? Is McCarthyism a form of social capital? – in which case its decline 
might be welcomed!
15. Thus, for Montero and Torcal (2006, p.339) ‘politics matter’, not least because 
‘the relationship between social capital and political disaffection varies according 
to the political context and, moreover, interacts with political factors’. Not 
surprisingly, the collection edited by Torcal and Montero (2006) is focused on 
explaining the US disaffection with politics as being much more complex than 
the decline in social capital. See also the essays in Maloney and Rossteutscher 
(2007) for European studies, in which there are many different processes 
involved in associationalism, different organisational forms and practices, no 
systematic relationship between nature of association and levels of resources and 
efficacy in action or mobilisation (including the myth that small is beautiful), 
the significance of gender, ethnicity, religion, welfare, leisure, politics, and so 
on. And, possibly most important, associations are far from being apolitical (so 
the notion of going from associational to political life is misleading) (Lelieveldt 
and Gaiani 2007, p.175), for ‘the most intense interactions seem to take place 
between socially connected, subsidized, well-funded associations and local 
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government’ (p.190). Indeed, ‘we should not consider the civic fauna to be an 
apolitical haven, but devote … much attention to differences in [associations’] 
political clout’.
16. See also Paldam and Svendsen (2004), for example.
17. He also suggests, ‘It was sometimes found useful to define capital – as Marx 
did – from another angle, namely as the inputs which share in the residual 
profit’. This, of course, is the complete antithesis of Marx, for whom capital 
embodied a social relationship of the exploitation of labour, from which a 
system of remuneration derives and in which profit is systemic not residual.
18. A rather different form of commodifying social capital is offered by Strathdee 
(2005) in the context of networks facilitating the passage of youth into 
employment in New Zealand, with network facilitators paid by results!
19. Ironically, Putnam and Goss (2002, p.8) refer to the Cambridge controversy, 
but only to highlight the diversity of social capitals, like that of its physical 
counterparts – as if this offered rather than undermined credibility! Note that 
the collection to which this is an introduction (Putnam 2002) provides, in its 
case studies of different countries, much by way of empirical refutation of 
Putnam.
20. Brooks (2005, p.1) finds that ‘[c]haritable giving appears to be a beneficial 
consequence of some types of social capital’ (p.1). But what about correlation, 
causation and omitted variables?
21. Note that Herreros (2004, pp.1–2) sees social capital as poorly defined and 
examined, and seeks to resolve this through appeal to the prisoners’ dilemma 
and assurance game (pp.48–9 and 119). But he finds it necessary to introduce 
the state as a crucial external agent to act as guarantor for the creation of social 
capital and the shifting from a vicious to a virtuous circle (p.72).
22. In this light, Roberts sees social capital as a legitimate concept, since he locates 
it at a different level of abstraction than capital as such. 
23. For an exception that proves the rule, see Everett (2008), which sees the social 
capital relationship between authors and editors in accountancy as a gift 
relation.
24. See also Hadjimichalis (2006) for the relationship between reciprocity, properly 
understood, and power.
25. Note that Newton (2006, p.82) identifies a number of synonyms for trust 
– ‘mutuality, empathy, reciprocity, civility, respect, solidarity, toleration, and 
fraternity’. Each of these points to trust’s complexity and contextual content, 
and each has the potential to change rapidly on its own and in relation to the 
others over time and circumstance. 
26. A difference is that Mauss perceives the spirit of the gift to reside in the object 
itself rather than in individuals who give and receive.
chapter 9
 1. For some exceptions across management studies, see Yli-Renko et al. (2001) on 
social capital as the knowledge to be gained through relations with customers, 
Harvey et al. (2003) on the need to be in touch with the global consumer, 
and also Menguc and Barker (2005), who claim that theirs ‘is one of the few 
studies that explores the strategic role of salespeople in creating a competitive 
advantage and links the sales management literature to the literature on the 
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RBV [Resource-Based View] of the firm and social capital/human capital theory’ 
(p.885).
 2. See Klooss (2001) for food and eating as a means to a community of inclusion 
and exclusion.
 3. For Scandinavia, see the special issue of Scandinavian Political Studies, vol.26, 
no.1, 2003. On a personal note or two, I was asked to chair the panel of 
international experts for the Finnish equivalent of the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC) for its funding programme on social capital. They 
have to have an international panel since the country is so small that all the 
academics know one another and would have difficulty in giving objective 
assessment. I saw this as a damage limitation exercise, but, just to make some 
of you scrabbling for funding feel bad, let me report that we seemed to be 
advising on handing out hundreds of thousands of euros to particular projects 
on the basis of applications that were little more than an abstract and a bunch 
of CVs. By contrast, in the United Kingdom only 40 per cent of alpha-rated 
ESRC proposals, themselves equivalent to fully fledged articles in substance 
and effort, benefit from much less generous funding. I wrote my previous book 
on social capital in Australia. At a conference there, for even challenging social 
capital’s validity in principle and use in practice, I was personally attacked for 
having ‘read too much and thought too little’. I do like to think I have been 
excessive in both respects. This was in front of a plenary audience of 500 and 
delivered by Eva Cox, a renowned feminist and labour radical, ardent promoter 
of social capital.
 4. Samal (2007) has a self-contained chapter on social capital, which does not 
appear elsewhere in the book. It acknowledges that local organisation is essential 
for natural resource management but points out that ‘modernisation and free 
play of market forces have been damaging these components of social capital’ 
(p.230).
 5. See Fine (2001c).
 6. Galab et al. (2006) appeal to ‘maternal social capital’ as a means of improving 
child nutrition in Andhra Pradesh, but conclude: ‘Higher social capital may help 
to enhance households’ access to food, uptake of health services or knowledge 
about appropriate caring practices of young children, but our initial findings 
suggest that social capital levels are unlikely to replace the need for these three 
core inputs’ (p.29).
 7. See Harrigan and El-Said (2008) for the idea that neo-liberal welfare policies have 
promoted alternative provision through the equally, if unwittingly, promoted 
medium of fundamentalist civic organisation. There is a case, of course, for a 
treatise on ‘It Ain’t Social, It Ain’t Capital, and It Ain’t the Middle East’. For a 
start, see Liverani (2007) on how the Algerian state has used social capital for 
its own internal and external purposes; and for Jamal (2007), in the context 
of Palestine and ‘centralized clientelistic settings’, associations attached to the 
governing regime incorporate high levels of trust but low levels of democracy 
and civic engagement (p.13), not least mirroring the presence of corruption 
(pp.42–3; see also pp.55–6 for further examples).
 8. Williams and de Mola (2007, p.233) report: ‘In Immokalee, churches provide 
access to new social networks that can facilitate the accumulation of social 
capital, but these networks tend to favor more established immigrants over 
migrant farmworkers and sometimes reinforce the segregation of groups 
along ethnic and regional lines. In other words, churches facilitate “bonding” 
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social capital but often neglect “bridging” social capital. In contrast, a secular 
organization, the Coalition of Immokalee Workers, is more effective in bridging 
ethnic and regional differences among immigrants and in generating “political 
capital” that seeks to affect political and social change.’
 9. Note that Scheepers et al. (2002) test for the impact of welfare regimes on social 
capital (family and neighbourhood contact) across 13 European countries, 
finding the lowest level of impact in social democratic regimes. And Hyggen 
(2006) concludes that social capital is not significant in facilitating access to 
social assistance.
10. Crime too is contextual; Hagan and Coleman (2001, p.353) observe that as a 
consequence of the war on drugs ‘half of all the parents in [US] state prisons 
are African American, and about 7 per cent percent of all African American 
children currently have a parent in prison’.
11. Tony Blair was infamous for being a gentrified resident of Islington (in which 
Barnsbury is situated) whilst eschewing the state schools in the borough for 
his own children.
12. No study of the Internet should overlook the thwarted ambitions of the free 
software movement and the presence of that overwhelming social capital 
otherwise known as Microsoft.
13. See also Selin and Pierskalla (2005). And for social capital as the way to manage 
fisheries, see OECD (2006b) and Bennett and Clerveaux (2005).
14. Heading taken from the title of Shakespeare’s play, from which we learn, ‘Some 
rise by sin, and some by virtue fall’ (ii, i).
15. See also Catts (2007), and Sabatini (2007, p.88) for a similar acknowledgement 
of ‘six main weaknesses affecting almost all the empirical studies’. Note that 
Paldam (2000) suggests that there is a trade-off between how close measurement 
of social capital is to theory and how easy it is to measure.
16. See Coulthard et al. (2002, app. B) for the 50 or so questions that make up the 
investigative content for social capital.
17. For the impact of social capital on the understanding of the social determinants 
of health, see Fine (2008e).
18. See above and also Holland et al. (2007), for example, for children as makers 
as well as beneficiaries of social capital. For Crozier and Davies (2006), the 
extended family is a form of social capital in Bangladeshi and Pakistani families, 
although its potential role has to be set against the considerably more significant 
impact of institutionalised racism. Parcel and Dufur (2001) and Stolle and 
Hooghe (2004) examine social capital as one element in the socialisation of 
children. Gillies and Lucey (2006) see older brothers and sisters as social capital 
to their younger siblings, and Schoen and Tufis (2003) posit children as a source 
of social capital to their mothers, and hence a motivation for having them, in 
or out of marriage.
19. See Blackshaw and Long (2005) and Walters (2002) for rare exceptions, with 
Coole (2009) also suggesting how social capital came to Camden Council: 
‘sticking together’, to use the expression offered by Khan and Muir (2006).
20. See also Gray et al. (2005) on the tensions between leadership and social capital 
once the notion of power is introduced. 
21. Social capital has not divided Gordon Brown and Tony Blair. For the former 
associates social capital with the Third Way and cites Tony Blair: ‘the third way 
“will build its prosperity on human and social capital”’, quoted in Prabhakar 
(2002, p.55). Blackshaw and Long (2005, p.239) report that Putnam was 
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required reading in Downing Street during the Blair years, with a social capital 
unit and with David Halpern as a senior policy adviser to the prime minister 
(Halpern 2005). See Runnymede (2005) for a rare confrontation between 
Halpern as a social capitalist and myself.
22. See also Jeffrey (2007) on the issue of NGO accumulation of social and 
cultural capital to access donor funding and local state confidence in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.
23. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Josiah_Stamp,_1st_Baron_Stamp
24. For ‘social capital’ in action in this respect, in the wake of the financial crisis, 
consider the following cartoon from the New Yorker, 9 March 2009, cited in 
Wade (2009, p.539):
Two executives sit at a conference table studying documents, and one says 
to the other, ‘These new regulations will fundamentally change the way we 
get around them’.
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